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foreword
These are exciting times for anyone in the creative economy. While much of the rest of the 
economy appears becalmed, it’s continuing to experience a heady mix of dynamic growth, 
a proliferation of new business models, as well as stunning new technologies that are 
making culture even more intense and engaging.
At Nesta, we’re fascinated to see what happens next. Our interest derives partly from 
our practical work – which stretches from digital arts to games, mentoring to media.  It 
also derives from our research, much of which aims to bring greater clarity and rigour to 
understanding the dynamics of these industries, part of a broader programme of work 
we’ve been doing on how policy can support innovation, and how, through what we call 
Plan I, the UK can follow a strategy for innovation-led growth.
This manifesto shows very clearly both what’s possible – and what could go wrong. It sets 
out both analysis and prescription, and our hope is that people will engage seriously with 
both.  
For several decades there has been much talk about digital technologies, about 
convergence, and about the transformation of old art forms, from the book to the film.   
Some of the rhetoric was overheated, and some of the predictions were slow to materialise. 
That led many to make the opposite mistake of concluding that because the revolution 
didn’t materialise immediately, it had been postponed indefinitely. 
Instead, as this report shows, the digital revolution is now very much underway, and almost 
certainly accelerating. This has obvious implications for the UK, given the remarkable scale 
of the creative economy. It demands a radical rethink of policies far beyond the traditional 
boundaries of the arts, encompassing everything from schools to competition policy.  
But I hope the analysis set out here will also be of interest in many other parts of the world 
which also want to make more of a living out of creativity. A previous generation of ideas 
and policies – many of which spread across the world over the last two decades – has run 
its course. It’s now time for a refresh. This manifesto shows how.
Geoff Mulgan 
Chief Executive of Nesta
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suMMAry
The UK’s creative economy is one of its great national strengths, historically deeply rooted 
and accounting for around one–tenth of the whole economy. It provides jobs for 2.5 million 
people, more than in financial services, advanced manufacturing or construction. This 
creative workforce has in recent years grown four times faster than the workforce as a 
whole.
Behind this success, however, lies much disruption and business uncertainty, associated 
with digital technologies. Previously profitable business models have been swept away, 
young companies from outside the UK have dominated new Internet markets, and some UK 
creative businesses have struggled to compete.
UK policymakers too have failed to keep pace with developments in North America and 
parts of Asia. But it is not too late to refresh tired policies. As the web’s inventor, Sir Tim 
Berners–Lee puts it: “the Web as I envisaged it, we have not seen it yet. The future is still so 
much bigger than the past”. On many fronts, technology continues to evolve rapidly and 
radically, guaranteeing further disturbances to established players and opportunities for 
innovators. Big Data, the Internet of Things, Wearable Computers, Assisted Creativity and 
the Maker Movement provide examples of this continued dynamic. 
This manifesto sets out ten areas in which policy refreshment is urgent. The top priorities are:
•	To ensure that the next generation of the Internet is truly open. This calls for 
contestable creative economy markets, well supervised by competition authorities 
which have the information and authority to act speedily and effectively when there are 
concerns about market abuse. 
•	All teenagers should have the opportunity to learn creative digital skills, such as 
designing apps and games, as part of a fusion in the curriculum covering technology 
and art, as well as maths, science and the humanities.
•	Policy tools designed to incentivise innovation, from tax relief to procurement rules, 
should be adapted to the needs of the creative economy. 
•	The UK’s publicly funded creative powerhouses, from the BBC to universities, arts 
organisations and museums, should make the most of the next generation of digital 
technologies. 
8  A MANIFESTO FOR THE CREATIVE ECONOMy
 SUMMARy
our ten policy recommendations are, in full:
proposAl one
the Government should adopt our proposed new definitions of the creative industries and 
the wider creative economy. these are simple, robust and recognise the central role of 
digital technologies.
proposAl two
policymakers should establish a ‘creative innovation system’ framework within which 
strategic priorities can be addressed in a coherent and effective manner.
proposAl tHree
the Government should make r&d tax relief more accessible to creative businesses. 
technology strategy Board programmes should be further broadened to address the 
needs of the creative economy. public procurement rules should be changed to open up 
opportunities for smaller digital firms. cross–disciplinary research council knowledge 
exchange initiatives should be rigorously evaluated and the lessons applied in a further 
round of investment. More international collaborations with leading research centres 
should be encouraged.
proposAl four
local policymakers should observe our seven–point guide for developing creative 
clusters.
proposAl fIve
Government should ensure that its generic business finance schemes do not discriminate 
against creative businesses, and that regulations help the development of financial 
Internet platforms (such as crowdfunding sites). Absent hard evidence on their efficacy, 
government should resist introducing new sector–specific finance programmes. A higher 
priority is to coordinate the collection and publication of investor–friendly data through 
the creative Industries council, thus supporting the development of a thicker market for 
risk finance.
proposAl sIx
the treasury and the dcMs should undertake a broad–based assessment of the value 
of public arts and cultural spending in the uk, drawing upon similar work on the natural 
environment and the cultural value project of the Arts and Humanities research council. 
funding decisions should be justified in the light of criteria that emerge from this work. 
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proposAl seven
funders should incentivise experimentation with digital technologies by arts and 
cultural organisations and allocate a sustained percentage of their resources to digital 
r&d, ensuring that the evidence arising from this work is openly shared. under its new 
leadership, the BBc should publish in 2013 a strategy to reflect its digital public purpose 
in the period to 2018, not least through the ambitious vehicle of its digital public space 
initiative.
proposAl eIGHt
ofcom should be given powers to gather information in all Internet markets in order to 
maximise the chances of sound and timely judgments about the emergence of potentially 
abusive market power and other market concerns (an ‘early warning system’). ofcom 
should contribute a regularly updated strategic overview of these issues, working 
closely with the Information commissioner’s office, the Intellectual property office, 
the competition and Markets Authority and other relevant agencies. ofcom’s remit 
should be broadened to advise the Government on the actions needed to ensure the uk 
enjoys a flourishing, open Internet, balancing the interests of consumers and citizens 
and committed to supporting innovation and growth. these changes should be a central 
feature in any communications Bill planned for 2013/14.
proposAl nIne
uk copyright rules and exceptions should be re–balanced, along the lines proposed by 
the uk Government, and also at the european level as part of the drive for a european 
digital single Market. A new mechanism for enabling vastly increased and more efficient 
rights licensing transactions (through the proposed copyright Hub) should be further 
developed during 2013, again with potential european replication.
proposAl ten
Governments across the uk should make a schools digital pledge, designed to ensure 
that the school curriculum, including its representation in the english Baccalaureate, 
brings together art, design, technology and computer science and that young people 
are able to enjoy greater opportunities to work creatively with technologies, both 
in and out of school. steps should also be taken to address the disconnect between 
what uk creative businesses need from graduates and what universities are teaching 
them. Measures to improve the quality of graduate employment data made available 
to prospective applicants for creative courses (including industry–approved course 
kitemarks) should be extended.
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1 wHy tHIs MAnIfesto? wHy now?
The goal of this manifesto is to identify what policymakers, educators, businesses and 
regulators need to do to ensure that the UK’s creative economy thrives in the coming 
decade. This important part of the UK’s economy has a considerable record of success. 
According to our new definitions and estimates, the creative economy employs 2.5 million 
people (greater than financial services, advanced manufacturing and construction) and 
accounts for at least 9.7 per cent of the UK’s Gross Value Added. 
This success reflects an outstanding tradition in creative content, and a wealth of talent in 
Britain’s creative people and entrepreneurs, underpinned by natural advantages such as the 
global reach of the English language. It also reflects supportive public policies, including 
a long–established commitment to the arts and cultural sector and a well–resourced and 
adaptive model of public service broadcasting. Policymakers in the UK cottoned on early 
to the contribution that the creative industries make to the economy, and their interest has 
been widely studied and copied around the world. 
We believe, however, that this success is now at risk. The ubiquitous digital communications 
technologies which have emerged in the last 15 to 20 years present an epochal challenge 
to the business models of the UK’s creative businesses threatening to make obsolete the 
policies and institutions that have been vital to past success. The reaction of policymakers 
and creative businesses to these disruptive shifts has so far been uncertain. 
This uncertainty of response has been most striking in the UK’s resistance to the necessary 
adaptation of copyright law to digital realities. But it extends more broadly into the design 
of policies to support R&D; to how the creative economy is taxed and how it is financed; 
to the response of the subsidised arts and cultural sector to digital technologies; to the 
regulation of competition; and to the design of the school curriculum. 
The prevailing rhetoric of this debate, amplified by the campaigns of lobbyists on all 
sides, has often put technology companies and creative businesses at loggerheads with 
each other, when instead the situation calls for well supervised, contestable markets that 
respond to changed circumstances and facilitate innovation. In this manifesto, we argue 
that this conflict creates a drag on our creative industries and, increasingly, upon the wider 
creative economy. Given the unusually high importance of these sectors to UK jobs and 
prosperity, this is not a price the UK can afford to pay. 
The creative economy is one of the few industrial areas where the UK has a credible claim 
to be world–leading. This leadership position cannot be taken for granted, as we know 
from such positions lost in the automotive industry in the 1960s,1 computing in the post–
war period2 and the chemicals industry in the third quarter of the 19th century.3 In all these 
cases, a more accurate assessment of strengths and weaknesses and a more systematic 
response might have increased the chances of a better outcome. We set out, therefore, a 
new policy agenda to sustain the UK’s creative economy in the next decade, based on a 
more constructive relationship between technology companies and creative businesses, 
and on grounded definitions and data revised for the digital era.
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
11  A MANIFESTO FOR THE CREATIVE ECONOMy
 WHy THIS MANIFESTO? WHy NOW?
1. the new industrial revolution 
The rapid diffusion of information and communication technologies, most prominently the 
Internet, is transforming modern economies and societies, threatening some established 
creative businesses, such as newspapers, and massively disrupting others, like those in the 
recorded music industry.4,5 Meanwhile, the biggest winners are digital, American companies 
focused upon either distribution or devices: Google, Facebook, Amazon and Apple.
you could say this pitch for a UK creative economy policy refresh comes too late, as the 
Internet is already approaching its third decade of global disruption, but that would not be 
right. The ICT revolution is not yet half done.6 As the web’s inventor, Sir Tim Berners–Lee 
puts it, “the Web as I envisaged it, we have not seen it yet. The future is still so much bigger 
than the past.”7 
In these circumstances, the UK’s creative economy has as good a chance as almost any 
country’s of doing well. Its strengths include: a long track record of creative excellence 
backed by public funding; a decent tradition of technology creation; diverse and dynamic 
cities housing world–class cultural institutions (most obviously, but not only, London); 
a public that is amongst the world’s most sophisticated in its use of digital technology; 
strong, long–established and diverse corporate players in digital, such as BSkyB, WPP, the 
Open University and Pearson, and a start–up ecosystem ranked top in Europe (though 
seventh in the world) according to Startup Genome.8 What we do not have is a policy 
stance towards the creative economy which is truly fit for this stage in the digital era. 
This matters because the Internet stakes are so high. The Boston Consulting Group thinks 
that the Internet Economy of the G–20 group of countries will be worth $4.2 trillion in 
2016.9 Booz claims that ‘universal digitisation’ would have been worth an additional £63 
billion to UK GDP in 2011.10 McKinsey says that the Internet contributed a tenth of all 
economic growth in the G–8 countries over the 15 years to 2009.11 Copenhagen Economics 
says the completion of Europe’s Digital Single Market is as economically significant today 
as the achievement of the original EU single market, which underpinned the continent’s 
prosperity for a generation.12 
The ultra–rapid speed of Internet–enabled smart phones, and the growth of innovative 
broadband providers like B4RN is circumventing the slowness of incumbent 
telecommunications firms in rolling out ‘fibre in the ground’, and forcing them to offer 
competitive products. In emerging markets, mobile phones not computers are the gateway 
into the Internet. In Europe and North America, those who suffer ‘digital exclusion’, usually 
meaning lack of regular access to the Internet, remain significant though in a diminishing 
minority: roughly 20 per cent of the population.13 Although there are ‘dark sides’ to the 
Internet – including fears about loss of privacy, cyber security, illicit file sharing and 
uncontrolled access to undesirable content – most governments have concluded that they 
need to design policy to encourage the benign effects of the Internet upon innovation and 
economic growth, whilst mitigating the risks.
So, even in tough economic times, political leaders show willingness to invest in broadband 
infrastructure because of the high returns on offer.14 The average impact of broadband on 
annual GDP growth in the Euro–15 countries between 2002 and 2007 has been estimated 
at 0.6 per cent, accounting for almost 17 per cent of total growth over this period.15 A ten 
percentage point increase in broadband penetration between 1999 and 2007 is judged to 
have raised annual per capita growth between 0.9 and 1.5 per cent in OECD countries.16 
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What makes new information and communications technologies so economically powerful? 
The answer is that their impacts are felt everywhere. Their pervasiveness is why economists 
consider them one of a small number of ‘general purpose technologies’ – like steam 
power and electricity – that change entire economic growth trajectories in industries 
that use them.17 The Internet, one such information and communications technology, has 
created unprecedented opportunities for more distributed forms of organisation and 
open collaboration throughout the economy in areas as wide as retailing (eBay), software 
(GNU/Linux), travel (TripAdvisor), finance (Kickstarter), and manufacturing (the Maker 
Movement).18, 19 
But a successful digital economy requires much more than investment in broadband pipes: 
it also calls for investment in new skills, the re–engineering of production processes and 
new business models to create and capture value. We see this in play on many fronts: the 
existence of widespread computer programming skills shortages in the UK workforce;20 
the trend towards outsourcing corporate functions in industries like banking and retail; the 
global reconfiguring of logistics chains (the Post Office) and the hollowing out of British 
high streets (Jessops, HMV) while e–commerce booms. 
Beyond the realm of economics, the Internet’s disruption to social patterns is equally 
extensive; visible in how we stay in touch with friends and family, participate in 
communities of place and interest, and mobilise politically. Here too, cherished norms of 
behaviour are challenged, as new opportunities unfold. 
We know how far–reaching the economic transformations wrought by disruptive 
technologies can be. Japan’s once mighty consumer electronics industry sector is a current 
example: profitability has crashed, competitive edge has been lost.21 Britain invented 
synthetic dye and modern steelmaking in the 1850s, but by 1900 had yielded its early lead 
in the chemicals and steel industries to Germany and the US.22 
2. Impact on the creative economy
Today, the creative industries operate in a technology landscape changed beyond 
recognition since 1998 when the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) first 
grouped together 13 business sectors whose connections had hitherto not been recognised 
by policy. 
The average user in the UK spends almost a full day of each month online,23 and the 
advertisers who traditionally financed news and entertainment production have followed 
her there: in 2009, the UK was the first country in the world where Internet advertising 
overtook advertising in other media, reaching £4.8 billion in 2011.24 Almost six in ten own 
smart phones (second only to Spain) and the UK leads the world in digital radio and 
digital video recorder ownership too. Almost a quarter of UK Internet users claim to access 
TV online every week, higher than any other country except China (where broadband 
penetration is, however, much lower).25 One of the world’s biggest companies by market 
capitalisation, Apple, makes market–leading gadgets, but is also a leader in distributing 
digital creative content. The second and third most popular websites in the UK – Facebook 
and youTube (after Google Search) – help their users share and navigate this content.26 
In some cases, the rise of digital has been accompanied by a severe decline in analogue 
formats. This is strikingly the case in news, where, in the UK, all the main newspapers 
have suffered big reductions in print circulation and many smaller titles have disappeared 
entirely. In music, sales of physical formats such as CDs and vinyl have for the first time 
been overtaken by digital revenues.27 In film, the disruption is visible in the demise of bricks 
and mortar rental outfits and in mail–order DVD rental, which is now forced to compete, in 
the UK, with video–on–demand services from the likes of Netflix UK, Lovefilm, Blinkbox and 
BSkyB’s Now TV. 
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That this digital ‘gale of creative destruction’28 has struck the creative industries particularly 
hard is not surprising – many creative businesses produce and sell information goods that 
can be easily manipulated, distributed and stored using information and communication 
technologies. With some obvious exceptions, such as designer fashion, creative goods 
are easy to codify into bits. Digital technologies also give firms greater opportunities to 
target their products and services to consumers, a boon for innovative creative producers 
wanting to tap the public’s desire for personalised experiences. They also afford artists new 
ways of expressing their personal visions, of differentiating their work from others, often 
through new, multi–media and multi–platform approaches. 
New technologies have also changed the way we consume, share and talk about creative 
content via Internet social media platforms such as Facebook. Music and other live 
performance arts are regularly streamed on platforms like The Guardian Online and 
broadcast to digital cinemas and even museums and art galleries are following suit. The 
social circles in which we discuss and share ideas, and through which we discover news, 
media and cultural content, have greatly expanded and yet become more connected.29 
At the same time, the boundaries between creative supply and demand have blurred, with 
the Internet now emerging as a mass–empowerment device for connecting individuals and 
businesses to a vast, global toolkit and repository of knowledge (Wikipedia, Khan Academy 
and, more recently, Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs)). Users, hobbyists and 
amateurs, who only a few years ago would have been passive consumers, nowadays upload 
one hour of video content to youTube every second. In the UK, the popularity of youTube 
explains why the average time spent on video–sharing sites increased by 43 per cent in the 
year to March 2012.30 In the US, the mobile usage of photo–sharing app Instagram overtook 
Twitter in August 2012.31 Crowdsourcing platforms such as OpenStreetMap, TopCoder and 
Kaggle show different ways in which the Internet democratises the domain of expertise and 
creativity. Objects with Internet connections (the ‘Internet of Things’), along with emerging 
technologies such as 3D printing, promise to transform craft and manufacturing.32 
3. Innovation and growth in the uk’s creative economy
This torrent of change presents UK creative businesses with a bewildering array of 
innovation opportunities, sometimes obscured by a blizzard of threats to existing business 
models. Digitisation lowers most costs of production and of reaching new markets – 
including in emerging economies – where increasingly affluent and connected audiences 
demand more creative goods and services.33 It has generated entirely new media forms, 
such as online video games. It creates untold opportunities for preserving and providing 
greater access to the UK’s cultural heritage. Digital distribution channels, in theory at least, 
reduce the UK’s reliance on global ‘gatekeepers’ for the financing and marketing of creative 
productions, a problem for UK creative firms traditionally better at creating value than at 
capturing it.34 This suggests that the Internet could help UK creative businesses overcome 
the traditional constraints on their scalability. As the UK economy struggles to grow out of 
its second dip into recession – with the worst five–year growth rate in peacetime since the 
1920s35 – it is more important than ever to ensure that the UK’s creative industries are able 
to exploit all of these new growth opportunities. The Government has acknowledged this 
by including them in its Plan for Growth.36 
In this manifesto, we seek to define a clear framework for policy, based on a simplified 
definition of the creative industries as “those sectors which specialise in the use of creative 
talent for commercial purposes.”37 But the creativity which drives these industries is 
also critical for many other parts of the economy.38 This arises from growing pressure to 
differentiate products and services from international competitors, deploying aesthetic 
and symbolic expressions of quality (such as design, brand and cultural association)39 
which appear to be increasingly important to consumers and businesses. This is what we 
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and others mean by the creative economy, whose activities we define more generally as 
involving “the use of creative talent for commercial purposes.” 
The creative industries have a central position in this creative economy, because they 
specialise in creative activities, but also because they supply other sectors with creative 
inputs that increase innovation and productivity.40 The past decade has seen businesses 
across the UK economy significantly increase their investments in creative intangible 
assets like design, software and advertising: between them, these categories accounted for 
over 40 per cent of overall investment in intangibles in 2009, compared with R&D which 
accounted for just 13 per cent.41 
In these circumstances, we might have expected the historical strengths of the UK’s 
creative industries to support a comfortable, even triumphant transition to digital markets 
and business models. But this has not been so: newer and smaller creative businesses in 
particular express their frustration with policies with regard to the issues addressed in 
this manifesto: education (visual effects), access to finance (music), intellectual property 
(archives), competition (book publishers) and infrastructure (video games). 
Others’ frustrations are also surely explained in part by the well–known ‘Innovator’s 
Dilemma,’42 which shows that past success generates inertias that obstruct adaptation 
to the new. In the music, film and now book publishing industries worldwide, some 
established players have resisted the adoption of new technologies where these could 
jeopardise established revenue streams or they have sought to retain or establish rules for 
accessing digital content via new technologies (such as release windows and encryption) 
which have often not made sense to consumers, who are increasingly accustomed to 
instant online purchase and wide open international transactions. Music is an often cited 
example, which tried to constrain the emergence of first recording and then a wave of 
copying technologies, culminating in digital distribution on the Internet, with its associated 
problems of rights piracy.43 
The fear of cannibalising established revenue streams, while sometimes well founded,44 
can undermine willingness to experiment with new business models. In the policy arena, 
incumbents’ resistance to change also encourages attempts at regulatory capture, most 
evident in policymakers’ traditional hostility to flexibility in the Intellectual Property 
Regime, which is needed to reflect changing consumer expectations and practices and to 
prevent copyright from creating barriers to innovation in other parts of the economy, such 
as medical and other scientific research.45 
This conservatism, we argue, is one of the reasons why UK policymakers have struggled 
to respond coherently or sufficiently to the transformations produced by information and 
communications technologies and the Internet: unclear whether the policy priority is the 
Creative Industries (Creative Britain, 2008),46 the Creative Economy (Cox Review, 2005)47 
or the Digital Economy (Digital Britain, 2009).48 There has, over time, been too ambivalent 
an attitude towards business–facing creative sectors like software, design and advertising 
and an unwillingness to adapt mainstream innovation and growth incentives, such as the 
R&D tax credit, to the needs of high–tech creative industries.49 It is also reflected in a public 
debate which pits the American born–digital content distributors (especially Google and 
Amazon) as the enemy of UK creative industries when the truth is that the fortunes of 
these businesses are inextricably intertwined. 
Meanwhile, the UK has an education system which promotes STEM (Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Maths), not a multi–disciplinary mix of STEAM,50 skills, and which up 
until now has gravely neglected the extensive demand within the changing creative 
economy for computer programming skills. On the whole, politicians and policymakers in 
the UK often appear insecure about whether to embrace the Internet (with its prospect of 
enhanced innovation and growth) or to recoil from it (illicit file sharing, loss of privacy and 
domination by American business giants). 
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In recent years, the confusion arising from this ambiguity has become more marked 
and more damaging. It is visible in the DCMS’s decision in 2011 to drop software from its 
classification of the creative industries, and in its lack of remit to frame policy with a view 
to stimulating the wider creative economy.51 It is there in the chaotic nature of the debate 
about the education and skills needs of the UK’s creative economy, which has yielded an 
English Baccalaureate which will (following pressure) include computer science but which 
excludes art and design & technology; and which struggles on many fronts to respond to 
the scale of inter–disciplinarity demanded in the digital age. It has made us too cautious 
about empowering our communications regulator, Ofcom to evaluate incipient competition 
issues in fast–changing digital markets. And it is most striking of all in the acrimonious 
arguments about copyright between rights holders and technology companies, where UK 
governments have, traditionally, taken a highly defensive stance, making choices such as a 
succession of term extensions that disregard hard economic evidence.52 
This pattern of behaviour, we believe, weakens both the capacities and incentives of 
UK businesses to innovate and so threatens the future contribution of the UK’s creative 
economy. When we look at its digital capabilities, while there are the clear strengths that 
we have noted, there are critical areas where they are lacking. For example, there are no 
UK companies in the current crop of dominant Internet platforms that are today capturing 
so much economic value in the creative economy. Few UK content businesses have so 
far been able to fulfil the promise of the ‘long tail’ and build global digital distribution 
operations while retaining their independence. The UK has been unable to exploit its 
world–renowned archives of English language content, despite the admired strength of 
its cultural institutions, such the BBC and the British Library. And even in areas like video 
games, where the UK took an early lead in the creative economy, this too has slipped. 
4. our manifesto
In short, the UK’s creative economy remains richly creative, but it faces an innovation 
problem. Or to put it another way, the UK’s creative businesses risk failing to make the 
most of their underlying creativity if they are unable to adapt their business practices and 
structures to the possibilities and constraints of new technologies. What can be done? 
The starting point is to ensure that the UK offers an environment to spur the kind of 
innovation UK creative businesses need to undertake. The Government’s job is to set the 
right framework for growth. This includes contestable creative markets where transactions 
costs are low and the rewards to innovation are high. To enable this there must be a 
refreshed regulatory regime, which includes improved arrangements for intellectual 
property. The competition authorities, currently undergoing a major re–shape in the UK, 
have to be empowered to play a more effective and agile role.
Government must do what it is able to do to ensure that the UK’s most innovative 
businesses – including the start–ups where the most disruptive innovations will come from 
– have access to the risk capital they need to experiment and grow. Careful consideration 
must also be given to where public investments through institutions like the BBC, the 
Technology Strategy Board and higher education institutions such as the Open University 
can support the development of UK–based global Internet platforms. Given the strength 
of its creative content and service businesses, the UK should also push for open and 
accessible platforms where the risks of market abuse by gatekeepers are lower.53 
A front–rank creative economy must also have front–rank broadband infrastructure, an 
argument which has been well rehearsed elsewhere,54 so we do not discuss it in detail in 
this manifesto, but it forms an important element in our view of what is needed. We also 
need to work harder at understanding and maximising the leverage that exists between the 
UK’s strong publicly funded arts and cultural sector and the creative economy and the role 
that digital technologies can play in this.55 
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Cluster development policies in the devolved and regional economies must be prioritised 
on growing industrial clusters that fuse creativity and digital technologies.56 The 
Government also needs to invest in the skills and talent of the creative people on whom the 
sector depends, investing not just in STEM knowledge but in art, design & technology. 
In this manifesto, we set out ten clear recommendations which, if acted on, will 
substantially improve the innovation and growth prospects of the UK’s creative economy. 
These recommendations cover a range of themes, some of which are the responsibility of 
the UK Government, while others are the responsibility of the devolved administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The policy principles that we identify are applicable 
across the whole of the UK, but the specific ways in which these principles might be 
embraced may differ in the devolved nations, particularly where differences in policy and 
practice already exist. Where possible, we have sought to reflect these nuances. 
The independence referendum planned for Scotland in 2014 may bring major constitutional 
change to that part of the UK, raising a multitude of policy questions for the creative 
industries across areas such as broadcasting, communications, fiscal policy and 
competition policy. While there is an urgent need for informed debate on these questions, 
this manifesto is not the place for that. We do not aim to cover every issue in detail, but to 
establish the right direction for policy in every part of the UK. It is also the case that many 
of the ideas promoted in this manifesto are as relevant for the whole of the European Union 
as for the UK; not least because UK law in areas such as communications, broadcasting, 
competition and intellectual property is framed at the European level. We take a number 
of opportunities to show where our proposals potentially extend to this pan–European 
context, though we acknowledge the potential impact of the current political debate about 
the UK’s relationship with the European Union upon these matters.
If the course we recommend is followed, the UK will be able to exploit more effectively 
the opportunities that digital technologies and the Internet afford. That way, the UK’s 
creative content and service businesses will be well placed to compete in global digital 
markets where we will see continued rapid growth. The stark alternative is a relative loss of 
competitive position. 
If we respond vigorously to this challenge, the UK should increase its global market share: 
building new markets in Asia and the Americas and fending off competition globally from 
their lower cost exporters. It may even help make the UK a possible home to whatever 
small legion of new enterprises snaps at the heels of currently dominant Internet platforms 
like Google, Apple, Amazon and Facebook in the course of the next decade. Perhaps more 
important, it will ensure that one of the few sectors of the economy where the UK has a 
leading position internationally will continue to thrive, creating more high–quality jobs and 
making greater contributions to economic value added. 
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2 How creAtIve BrItAIn lost Its wAy
1. Creative Britain
In the late 1990s, the UK pioneered57 an approach to supporting its creative industries. 
Although viewed by critics to the left of the Blair Government as yet another example of 
the forward march of neo–liberal marketisation and by others as involving more rhetoric 
(‘Cool Britannia’) than substance, the ‘Creative Britain’ narrative generated a policy 
paradigm which has been studied if not copied all over the world58 and which has been 
characterised as a highly effective ‘policy brand’.59 The simple power of the ‘creative island’ 
story was re–illustrated in Danny Boyle’s acclaimed opening ceremony for the 2012 London 
Olympic Games.
This chapter considers the history of the Creative Britain project, from its political inception 
in 1997 to the present day, primarily with a view to identifying those risks to its further 
success which have emerged in recent years. We highlight points worth noting, whether 
these be visionary (the value of bold and motivational leadership) or cautionary (the risk of 
regulatory capture or incoherent policy). Without a grasp of this history, policymakers risk 
repeating its errors.
The 1998 Creative Britain book (in structure, an edited collection of speeches by the 
then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Chris Smith) began with a visionary 
quotation from William Blake and continued:
“This book is about creativity. It is about the cultural ferment and imaginative heights 
to which creativity leads, the enormous impact that both creativity and culture have 
on society and the growing importance to the modern economy of Britain of all those 
activities and industries that spring from the creative impulse. And it is about the 
implications of all these things for the development of public policy, and the work of 
government.”60 
From this, it was clear that the project had aspirations well beyond the obvious core 
territory of the arts and media, extending into design and even science, medicine and 
engineering; it spoke to the role of creativity throughout an emerging ‘post–industrial’ 
UK creative economy, more dependent upon knowledge than natural resources or 
manufacturing skills, and set in a rapidly globalising context.61 Box 2.1 reproduces the 
book’s Contents page.
In parallel, however, Creative Britain also initiated a more workaday ‘mapping’ of creative 
industries, defined as comprising 13 creative content sub–sectors, alphabetically: 
advertising, architecture, art and antiques, computer games, crafts, design, designer 
fashion, film, music, performing arts, publishing, software and television and radio. 
It would be the role of the Government to ensure that these sectors were treated seriously 
as contributors to the national economy as well as essential to the fabric of the UK’s 
cultural life. From the start the mapping exercise acknowledged that “there was no 
historical, and little current, data available”62 to support this exercise.
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This early tension between high–level statements of vision and problematic quantification 
of facts has persisted to the present day. In Chapter Three of this manifesto we set out new 
thinking on data and boundary definitions designed to support a more coherent approach 
to policy development; in this chapter, we follow the flow of events. 
The 1997 manifesto pointed to a bundle of inspirations and motivations for Creative Britain:
•	A political narrative of ‘modernisation’, reflected in Tony Blair’s re–naming of his party 
as ‘New Labour’, committed to a modernised UK economy equal to the demands and 
opportunities of globalisation. The Department of Heritage was re–branded as the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport and invited to collaborate closely with the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which would itself be subject to a number of 
re–badgings in the subsequent 15 years.63 
•	The legacy values of Victorian and Edwardian social and communitarian philosophy, 
in particular the ideas of William Morris and John Ruskin (‘useful beauty’) along with 
Keynes’s forthright advocacy for an Arts Council. This provided a policy context for 
restoring free entry to museums and galleries; along with the diversion of funds from 
the National Lottery, established in 1994, to create the National Endowment for Science, 
Technology and the Arts, which Chris Smith said (presciently) would be “about pulling 
down the artificial barriers between science, technology and the arts, because in the 
worlds of the new design techniques and multimedia and digitised images such barriers 
are becoming meaningless as well as counter–productive.”64 
•	A recognition that rapidly emerging digital communications technologies called for 
substantial infrastructure investment, along with radically re–designed regulation. 
In December 2003, Ofcom took the place of five regulators in broadcasting, 
telecommunications and radio spectrum. Answerable jointly to the DCMS and the DTI, 
Ofcom’s focus would be broadcasting and telecommunications, rather than the Creative 
Britain project as a whole, though the overlap between Ofcom’s mission and the pursuit 
of Creative Britain would become more obvious in the early years of the new millennium 
as digital communications technologies became pervasive. 
Box 2.1: contents page for Creative Britain, 1998 
1. Cultural Value: the Creative Industries in Britain.
2. Only Connect: Culture and our Sense of Identity.
3. A Vision for the Arts.
4. All the World’s a Stage: Culture, Business and Society.
5. The World is your Oyster: the Information Society and the Role of Public 
Libraries.
6. Past Present: the importance of World Heritage.
7. In a Great Tradition: The British Music Industry.
8. Making Movies: the State of the UK Film Industry.
9. Pennies from Heaven: Public Broadcasting in the Digital Age.
10. Living in the Real World: Access to Intellectual Property.
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2. what about the Internet?
The importance of new communications technologies in the Creative Britain concept was 
clear from the outset, revealing continuities with earlier paradigms of productivity–fuelled 
economic regeneration enabled by computers and other electronic devices.65 From a 
critical perspective, this modernising fusion of culture and electronics was seen as an 
“attempt to capture the current prestige of this theory of innovation… for a sector and a 
group of workers to whom it does not really apply.”66
By 1997, the threat to the broadcasting barons of multi–channel television delivered by new 
mechanisms, such as cable and satellite, was clear, as was the commitment of liberalising 
governments around the world to the privatisation of the telecommunications sector. 
Much less clear, in the pages of Creative Britain, was the significance in this unfolding 
drama of the Internet. Despite clunky dial–up connectivity, there was by March 2000 
enough heat to inflate the ‘dotcom bubble’. yet, Creative Britain’s chapter on the music 
industry does not mention the Internet, noting that “the toughest challenge facing the 
music industry is CD piracy,” said to be costing globally $5 billion a year in lost physical 
sales. Lord Smith commended the UK music industry’s response to off–line piracy as a 
“blue–print for anti–piracy initiatives in other creative industries.”67 In 1998, peer–to–peer 
file–sharing was already a fast growing phenomenon and 1999 saw the launch of Napster, 
which precipitated a response from the American and British music industries which would 
become a model for how not to respond to business model disruption from the online 
world.
A similar hesitation with regard to the Internet occurred in the framing of the new 
Communications Bill. The White Paper heralding this legislation was delivered on the stroke 
of the new millennium, in December 2000, when politicians and the media were more 
agitated about the ‘millennium bug’ than the emergence of the Internet as an alternative 
global, commercial platform for distributing creative works, along with other goods and 
services.68 
Around the same time, Scottish policymakers had identified a somewhat different direction. 
The publication by Scottish Enterprise in 1998 of Creativity and Enterprise69 took as its 
starting point the DCMS and Creative Britain paradigm, but set out a far more digitally 
driven vision of the creative industries in which the role of the Internet and enabling 
software were made explicit. This initial work was further developed with the launch in 
2000 of a creative industries strategy for Scotland,70 which saw digital media as the engine 
of growth and a focus for investment. Subsequently, Scottish Enterprise’s interest and 
commitment to the creative industries has waxed and waned, suffering from unhelpful 
tensions between Scottish Enterprise on one side and major cultural organisations (such as 
the then Scottish Arts Council and Scottish Screen) on the other. The result has been a loss 
of clear shape in policy. An industry–led 2009 digital media strategy for Scotland, Digital 
Inspiration, was forthright in its focus upon economic opportunities arising from digital 
11. Design: At the Crossroads of Science and Arts.
12. It Could be you: The Future of the National Lottery.
13. Into the Future: The Millennium and Beyond.
14. Arts and the Man: Culture, Creativity and Social Regeneration.
15. No Wealth but Life: the Importance of Creativity.
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technologies, in contrast to the Scottish Government’s current creative industries strategy71 
which makes scant mention of the Internet. It is not easy to identify concrete outcomes 
from most of this activity. 
Northern Ireland came late to the creative industries party, following a stuttering start with 
early policy statements that did not translate into action.72 In a Strategic Action Plan for the 
sector in 2008,73 the transformative impact of the Internet and digital technologies were 
still conspicuous by their absence. Northern Ireland has a division of responsibilities for 
creative industries policy between the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) and 
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Industry (DETI) that mirrors the UK split between 
the DCMS and Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) (formerly the DTI). 
However, DCAL’s ‘lead’ role is not as formally established as that of the DCMS (and a recent 
inquiry by the Committee for Culture, Arts & Leisure calls on it to raise its profile as policy 
lead for the sector74).  
Wales commissioned a policy review of creative industries in 2004,75. which built upon 
sectoral approaches to the automotive and aerospace industries, but suffered from a 
serious absence of data about Welsh creative industries. This review focused on film, 
television and music, with the intention (never realised) of extending to other parts of the 
creative industries later. At its heart was a £7 million Creative Intellectual Property Fund, 
stronger business support and more involvement of industry experts in administering 
policy towards the creative sector. A subsequent review of Wales’ creative industries (led 
by one of the authors of this manifesto in 2009/10) found the 2004 policy insufficiently 
attentive towards emerging digital business opportunities across the creative industries 
generally and “lacking clarity of strategic purpose.”76 More recently, Wales has developed 
an investment fund to support digital business growth and continues the search for 
an effective way to achieve satisfactory broadband and mobile coverage in a sparsely 
populated, mountainous country.
Meanwhile in the English regions, the early years of Creative Britain saw some Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) take up the baton of policy thinking for the creative 
industries, supported by landmark initiatives such as the BBC’s move of significant parts 
of its London–based activities to Salford. Cities such as Bristol and Glasgow were among 
those that emerged with a reputation for imaginative growth of their creative industries, 
with a combined focus upon creative businesses, on the one hand, and the subsidised arts 
on the other. It became routine to identify the creative and digital industries as ‘priority’ 
sectors in regional and local industrial policies,77 not always convincingly so. Following the 
2010 election, the RDAs were abolished and budgetary pressure on local authorities led 
to significant retrenchment in cultural projects. Across the UK, there have been spasmodic 
attempts to nurture creative clusters of one kind or another; in Chapter Six, we critically 
evaluate the approaches taken. 
3. ofcom
In 2003, Ofcom represented an ambitious response to the forces shaping media and 
telecommunications convergence,78 with a set of powers intricately connected to 
the governing EU legal framework in telecommunications, audio–visual media and e–
commerce. Some, including powerful news media proprietors, thought the new ‘super–
regulator’ had too much power (in the run up to the 2010 General Election, David Cameron 
proposed radical retrenchment79). Others argued that Ofcom needed an even broader 
mandate, given the speed at which the Internet was changing the face of the media and 
telecommunications sectors.
For example, film–maker (Lord) David Puttnam, argued that “Ofcom should have been 
given more powers, even investigative ones, in relation to emerging technologies,”80 but 
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as the Bill made its way through Parliament print media companies’ concern to avoid 
encroachment of broadcast–style ‘over–regulation’ of their own activities converged with 
the views of Internet free speech campaigners to resist anything that smacked of content 
regulation on the Internet, unless (according to the compromise eventually reached) the 
service in question was ‘television–like’.
Telecommunications companies, as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), were chiefly 
concerned to ensure that the new regulator focused upon incentivising investment in 
their burgeoning broadband networks. The Communications Managers Association said 
a regulatory approach to issues arising from the Internet could wait another decade.81 
These positions reflected legitimate concerns, but they meant that that consideration of 
the Internet’s rapidly emerging importance as an alternative platform for the delivery of 
content became something of a side issue.
So, Ofcom formally began its operations in 2004 with no mandate, not even a research–
based watching brief, with regard to the Internet. By 2004, it should be recalled, Apple 
was engaged in its potent re–invention; Amazon was a decade old; Google was planning 
its first stock market public offering and Facebook was the new kid on the block. Whilst it 
is true that Ofcom’s data gathering and research activities today (with no change in legal 
mandate) have not prevented it from paying attention to the impact of the Internet on 
the UK’s media and telecommunications sectors,82 even now that work largely has to be 
justified with reference to legal duties framed in a pre–Internet environment or to concerns 
arising from Ofcom’s more detailed responsibilities with regard to either broadcasting or 
telecommunications. For example, the 2012 Ofcom Communications Market Report deals 
for the first time with the important issue of emerging online ‘hyperlocal news services’;83 
Ofcom justifies this work with reference to its need to deliver competition and plurality 
assessments of regulated local broadcast media markets. 
It is also true, however, that Ofcom had plenty on its plate in 2004. There were complex 
spectrum auction and utility regulation challenges arising in telecommunications, which 
would themselves govern the speed at which the UK could acquire a fit for purpose 
broadband infrastructure. Commercial television needed a new regulatory framework 
as UK television went officially ‘digital,’ a process completed only in 2012, by which time 
the Internet had emerged as a very significant alternative platform for both radio and 
television, with big implications for Ofcom’s core duties with regard to telecommunications 
regulation and spectrum licensing. We discuss Ofcom’s role and related competition issues 
in Chapter Nine.
4. nesta, creativity and innovation
As Ofcom made its way from infancy to adolescence, Creative Britain’s other children were 
also coming of age. Nesta, with an initial endowment of £200 million, was in business by 
1998, meriting seven references in Chris Smith’s Creative Britain publication, where it is 
variously asked to: “build the bridge between an idea and a product”; “be a National Trust 
for Talent”; “pull down the artificial barriers between science, technology and the arts”; 
“turn creativity into products and services which we can exploit in the global market”; and 
“advance public appreciation of the creative industries, science and technology.” 
It is not surprising that with such a sprawling brief, Nesta suffered some blurring of vision. 
In its first decade it chose to assist individual creative entrepreneurs and businesses 
through enterprise support and mentoring, but it lacked the authority to influence in any 
decisive way the digital creative economy issues which are the subject of this manifesto. 
For example, it played no significant role in the debates that dominated Ofcom’s first 
decade (broadband roll–out and the future of public service television) and it was a 
bystander in the acrimonious debates about intellectual property which eventually 
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overwhelmed the Digital Britain project of 2008 to 2010. Nesta’s authority in creative 
economy issues, however, has been established in an ambitious research programme in 
the last decade, providing a renewed opportunity for evidence–based thought leadership 
following its new role (since 2012) as a free–standing charitable endowment. 
But if Nesta’s brief was hazy, the education debate was marked by violent self–
contradiction. In 1999, Ken Robinson, then Professor of Education at the University of 
Warwick, was asked to chair a national committee of inquiry into creative and cultural 
education. His report, All Our Futures,84 argued that creativity should be set alongside 
literacy and numeracy as a strategic priority at all levels of education. Although Robinson’s 
views have subsequently been in demand all over the world (he is now based in Los 
Angeles) his own assessment of the UK Government’s response to his work is that it was 
‘marginalised’85 by a Government in thrall to more basic issues of numeracy and literacy. 
In 2006, the Leitch Review of Skills further focused political attention upon numeracy 
and literacy, maintaining a line of continuity in UK education policy which extends to the 
current Government’s concern about ‘essential knowledge,’86 so ensuring marginalisation 
for Robinson’s creativity agenda. In 2010, the Government’s attempt to emulate the 
International Baccalaureate, the English Baccalaureate, excluded Art and Design & 
Technology. We address the creative economy education debate more fully in Chapter 
Eleven of this manifesto.
In 2005, Sir George Cox had delivered (to HM Treasury) his report: Creativity in Business: 
Building on the UK’s Strengths. This took a very broad view of the growing place of 
creativity in many business sectors, including manufacturing, and drew particular attention 
to the creative needs of small and medium–sized enterprises. The Cox Review specifically 
highlighted the critical role of design in shaping the relationship between creativity and 
business. yet Cox’s impact upon policy would also prove elusive as UK policymakers fought 
shy of developing an innovation system designed to harness and respond to creativity. We 
consider these issues in greater detail in Chapters Five and Six.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in the early years of the new century, the visionary 
dynamics of Creative Britain were encountering resistance. Education policymakers were 
not convinced by Robinson’s creativity agenda. Business and innovation policymakers did 
not act upon Cox. This absence of coherent engagement from relevant parts of Whitehall, 
including the Treasury, would prove debilitating for policy thinking on the creative 
economy. Ofcom and Nesta, in their different ways and for different reasons, were not in a 
position to offer the breadth of thinking needed to help guide the UK’s strategic response 
to a digital world where the pace of change was becoming more intense, year after year.
Worse still, as the political momentum behind the creative economy dipped or became 
more cautious in the UK, it was picking up in other parts of the world. South Korea 
designed and delivered a world–leading digital infrastructure; Singapore executed 
an ambitious programme of reform of education, then, along with Israel, IP; Canada 
introduced a series of aggressive tax measures to attract inward investment to its video 
games, music, film and publishing sectors; China set itself ambitious creative industries 
and patent generation goals. Brazil, for a period, embraced open source and Creative 
Commons. Most important of all, Silicon Valley roared into the world of social media, with 
the launch of Facebook, as other creative business centres thrived in the US, in places as 
diverse as New york, North Carolina,87 Boston88 and Austin, Texas. 
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5. creativity plus electronics
In the UK, these international developments lent weight to calls for a more ambitious 
approach, but the political and business climate had become more difficult, as the creative 
industries united around the central priority of defending copyright in the disruptive new 
setting of booming online markets.
As early as 2001, John Howkins, a prolific and influential UK media business consultant, 
had deployed the term ‘creative economy’ in the title of a book with an airport bookstall 
proposition: The Creative Economy: How people make money from ideas. Howkins 
identified intellectual property reform as a key issue and led the group which drafted the 
Adelphi Charter on Creativity, Innovation and Intellectual Property in 2005, and which 
sought to jolt the UK from its gridlocked approach to copyright and other IP issues.89 
In the 2007 revision of his book, Howkins declared: “The new economy is creativity plus 
electronics.”90 
Recognising the need for a government response, in 2005 the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport launched its own ‘Creative Economy Programme’, of which arguably the 
most substantial output was Staying Ahead (2007), a detailed re–assessment of the scale, 
scope, prospects and policy framework for the UK’s creative economy (and co–authored by 
one of this manifesto’s authors).91 Meanwhile, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his pre–
Budget report in 2006, published the findings of a review of intellectual property issues, 
led by Andrew Gowers, a former Editor of the Financial Times.92 
The Gowers Review concluded that the UK’s IP system had historically been a source of 
strength, but in advancing 54 specific propositions for change, Gowers also recognised the 
case for a substantial overhaul. In particular, Gowers challenged the UK’s creative industries 
over their relentless campaign for further extensions of copyright protection, supported 
by ever stronger policing, arguing that current term limits (already extending beyond a 
century) were already as hard to justify on economic grounds as they were difficult to 
enforce in the world of global data sharing facilitated by the Internet. (We discuss IP issues 
in Chapter Ten of this manifesto).
In 2008, another White Paper sought to re–assert a sense of policy coherence, but 
Innovation Nation had nothing beyond lip service to pay to the creative economy.93 
Its institutional focus was on the Technology Strategy Board, newly chiselled from the 
Business Department, and very closely tied to a science and technology agenda. With an 
Intellectual Property Office set up as an administrative rather than a policy–shaping body 
and Ofcom pre–occupied with a complex regulatory load on issues like competition in the 
Pay Television market, Creative Britain was running out of steam. 
6. Digital Britain
This was one of a number of voids which the Digital Britain project aimed to fill.94 In June 
2007, Gordon Brown had replaced Tony Blair as Leader of the Labour Party and Prime 
Minister. Stephen Carter, Ofcom’s first Chief Executive, was drafted into Number 10 as the 
PM’s Chief of Staff, but the new arrangement did not take. Carter moved over to the House 
of Lords and a new role as Minister for Technology, Communications and Broadcasting in 
the Business Department. From there he would direct a Digital Britain team drawn mainly 
from the civil service and Ofcom, but which also co–opted external experts, including 
Andrew Gowers to guide on intellectual property issues. 
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Digital Britain expressed a technocratic ambition, which included the re–invigoration of 
Creative Britain. It set its sights on “a strategic view of the sector, backed by a programme 
of action… to support the growth of digital infrastructure… to enable Britain to be a global 
centre for the creative industries in the digital age”; to ensure that people have the right 
“skills to flourish in the digital economy and that all can participate in the digital society” 
(and to improve public services) “through digital procurement and digital delivery.” By 
the end of 2008, this was presented as a beacon of the new ‘industrial activism’ to which 
Prime Minister Brown and his newly appointed Business Secretary Lord (Peter) Mandelson, 
were committed as part of their response to the economic shock caused by the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and the resulting financial crisis. 
Prime Minister Brown proclaimed on the first page of the resulting report: “Only a Digital 
Britain can unlock the imagination and creativity that will secure for us and our children 
the highly skilled jobs of the future. Only a Digital Britain will secure the wonders of an 
information revolution that could transform every part of our lives. Only a Digital Britain will 
enable us to demonstrate the vision and dynamism that we have to shape the future.”95 
Beyond this rhetoric, the 60–point summary of conclusions and actions ranged from taxing 
telephone lines to providing support for investment in Next Generation Broadband through 
to giving tax breaks for video games developers. The first of 19 Digital Britain propositions 
also declared that “the Government believes piracy of intellectual property for profit is 
theft and will be pursued as such through the criminal law”, paving the way for legislation 
to force ISPs to co–operate with an Ofcom–led regime to identify and punish offenders, if 
necessary by cutting them off from the Internet.96 
Other recommendations sought to secure the Gowers Review’s copyright reforms around 
access to orphan works and the development of more fluid, legal markets in licensed digital 
content; the Technology Strategy Board was instructed to start work on a Next Generation 
Broadband ‘test bed’ for digital transactions. There were also warm words for the BBC 
and Channel 4 and some rather innovative thoughts about how to shore up the crumbling 
base of local news provision in the UK by supporting a network of independently financed, 
multi–platform news consortia. 
But with the election approaching, creative industries lobbyists were at the peak of 
their capacity to influence. One by one, the three main political parties turned against 
the proposed Gowers Review copyright reforms and in the process disembowelled that 
aspect of the project’s reforming intent. In 2009, a junior Business Minister, David Lammy, 
was asked to turn out a new ‘copyright strategy,’97 which confirmed much of the Gowers 
analysis, but concluded that reform was not needed.98 As the Government readied itself to 
push the Digital Economy Bill through Parliament ahead of an election due by May 2010, 
the press was thick with reports of Government concessions to industry lobbying.99 Some 
of the most controversial clauses were dropped and the Digital Economy Act, including its 
measures to toughen up online enforcement of copyright and allow Ofcom to monitor ISP 
traffic management practices, hobbled to the statute book.100 
7. Digital Opportunity: innovation and growth
Prime Minister Brown, of course, lost the election, and less than six months later, Prime 
Minister Cameron dismayed rights holders by proposing yet another review of intellectual 
property issues, this one to be focused upon the relationship between IP law and its 
consequences for innovation and growth. In launching the review, the Prime Minister asked 
whether the UK needed something more like the American ‘Fair Use’ defence against 
copyright infringement, which Google had argued to the Gowers Review was a critical 
factor in explaining its own success. This review (see Chapter Ten) was led by one of the 
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authors of this manifesto. It concluded that there was, indeed, a significant growth dividend 
to be had from a well–evidenced programme of reform, but advised against the embrace of 
a US–style Fair Use law.101 
Critics of this latest review have argued that both the Prime Minister’s agenda and the 
review’s recommendations are too sympathetic to the arguments for IP reform made 
by Google and other large American digital businesses. The Coalition Government has, 
nonetheless, acted upon the Hargreaves Review’s findings on IP reform.102 At the same 
time, it has opened a public discussion about the contents of a new Communications Bill, 
which may be needed in some form, if only to update licensing arrangements and to enable 
UK statute to reflect changes in European law. An open letter published in May 2011103 
anticipated three areas for potential government action:
•	Growth, innovation and deregulation “to make the UK communications and media 
markets more competitive globally”.
•	A communications infrastructure that provides foundations for growth, delivering “the 
best superfast broadband network in Europe by 2015, supported by any necessary 
reform of spectrum allocation arrangements”.
•	The right environment for the content industries to thrive “in order to achieve the 
right balance between appropriate protection for the public while enabling rapid 
innovation, better services and sustaining freedom of expression.”104 (The language here 
establishing a place–holder for the Government’s response to the Leveson Inquiry on 
the culture, practices and ethics of the press, which would be published in November 
2012.) 
What was most obviously missing from this list? In short, the Internet or, to put the point 
another way, the ambition to understand the implications for competition and other 
regulatory issues of rapidly growing digital markets including the role within them of 
powerful Internet platforms, such as Google, Amazon and Apple. 
Today, governments around the world continue to define and refine policies designed to 
strengthen their creative economies. Europe’s fragmented digital market contrasts with the 
borderless digital markets of the United States and China. Much can be learned from digital 
initiatives in places as diverse as Singapore, Estonia and Canada. But the main lesson of 
this short UK history of the last 15 years is that brisk adaptability to transformative digital 
technologies is a pre–condition for successful policy design. Policymakers must beware 
of those forces, such as regulatory capture by powerful established interests, which draw 
them into paralysis. 
It would be wrong, however, to ignore what is going right on the policy front today. The 
Government, having established a Creative Industries Council,105 has embraced the case 
for copyright reform, along with an agenda to promote greater access to public and 
open data and a more open model in academic publishing. The Council is also supporting 
important work to improve statistics and measurement and on skills and access to finance. 
Nesta’s Next Gen collabaration with Ian Livingstone and Alex Hope has won sufficient 
support to persuade the Education Secretary to include computer science in the English 
Baccalaureate. There has been clear digital leadership from a number of important UK 
institutions, ranging from the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the British Library 
to the National Theatre and the Open University. The challenge is to shape these initiatives 
into a coherent and sustainable whole. Our starting point is to go back to basics and ask, as 
we did in 1997: what is the creative economy? 
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3 wHAt Is tHe creAtIve econoMy?
It is easy to understate the importance of clear definitions and reliable economic statistics 
to the formation of good policy. yet, without these tools, policymakers risk missing the 
most important sources of employment and growth; it becomes much harder to maintain 
a coherent policy framework, and impossible to track progress. In the UK, the existing 
creative industries definitions underemphasise the importance of digital businesses, many 
of whose business models do not revolve around the exploitation of IP. They also neglect 
fast–growing creative activities that take place outside of the creative industries in the 
wider economy. 
But defining and measuring the creative economy is not straightforward.106 Not only does it 
require data to be consistently gathered over time, but the definitions must also be capable 
of responding to genuine structural shifts in the composition of the creative economy, such 
as those stemming from digitisation. 
In this chapter we describe how, over time, the definitions and metrics used by DCMS have 
become less able to fulfil this essential function. Inadequate statistics have contributed to 
a perception in the eyes of some that the creative economy is not a well–defined economic 
entity that is susceptible to strategic policy interventions. We recommend a way forward, 
with a statistically robust new methodology for classifying and measuring the creative 
economy, based on a detailed study of where creative people work, which evidences what 
is distinctive about the creative industries (namely, their specialised use of creative talent), 
but also captures the importance of ‘embedded’ creativity in the wider economy.
1. A brief history of creative industries statistics in the uk
In 1998, the UK Department for Culture, Media and Sport famously defined the creative 
industries as “those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and 
talent and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and 
exploitation of intellectual property.” 
Based on this, the DCMS Mapping Documents in 1998 and 2001 proposed that 13 sub–
sectors made up the creative industries (as listed in Chapter Two). This seminal work 
became the template for numerous other national studies throughout the world, in high–
performing countries like Taiwan, New Zealand, Australia, Singapore107 and Germany,108 and 
at the regional and city level too, e.g. London, Paris and Auckland.109
For the UK, these creative industries appeared to form a reasonably coherent group based 
upon the generation of commercial value by creative talent. Together they comprised one 
of very few business sectors (with financial services and aerospace), where the UK could 
plausibly claim to be a world leader.
Independent research lent support to the view that the DCMS’s sub–sectors were a 
coherent grouping: they produced most of the UK’s creative products. The official Input–
Output tables, which provide detailed information on the supply and use of goods and 
services in the economy, showed that the creative industries provided as much as 83 per 
cent of total domestic supply of creative goods and services in 2004.110 
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Labour market statistics further reinforced the view that the creative industries as captured 
by the DCMS–13 were an economic reality. Analysis of the 2001 UK Household Census and 
the 2001–2006 Labour Force Surveys showed that the great majority of these sub–sectors 
were the biggest employers of creative talent.111 
However, the DCMS’s 13 sub–sectors counted amongst them some uncomfortable 
bedfellows, with a notable split between household–facing sub–sectors like music, film and 
performing arts and business–facing sectors like advertising, design and software. Software 
in particular turned out to be controversial because it did not sit easily with the artistic or 
aesthetic dimension which many believed was the essence of creative industries.112 
There were also a good many caveats and limitations in the DCMS Mapping Documents. 
These variously concerned overreach, gaps, lack of comparability across sub–sectors (in 
particular, inconsistencies in data sources and classifications), and insufficient granularity 
(the reliance on highly aggregated source data).113 
The annual DCMS Creative Industries Economic Estimates,114 first released in 2002, 
attempted to address some of these inconsistencies, at least for the sub–sectors which 
could be identified using the official Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, 
by producing each year the same headline statistics on Gross Value Added (GVA), 
employment, net exports and the number of creative businesses, based on consistent 
data sources for each sub–sector. These headline statistics showed that the UK’s creative 
industries were growing at twice the rate of other sectors, helping to raise the profile of the 
creative industries (both in the UK and internationally).115 
yet, a great many challenges remained in the DCMS statistics, as a result of the limitations 
of the SIC codes, which are set in conjunction with the UN’s industrial classification system 
for the purposes of international consistency and which are reviewed only at ten–year 
intervals, and a low level of investment in the statistics by successive governments.116 
Partly because of this (but also because they had different data needs) sector bodies 
such as UK Music, the (now defunct) UK Film Council, the British Fashion Council and 
the Crafts Council started producing their own sector–specific economic statistics, along 
with equivalent bodies across the devolved nations and the English regions. Inconsistent 
treatments of sectoral boundaries (what should be included and what should not) led to 
a plethora of non–comparable estimates. The result was an ever–increasing landscape of 
sectoral, national and regional statistics that purported to measure similar things.117 
To make things worse, in December 2011 the DCMS removed two software–related 
occupations and industries from its classifications, slicing off in one fell swoop £25.9 billion 
that the creative industries had previously been estimated to contribute to the UK’s GVA. 
This unfortunate decision betrayed a lack of appreciation of the interconnected role that 
software and creative content plays even in non–software businesses, a point we return 
to below. Meanwhile, a 2012 economic impact study by Creative Scotland argued for the 
inclusion of software.118 
Such confusion weakens the standing of the creative industries in the eyes of mainstream 
UK economic policymakers, and in particular HM Treasury.119 The work of key agencies 
like the Office for National Statistics has also remained strangely disconnected from 
the creative industries, even as BIS and the DCMS promoted the creative industries as a 
high–growth sector.120 The UK Government has not played a sufficiently energetic role in 
international efforts to coordinate the production of internationally comparable statistics, 
such as UNESCO’s or Eurostat’s ESSnet Cultural Statistics Frameworks.121 
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2. A dynamic mapping of the uk’s creative industries
The DCMS has never published a methodology by which it determines which sub–
sectors are deemed ‘creative’ and which are not. Without this, it is no surprise that the 
way we think about the creative industries in statistical terms has not adapted well 
to the emergence of entirely new forms of creative business made possible by digital 
technologies. 
In order to address these issues, we have worked with researchers Alan Freeman and 
Peter Higgs at the Queensland University of Technology to develop a methodology that 
is explicit about those features which make an industry creative, and then measures those 
features in order to identify the creative industries.122 We show that a defining characteristic 
is their especially intensive use of creative talent. 
Our starting assumption is that creative talent is different from other types of labour in that 
it helps give the organisations that employ it the capacity to offer differentiation in their 
products; to cater precisely for the discretionary requirements from ever more demanding 
groups of consumers and business clients. What characterises genuine creativity is not the 
production of large, standardised volumes at low costs, but what is in effect a continuous 
succession of smaller runs of products each varying from its predecessors and competitive 
offerings. These points of differentiation may be small, but they are sufficiently valued by 
customers to attract their loyalty. This helps explain why bestselling products in markets 
as diverse as books, music (and, outside the creative industries, pharmaceuticals) are 
characterised by high and increasing rates of churn.123 It is creative talent that has enabled 
these creative businesses, much more so than businesses in other industries, to respond to 
the needs and desires of their customers and to reach new markets. 
Core to our understanding of this creative talent is that it has an appreciation of what 
‘kind’ of effect is desired, but it is not told how to produce that effect in the same way that, 
say, an assembly line worker or many skilled technicians or engineers are instructed. The 
creativity consists in devising an original way of achieving an effect that is not expressed in 
precise terms (or in any terms at all in the case of open–ended creativity).124 
This confers an important quality on creative talent, namely that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to fully mechanise the creative process and hence to substitute machines 
or devices for humans. Mere implementation of a creative decision is not in this sense a 
creative role, but making one is. 
Technology has largely done away with the need for the highly skilled roles of typesetters 
and photo touch–up artists, for example. The former is now subsumed into the page 
management applications and style guides applied by art directors and graphic designers. 
The continual process of democratisation of technology lowers the cost and the technical 
skill needed to do previously highly complex, yet no longer creative, tasks. Creative 
professionals adopt, adapt and absorb new technologies in pursuit of creative excellence, 
but they are seldom made wholly redundant by it.
The product differentiation that characterises the creative industries and their talent is also 
reflected in their distinctive production processes, described by writers such as Richard 
Caves.125 Foremost amongst these are very high levels of flexible collaboration and project–
based work126 (Caves’s ‘motley crew’ property), the existence of pre–market or ‘gatekeeper’ 
selection mechanisms (galleries, agents, distributors, publishers etc.), contracts that 
manage uncertainty rather than risk (the ‘nobody knows’ principle) and so on. A final 
important characteristic is the strong tendency towards geographical clustering at a local 
level,127 which we discuss in Chapter Six, leading to phenomena such as Soho’s post–
production cluster, East Scotland’s games hub, Brighton’s Fuse and Shoreditch’s Tech City.
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These considerations inform an economic model of the creative industries, with its own 
characteristic inputs, outputs and production processes. They also give rise to a definition 
of a ‘creative occupation’ as:
“a role within the creative process that brings cognitive skills to bear to bring about 
differentiation to yield either novel, or significantly enhanced products whose final form 
is not fully specified in advance.”
In research undertaken for this manifesto, this definition is used to specify five creativity 
criteria with which to score all the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) Codes in the 
UK workforce. These are:
1. Novel process – does the role most commonly solve a problem or achieve a goal, even 
one that has been established by others, in novel ways? 
2. Mechanisation–resistant – does the role contribute something for which there is no 
mechanical substitute?
3. Non–repetitiveness or non–uniform function – does the work vary because of the 
interplay of factors, skills, creative impulse and learning?
4.  Creative contribution to the value chain – is the outcome of the occupation novel or 
creative irrespective of the context in which it is produced?
5. Interpretation, not mere transformation – does the role do more than merely ‘shift’ the 
service or artefact’s form, place or time? 
Of course, each of these five criteria is problematic when considered in isolation, and they 
do not offer hard and fast rules for determining when an occupation is or is not ‘creative’. 
There are also deep connections between them: it is unlikely that the activities of someone 
who is constantly called on to devise new processes, to carry out new transformations 
and to construct creative interpretations of raw material can easily be mechanised. 
Nonetheless, occupations which score positively on all or most of the indicators are very 
likely to function as an economic resource that the creative industries require.128 
Occupational scores are then used to calculate a ‘creative intensity’ for each SIC industrial 
code. This creative intensity measures the percentage of the workforce in the SIC code that 
is accounted for by workers in creative occupations. Figure 3.1 presents the distribution  
of employment (y–axis) across sectors with different levels of creative intensity (x–axis), 
highlighting whether or not they are classified as ‘creative’ in the DCMS’s current 
classification. 
The first striking thing it shows is how a group of industries (towards the right end of the 
figure) are distinguished by a markedly higher tendency to employ creative workers than 
other industries. Secondly, it shows that very large numbers of creatively–occupied workers 
– the majority in fact – work outside the creative industries (the lighter columns add up to 
more than the darker columns). Thirdly, it suggests that there are serious misallocations in 
the current DCMS classifications; this includes a definite group of industries, which DCMS 
does not treat as creative, but which appear in the range 55–65 per cent as a ‘blip’ in the 
non–creative distribution (the fourth lighter column from the right), including ‘Computer 
programming activities’ (62.01) and ‘Computer consultancy activities’ (62.02) – the two 
SIC codes that DCMS dropped in 2011 – which between them in 2010 accounted for over 
400,000 people.129 ‘Other information technology and computer service activities’ (62.09), 
with a creative intensity of 36 per cent, employs a further 35,000 people. 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of creative employment by creative intensity of  
 SIC codes, partitioned into DCMS and non–DCMS
The research further shows that the integrity of the creative industries – the most 
specialised employers of creative talent – as an economically coherent grouping is in fact 
badly damaged if software workers are excluded from the list of creative occupations 
used to generate the estimates of creative intensity. While in that scenario an industry 
like ‘Computer programming activities’ (62.01) retains its relatively high level of creative 
intensity, indicating that it is a major employer of non–software creative professionals, 
others like ‘Manufacture of consumer electronics’ (26.40) – which few would consider 
a creative industry – now emerge as relatively ‘creative’ on the basis of their creative 
intensities too. This suggests that it is the combination of workforce creative skills 
across a spectrum of activities – with software as a core skill – which contributes to the 
‘creative industries’ as a coherent grouping of sub–sectors. Or more generally, that digital 
technologies, and the opportunities they open up for creative activity, tend to complement 
other non–technology creative skills. 
What these results suggest is that there is a distinctive set of industries – the creative 
industries – which share a common feature: they are disproportionately significant 
employers of creative talent.130 But they also highlight the huge significance of creative 
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employment outside the creative industries. In this sense, we both agree and take issue 
with exceptionalist critiques that creative markets cannot by their nature easily fit into 
industrial frameworks.131 The creative economy is indeed complex, socially networked and 
“to a large extent an outgrowth of the previously non–market economy of cultural public 
goods and private imagination”. But the results show that they can still be measured, 
insofar as occupational classifications permit us to track where creative people work, and 
on that basis a distinctive set of creative industries, set within a broader creative economy, 
can be clearly identified in the data. 
3. digital technologies and creativity
If we think about the shape of the creative industries today, we should not be surprised 
to find digital technologies at their heart (see Box 3.1).132 Today, social networks, search 
engines and other digital platforms help to generate new products and services which 
rely upon highly creative talent (including the contributions of users).133 We also know that 
many ‘digitally native’ companies are deeply integrated into creative industries value chains 
– another indication that they rightfully belong in the creative industries.134, 135 We see this 
at all levels – from production, where digital tools are transforming the creative process, to 
distribution (with new platforms) and consumption (devices); we explore these issues in 
more detail in Chapter Four.
The inclusion of these digital creative activities in the frame of the creative economy 
also challenges the preoccupation of the existing DCMS definitions with businesses that 
generate and exploit intellectual property (IP). IP is of course central to the value added 
in many creative industries, but significant elements of the creative industries use (or 
provide inputs for) business models such as online advertising that do not directly rely on 
exploitation of IP.136 In fact, sectors like fashion design and advertising showed long before 
the digital revolution that creative businesses can in some cases thrive on competitive 
strategies like first mover advantage in which IP plays less of an obvious role.137 
4. so how big is the creative economy?
The new estimates suggest that in 2010, as many as 59 per cent of creatively–occupied 
workers in the UK worked outside of the creative industries as we have identified  
them.138, 139 Table 3.1 also suggests that 2,495,700 (or 8.7 per cent of the UK labour force) 
worked in the creative economy (that is, 1,932,400 + 563,300). Of this almost 2.5 million–
strong workforce, the creative industries employed 1,357,300 workers (4.7 per cent of 
the UK workforce). These numbers suggest that in its 2011 Statistical Release, the DCMS 
understated the size of the creative economy by almost one million employees, of which 
almost half falls within the creative industries.140 
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Box 3.1: the digital face of the creative industries 
One of the authors of this manifesto is involved in an AHRC–funded research project 
called ‘Brighton Fuse’, which seeks to measure the economic significance of the 
Creative, Digital and IT Brighton cluster. As part of their work, Fuse researchers have 
identified over 1,500 creative and digital media businesses in Brighton, and have used 
these companies’ SIC codes to study the extent to which the current DCMS industrial 
classifications cover the sector. Only just over one quarter (27.2 per cent) of them 
are covered by the DCMS’s classification. Reintroducing the two software–related 
SIC codes that were dropped in December 2011 would alone bring that up to 42.5 
per cent. If we also considered 62.09 (‘Other information technology and computer 
service activities’), which as we pointed out also has a very high creative intensity, the 
coverage would reach 56.5 per cent of the cluster – twice as big as what is covered 
by the DCMS classification.
The Fuse team also surveyed around one–third of all digital media companies in 
Brighton, including detailed questions on the commercial activities of respondents. 
When we look at the activities of the 60 respondents in the two software–related 
SIC codes dropped by DCMS, we find video games studios, web designers and 
developers, social network marketing companies, and digital agencies which combine 
technology and design capabilities to offer advertising and marketing services, and 
even BAFTA nominees. Interestingly, 22 per cent of these businesses were started by 
Arts and Humanities and Design graduates, and 40 per cent see themselves as part 
of Brighton’s ‘artistic and creative community’ – all of which, to our mind, makes them 
convincing candidates for inclusion in any meaningful classification of the creative 
industries.
We have separately looked at a recent list of ‘Top European Start–ups’ compiled by 
the Daily Telegraph, and explored what are the primary SIC codes for UK companies 
that appear in their ‘Advertising and Marketing’, ‘Audio and Media’, ‘Gaming and 
Virtual Worlds’, and ‘Social Networking and Collaboration’ categories – that is, those 
that many would argue are part of the creative industries. In this case, we find that 
only three out of the 22 start–ups listed would be captured by the DCMS’s current 
classification of the creative industries (note that some of these are included in catch 
all categories like ‘Other Business Support Service Activities not elsewhere classified’; 
in most cases it is difficult for statisticians to do anything with these businesses until 
new industrial codes are agreed through the ten–yearly international cycle by which 
the SIC codes are set).
sources: 
AHRC Brighton Fuse project. http://www.brightonfuse.com/ 
Daily Telegraph Start–Up 100 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/technology–startup100/8428665/
Start–Up–100–the–class–of–2011.html 
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The estimates suggest that the UK’s creative economy workforce grew at over four times 
the workforce as a whole in the 2004–2010 period.141 The clear conclusion is that those who 
have drawn attention to the high growth rates of the UK’s creative economy, in the face of 
accusations of boosterism,142 are in fact right. 
In value added terms, we further estimate that in 2010 the creative industries accounted 
for 5.3 per cent of UK GVA (which, together with the 4.7 per cent of the UK workforce, 
suggests that labour productivity is on average higher in the creative industries than in the 
rest of the economy).143
Estimating GVA in the creative economy is less straightforward, as estimates of the 
GVA contribution of workers in creative occupations (or of any workers in fact) are not 
published by the ONS.144 In their absence, we infer an indicative estimate by taking the 
creative intensities for each four–digit SIC code outside of the creative industries in the 
economy and multiplying them by the corresponding GVA value for that four–digit SIC 
code.145 We sum the resulting numbers to give an estimate of the overall GVA contribution 
of creative workers outside the creative industries,146 and then add this back to the 5.3 per 
cent of GVA contribution of the creative industries to give a creative economy estimate of 
9.7 per cent of the economy.147 
5. new definitions
Our analysis of creative employment in different sectors of the economy, and the argument 
that the creative industries are highly specialised users of creative workers, points to a 
renewed focus on creative talent in the creative industry definitions. It also supports the 
view that the UK economy is one where digital technologies have given rise to a new 
class of businesses that are some of the most creative on this measure and also make use 
of software talent. Furthermore, we have noted that like advertising and fashion design 
businesses before them, many of these businesses rely upon business models that do not 
rely fundamentally upon the exploitation of intellectual property. With all this in mind we 
propose a modification to the DCMS’s original definition so that it comprises:148 
source: Bakhshi, Freeman and Higgs (2013), using SIC 2007 and SOC 2000 classifications for consistency with 
DCMS’s latest published Creative Industries Economic Estimates.
 creative industries  non–creative  All industries 
  industries
creatively– Specialists Embedded Creatively–occupied 
occupied jobs 794,000 1,138,400 jobs 1,932,400
other jobs Support Non–creative Non creatively– 
 563,300 26,178,900 occupied jobs 
   26,742,200
All occupations Working in the Working outside Total workforce 
 creative industries the creative 28,674,600 
 1,357,300  industries 27,317,300
Table 3.1: Creative Economy Employment, 2010
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“those sectors which specialise in the use of creative talent for commercial purposes”
and an allied definition of the creative economy:
“those economic activities which involve the use of creative talent for commercial 
purposes”
These definitions have the merit of simplicity and involve only one bottomless item of 
complexity: the word creativity, the definition of which policymakers and academics will 
surely debate for the rest of time, but which this chapter has argued can be operationalised 
for measurement purposes.149 
The dropping of the reference within the creative industries definition to IP may be seen 
by some as a retreat from commitment to the importance of copyright, patents and 
trademarks, but that is not so. The IP framework plays a central role in the generation of 
value added for many creative businesses, and it is essential therefore that such businesses 
are covered by the metrics. But by overstating the centrality of IP, we risk neglecting other, 
fast growing creative businesses and distorting our approach to policymaking across the 
creative economy.
proposAl one
the Government should adopt our proposed new definitions of the creative 
industries and the wider creative economy. these are simple, robust and recognise 
the central role of digital technologies.
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4 creAtIve tecHnoloGIes And MArkets
1. our digital present
In the previous chapter, we studied employment patterns to show that digital technologies 
and creativity work in tandem and that it makes no sense to separate the creative use 
of digital technologies from other creative work. This chapter sheds further light on this 
relationship through the prism of the digital innovations that are transforming creative 
markets. In doing so, we provide a context for assessing in Chapter Five the competitive 
situation of the UK’s creative economy, and for identifying those areas where UK 
policymakers should focus if they want to support growth.
Perhaps music provides the starkest illustration of a creative industry that has been 
disrupted by information and communication technologies. In 1998, when DCMS first 
defined the creative industries, Cher was at the top of the UK singles chart, and The Corrs 
dominated albums sales. Music was mostly recorded in expensive studios, reviewed in 
Smash Hits, the New Musical Express and Melody Maker, promoted on the radio, MTV and 
Top of the Pops, and sold in the form of shrink–wrapped CDs in HMV, Virgin and a legion of 
independent stores, to be played on a home stereo system or portable Discman. 
Fast forwarding to today, easy–to–use software applications like Audacity and GarageBand 
are helping millions record and edit music. Audiences discover and spread the word about 
it through social media, video sites and music blogs. They purchase it in MP3 format in 
online music stores or stream it from services like Spotify, and listen to it on portable music 
devices and smart phones that can store hundreds of albums. 2012’s biggest popular music 
phenomenon was Korean pop star Psy, whose hit Gangnam Style received a billion views 
on youTube.
To be sure, several major record labels are still in business (although they have gone from 
six at the beginning of 1998 to half that number now), but their control over the value chain 
has become less assured, as they have been joined by new Internet players such as Apple, 
Amazon, Facebook and Google, and smaller entrepreneurial start–ups like SoundCloud and 
Bandcamp. 
While specialist music retailers have all but vanished from the high street, the Internet is 
bustling with digital services providing legal access to music – over 70 in the UK alone.150 
Many innovative independent record labels are thriving too. The UK’s best–selling artist 
in 2011, Adele, is signed to XL, an indie stalwart. Beggars Group has doubled its annual 
gross profit since 1998, and now generates 22 per cent of its digital revenues from 
streaming through sites like youTube and Vevo.151 Warp Records has gone from strength to 
strength, expanding into digital distribution through Warpmart, as well as into film and TV 
production. No part of the music industry value chain remains untouched by digitisation. 
What is true for music also applies in varying degrees to other creative industries, whether 
they provide content or services to their customers. Amazon already sells more e–books 
than paperbacks. Advertisers spend more money online than they do offline. Broadcasters 
operate digital streaming services that can be accessed on computers, smart phones, 
tablets and video games consoles. Even industries like fashion, which trade in physical 
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goods rather than bits, are being transformed by blogging, along with image–sharing and 
e–commerce sites like ASOS and Etsy. The advent of affordable 3D printers and digital 
platforms for the distribution of product blueprints promises to bring the same disruption 
to product design that we have already seen in music and publishing, disturbing creative 
sectors like crafts152 as well as manufacturing value chains.
This rapid change raises important questions: What are the drivers of these digital 
transformations? Will they continue? What are the sources of value in digital creative 
markets? We need to make sense of the evolving landscape in order to assess the 
readiness of the UK’s creative economy to harness new growth opportunities, and the 
fitness of the policy framework which aims to help it to do so.
In this chapter, we draw on an assessment of market and technology trends that we 
commissioned from consultants MTM London to inform our work153 and the academic 
literature to address these important questions. We begin by examining the technological 
trajectories driving the evolution of the markets where UK’s creative businesses 
increasingly compete. 
2. technology: layers and trajectories 
The information and communication technologies that have so transformed the UK’s 
creative economy are sometimes described as a ‘stack’, composed of layers – hardware, 
software, networks and platforms.154 Hardware is the physical embodiment of these 
technologies – silicon chips, screens, memory, batteries and input/output devices. Software 
is the set of instructions that enables hardware to manipulate data to achieve a purpose. 
Networks are the copper and fibre optic cables and wireless transceivers that machines 
(and their users) in different locations use to communicate with each other. Platforms 
combine hardware, software and networks to provide the foundation on which other 
products or services can be built, bought and sold – the Internet being the most obvious 
example.155 Others include the Windows Operating System, Apple’s iTunes and eBay’s 
PayPal.
Information and communication technologies have in the past experienced a sustained 
trajectory of improvement underpinned by progress at all levels of this stack:
I. The processing power of hardware has grown apace with Moore’s Law, according to 
which the number of transistors that can be placed inexpensively on an integrated 
circuit doubles approximately every two years. It is projected that by 2022, 
microprocessors in consumer devices will have 50–100 times more processing power 
than they do today.156
II. Software development has become more efficient as a consequence of innovations 
such as: object–oriented programming (which makes the ‘objects’ that compose a 
software program modular, and thus easier to reuse across products and services); 
new development methodologies such as ‘agile’ and the ‘lean start–up’ model, and 
the large volume of software code developed by global communities of volunteer 
programmers who release it with open source licences allowing anyone to download 
it freely, use it and improve it.157 
III. Networks are acquiring users (whose devices are nodes), density (the number of 
connections between nodes), and capacity (ability to transfer data across those 
connections). This is true of fixed–line Internet – with the advent of superfast 
broadband, which is now available to the majority of UK households – as well as 
mobile broadband which, in its Fourth Generation, is projected to reach speeds of 100 
Megabits per Second and more. 
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Iv. Platforms are able to benefit from the lower costs and higher performance achievable 
through innovations that involve combinations of components across the technology 
stack. Examples of such innovative re–combinations include: Microsoft’s Kinect 
(integrating a motion sensor device, 3D camera, body tracking and voice recognition 
software); Apple’s Siri personal assistant; the Raspberry Pi educational single–
board computer; and the ‘Thingiverse’ Internet Marketplace for object blueprints 
reproducible in 3D printers. The Internet of Things that connects ‘intelligent’ devices 
in networks of automation for activities such as logistics or manufacturing is perhaps 
the ultimate example of an emerging platform made possible by radical progress in 
hardware, software and networks.158 
3. the impacts: lower barriers to entry in creative markets
This sustained trajectory of improvement in all layers of the technology stack, and the 
combinatorial innovations that it has made possible, has lowered the barriers to entry to 
creative markets. 
We see this in all stages of the creative value chain: in the area of content creation, for 
example, cheap (and in some cases even free) tools like Audacity (for music editing), 
Unity 3D (for games) and Blender (for animation) have reduced the costs of producing 
professional quality–grade content; in distribution, a myriad of websites, services and 
platforms magnify audience reach and marketing opportunities. Collaboration tools and 
crowdfunding sites have lowered the costs of finding potential partners and funders, even 
when they are on the other side of the globe. Cloud computing services such as Amazon 
S3 lower the start–up costs for entrepreneurs who can now scale up their computing 
capacity as market demand grows, reducing their operating costs by as much as 90 per 
cent according to venture capitalist Mark Suster.159
Box 4.1: platform openness 
All Internet platforms share one important feature: they provide a foundation to 
build and deliver, possibly for money, other products or services. Our definition of a 
platform emphasises its ‘unfinished’ aspects – that is, the fact that it can be extended 
– but it does not prescribe what the extension entails, which may be provision of 
goods or services as with e–commerce sites, applications in the case of Operating 
Systems, or user–generated content in social networks. Our definition is also agnostic 
about who does the augmenting – it could be the platform owners, third parties or a 
mix of both. The design of this mix, and its governance – in particular how ‘open’ or 
‘closed’ a platform is – are central aspects of a platform’s competitive strategy and 
business model.
Open platforms allow a great deal of access for users, content and application 
providers, in some cases through open standards that make it easy to develop 
services, devices and applications which are compatible with them, as well as open 
application interfaces that facilitate the exchange of data. Closed platforms are 
more tightly managed by their owners – for example in terms of the technical and 
administrative requirements for participants to use them. 
During the ‘Operating Systems Wars’ of the 1980s and 1990s, the personal computer 
(PC) was presented as an open platform because it was easier to target by third 
party developers of applications, and manufacturers of hardware and peripherals, in 
contrast to Apple’s Macintosh. Today, we see similar differences between the open 
and even uncontrolled App environment for Google’s Android operating system 
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As a result of all this, we have seen a vast increase in the supply of creative goods and 
services, and also a diversification in the supply base, which now goes beyond ‘for–profit’ 
businesses and start–ups to also involve countless new forms of small–scale producers, 
user innovators and user content generators, ‘produsers’160 and creative citizens.161 
Amateurs, hobbyists and fans can now, for example, use the Internet to reach hyper 
local as well as global audiences.162 youTube users upload nearly an hour of video every 
second.163 There are currently around 60 million sites in blog publishing site Wordpress.164 
And communities of ‘modders’ create thousands of custom levels for video games such 
as Minecraft and Left For Dead.165 While the fruits of many of these creative experiments 
will only be enjoyed by their creator’s friends and family, some represent the beginning of 
a career in the creative economy. Or even the path to stardom in cases like singer Justin 
Bieber, who achieved global recognition on youTube; E.L. James’s 50 Shades of Grey, 
which started as an online exercise in ‘Fan Fiction’; or Londoner Jamal Edwards, whose 
youTube channel SB.TV has more than 11 million views, and who was ranked 42 in the 
Sunday Times young Rich List.166 
Open source communities have for their part developed the GNU/Linux Operating System 
at the heart of the Android platform, the Firefox browser and the Apache Server software, 
which currently powers 60 per cent of the world’s servers.167 The ‘Maker’ movement 
is applying the open source ethos to the design and production of physical goods.168 
More problematically, users have also taken to distributing copyrighted content through 
filesharing networks, an issue which we consider in Chapter Ten.
and Apple’s carefully curated App Store, and between the open PC games platform 
(that can be freely targeted by any developer) and the ‘walled gardens’ of video 
games consoles (that can only be targeted by those who purchase an expensive 
development kit from the platform owners, and pay them royalties on each sale). 
Platform openness can also refer to user access – in this respect, Wikipedia is an open 
access platform, while Encyclopaedia Britannica is a closed one.
There are several trade–offs between openness and closure in Internet platforms – 
for their owners as well as the suppliers of complementary programs and content. 
Open platforms are usually associated with more experimentation, innovation and 
competition because entrepreneurs do not need to get permission from the platform 
owner to launch a new product or service there. Openness has its downsides though 
– it can attract malicious developers and users, lead to an excess supply of low 
quality content (as happened in the ‘video games crash of 1983’, when an avalanche 
of inferior games for Atari’s openly accessible console led to a collapse in the market) 
(Boudreau and Hagiu, 2008), and create usability problems that prevent a platform 
from achieving mass adoption (this has been a perennial barrier for open source 
platforms like GNU/Linux which are popular with tech savvy users, but not with the 
mass market). 
sources: 
Shapiro, C. and Varian, H. (1999) ‘Information Rules; A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy.’ Harvard, 
MA: Harvard Business School Press; Zittrain, J. (2006) The Generative Internet. Harvard Law Review. 
‘119: 1974–2039; Veugelers, R. (2012) ‘New ICT Sectors: Platforms for European Growth?’ Boudreau, K., & 
Hagiu, A. (2008). Platform rules: Multi-sided platforms as regulators. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1269966 
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4. Internet platforms and the attention problem
The proliferation of digital content and services that we describe has produced what 
some refer to as an ‘information overload’ or ‘content glut’, that strains the attention of 
consumers and users, making it hard for them to find what they are looking for, and for 
creative businesses to secure an audience or user–base for (or an income from) their work. 
With the content avalanche also come hazards for users, including the malicious – scams, 
spam and trolls – as well as purveyors of illegal and shoddy goods and services.169 
The multiplication of web media outlets and the general decrease in audience loyalty 
towards single sites have, for their part, made it hard for advertisers to measure the 
effectiveness of traditional campaigns (for all they know, their adverts could be reaching 
the same individuals as they browse across different sites).170 
In the language of economics, the increase in the supply of information brought about 
by digital technologies and the Internet has not always lowered the transaction costs for 
consumers and content suppliers, with advertisers caught in the middle. 
Some of the world’s most profitable corporations today are in the business of solving 
this problem. They have done so by diminishing or removing transaction costs through 
websites that match consumers to relevant information in innovative ways, whilst 
simultaneously helping advertisers reach these consumers (thus sometimes described 
as serving two-sided markets). Google built its search engine atop the hyperlinked 
pattern of the world wide web, and has used the data it generates to target adverts more 
accurately. Apple has put in place a seamless, secure and, for many people, beautiful 
ecosystem of hardware (iDevices and computers) and software (iTunes and the App 
Store) for the distribution of music and video content and software apps. Valve has done 
something similar with PC Games through Steam. Amazon and Netflix have used data from 
consumers’ past behaviours to build powerful recommendation engines. Facebook’s new 
Graph Search feature promises to make it easy for people to source information from their 
friends – and provides a market research tool for brands and advertisers at the same time.
There has also been a proliferation of sites matching suppliers and buyers of knowledge 
and creative services. These generally use a crowdsourcing model where clients (‘seekers’) 
set ‘challenges’ that they use to find the best suppliers (‘solvers’). We see this in TopCoder, 
which brings together software programmers and clients, 99 Designs, which does the same 
for graphic designers, and Poptent with its video content for adverts.171 
All these websites and platforms benefit from network effects. That is, as more participants 
(users or suppliers) join them, their attractiveness to other participants increases. This 
creates a virtuous circle. Think of how a popular platform such as the iPhone attracts App 
developers looking to target large markets, while at the same time the rich catalogue of 
Apps that these companies offer brings in more consumers. Another important implication 
of these network effects is that they can result in the opportunity for the abuse of market 
power. We explore this in more detail in Chapter Nine.
5. long tails and fat Heads
In principle, an online supplier’s ability to offer a repertoire of content or services is not 
constrained by storage and logistics as is the case with bricks and mortar stores – compare, 
say, the 26 million songs on the iTunes Store in 2012 with the catalogue available in any 
record shop.172 This is true to an even larger extent in online marketplaces like eBay or Etsy, 
the e–commerce site for crafts, jewellery and vintage goods which in December 2012 listed 
2.36 million items for sale.173
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The ability of such sites to aggregate consumer demand globally via the Internet also 
reduces the opportunity costs of stocking ‘niche’ offerings. For example, fans of ‘retro’ 
adventure games in the vein of ‘Broken Sword’ created by famed UK developer Charles 
Cecil perhaps amount to a handful in any particular town, and this makes it uneconomical 
for the local store to sell those games. However, when those fans are aggregated across 
the world, for example at Apple’s App Store, demand can become very substantial: the iOS 
version of Broken Sword was in fact downloaded four million times in 2011.174 
All of this means that digital platforms can now offer a ‘long tail’ of niche products which, 
according to journalist Chris Anderson (who coined the term in 2004), accounts for a 
large and growing proportion of their sales.175 A study by US economists using 2008 book 
sales data from Amazon estimates that niche books accounted for 36.7 per cent of overall 
revenues and contributed as much as $5 billion to consumer surplus.176 Anderson further 
argues that “most successful businesses on the Internet are about aggregating the long tail 
in one way or another. Google, for instance, makes most of its money off small advertisers 
(the long tail of advertising), and eBay is mostly tail as well.” 
Empirical studies, however, show that the majority of companies ‘living in the long tail’ 
fail to generate any sales at all.177 In fact, the long tail has been connected to a decline in 
demand for productions lacking large (‘triple A’) production and marketing budgets; media 
consultants Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates refer to this situation as ‘the Sagging Middle.’178 
Several empirical studies of the distribution of sales in the US home video market, and 
more recently, video rental and streaming service Netflix, lend support to this view.179 
We also see this situation playing out within Internet platforms in the form of ‘congestion’. 
Companies in marketplaces such as the Apple App Store have trouble standing out above 
the crowd. When they do, their innovative ideas are often ‘cloned’ by copycat developers, 
a behaviour that has resulted in several lawsuits, and is now being punished by some 
companies, including Apple. In games, consumers have started migrating to platforms with 
a ‘longer tail’ such as online and mobile games, but mid–tier developers in games consoles 
and PCs have suffered.180 Almost 50 per cent of creative and digital media companies in 
content sectors like film, TV, music and video games responding to a survey carried out 
as part of the AHRC’s Brighton Fuse research reported that ‘excessive competition in the 
market’ is a substantial barrier to growing their business.181
Meanwhile, the commercial ‘superstars’ in the ‘fat head’ of the creative economy are 
reaping the benefits from the expanded reach and ability to engage consumers that the 
Internet affords them. Lady Gaga has almost 30 million followers on Twitter, while J.K. 
Rowling has ‘Pottermore’, a website to sell digital books directly to her millions of fans. As 
of May 2012, users of the last instalment of Activision’s blockbusting ‘Call of Duty’ games 
franchise had collectively logged 1.6 billion hours of online play. Venerable arts and cultural 
institutions are also using digital technologies to grow their ‘virtual capacity.’ For example, 
over ten million tickets for high–definition live broadcasts from the New york Metropolitan 
Opera House have been sold since the series started in 2006.182 
6. the imperative for business model innovation
The transformations in supply and access brought about by the Internet have also 
produced a surge of experimentation with business models – that is, in the strategies 
through which creative businesses seek to generate and capture value, something that 
starts by being found by audiences.
In that respect, creative businesses are drawing on the Internet’s social infrastructure 
to implement innovations in marketing – such as ‘viral campaigns’ designed to diffuse 
rapidly through social networks. The Blair Witch Project, The Dark Knight and Cloverfield 
have become iconic examples of viral film marketing campaigns. Creative businesses 
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are also nurturing loyal user communities that provide feedback, user testing, new ideas 
and valuable user–generated content. For example, Icelandic games company CCCP 
has established a democratically elected ‘Council of Stellar Management’ to steer the 
development of its game EVE Online.183 In some cases, users are enjoying some of the 
monetary benefits too. In 2012, youTube generated an income for more than one million 
of its users, and is actively seeking to increase the professional quality of the content they 
provide.184 
Creative businesses are also innovating in their pricing strategies, including ‘Freemium’, 
where a business provides free access to a ‘sampler’ or a ‘no frills’ version of a good or 
service for consumers who are then given the option of paying for ‘premium’ features (such 
as ‘virtual items’, extra content, professional features, more storage space and so on).185 
This helps creative businesses overcome the ‘information paradox’ that consumers can only 
work out their willingness to pay for information products when they’ve consumed them.186 
The ‘metered’ paywalls being adopted by an increasing number of newspapers, where 
users are only charged after going over a threshold of free articles, are a good example 
of this. The New york Times, a leader in the adoption of this model, reached 450,000 
subscribers in 2012, generating for the first time more revenue from its circulation than via 
adverts.187 The Financial Times now has more paying digital subscribers than purchasers of 
its newsprint editions,188 but its advertising base still relies disproportionately heavily upon 
print advertising, whose benefits to advertisers are, at this point, better understood.
Another advantage of Freemium over traditional pricing models is that it can help creative 
businesses segment consumers depending on how much they are willing to pay, and 
charge them accordingly, thus avoiding a situation where they ‘leave money on the table.’ 
Other pricing innovations include: Google’s use of auctions to set the prices of keywords 
for advertisers; crowdsourcing platforms for services (where the client sets the price and 
quality for a product, and competing suppliers – say, graphic designers – adjust their costs 
to deliver it); and even markets for the financing of creative projects such as the successful 
crowdfunding platform Kickstarter. 
The tried and tested ‘razor and razorblades’ approach is also helping creative businesses 
generate revenues in an environment where the costs of reproducing content are 
converging towards zero. Such content can in effect be cross–subsidised to drum up 
demand for a complementary product or service where the seller makes the bulk of their 
profits. This is what Apple does with iTunes and the App Store (supplying affordable 
digital content that drive sales of its iDevices), what Amazon does with its Kindle family of 
portable devices (which are sold cheaply to increase demand for media purchased through 
Amazon.com), and what TED does with its streamed talks (which increase demand for its 
live events).
Another feature of the Internet that creative companies, like others, are using to generate 
revenues is its ability to generate ‘Big Data’ about user characteristics and behaviours.189 
These data are being analysed extensively to optimise prices, evolve products in ways that 
respond to consumer demand, and target adverts more effectively, for example, through 
real–time bidding where every visit to a site generates an auction between advertisers 
competing to serve an advert to a visitor, depending on their attributes. Although this 
helps address some of the challenges already highlighted for online advertising, it also 
of course raises significant concerns – and increasingly, heated protests – about the 
boundaries of user privacy.
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7. future prospects
The momentum of the technological trajectories that are shaping the convoluted – even 
chaotic – landscape we have described in this chapter is unlikely to abate in the years 
ahead. If anything, it is likely to accelerate.190 
In a situation of uncertainty and market disruption, not even the position of today’s 
corporate giants is assured. Developments in Internet (and stock) markets over 2012, such 
as the collapse in the share price of Facebook and Zynga soon after their Initial Public 
Offerings have been linked to these organisations’ difficulties in migrating to the mobile 
Internet (what some investors refer to as ‘Web 3.0’).191 Apple stumbled with the release of 
its new operating system for its iDevices in 2012. Improvements in the HTML5 standard for 
accessing rich media content in the browser (instead of Apps), and even the appearance of 
affordable (and crowdfunded) microconsoles may yet overturn the ascendance of ‘walled 
garden’ environments over the open Internet as a source of content.192 And consumer 
backlash against perceived privacy breaches in social media networks may conceivably 
increase the appeal of business models that are less reliant on hyper–targeted advertising 
and Big Data.
Mike Lynch, former CEO of Autonomy, has remarked that only now are we finishing the 
first phase of the digital revolution. According to him, it will be in the second phase – 
where computers become better at extracting meaning from data – when ‘everything 
will change.’193 Other entrepreneurs and commentators have their own favourite ‘next big 
thing’, including Wearable Computing, The Internet of Things, Big Data, Assisted Creativity 
and the Maker Movement. Opinions about what it will be may diverge, but there is general 
agreement that there will be one.
This is also consistent with the view of scholars of wider general purpose technologies, 
such as information and communications technologies and electricity.194 The economic 
transformations that such technologies bring about are much more than the technical: they 
require the “wholesale remaking of infrastructure environments, of business models, and of 
cultural norms”,195 all of which take many, many years to become fully embedded. 
The picture we have painted leads to one plausible hypothesis, namely that the race for 
future leadership positions in the global Internet economy is still on. The question is how 
the UK’s creative economy, which historically has been so strong, can be best positioned to 
compete in it. The rest of our manifesto looks at what policymakers can do to help. 
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5 A polIcy AGendA for tHe creAtIve  
 econoMy
Having provided the context for our manifesto – one of economic opportunity and 
technological disruption – in this chapter we look at the competitiveness of the UK’s 
creative economy: how ready is it to harness the growth potential of digital markets? We 
then propose a framework – we call it the ‘creative innovation system’ – that identifies the 
resources that feed innovation in the creative economy, as well as its infrastructure and 
how it is regulated. In the remainder of the report (Chapters Six to Eleven), we examine 
the state of policy in each of these important areas, and recommend changes which, if 
enacted, will support innovation and growth in the UK’s creative economy.
1. the competitive position of the uk’s creative economy 
In cross–country assessments of digital ‘readiness’, the UK appears in the leading pack in 
many areas but in others is (in some cases, badly) lagging.196 
What everyone agrees on is the high level of digital sophistication of UK consumers, who 
are leading the world in their adoption of the Internet for e–commerce and for accessing 
creative media. They spend more, for example, on Internet shopping than any other major 
country: in 2011, the average spending per head on e–commerce was £1,083 in the UK, up 
14 per cent from 2010, and ahead of Australia and Sweden.197 In 2011, UK consumers also 
became the biggest users of mobile data in the world – pushing Japan into second place 
– and the same is true for consumption of on–demand television content. Smart phones 
are already mainstream (as many as 58 per cent of the population have one, behind Spain 
but ahead of the US, France and Germany), and tablet ownership is rising rapidly too. 
Meanwhile, UK participation in social media networks has grown rapidly, with 10 million 
active users on Twitter, and over 30 million active users on Facebook.198 
More generally, the UK is one of the largest markets in the world for creative content, 
goods and services – third in filmed entertainment199 and video games200 (after the 
USA and Japan), fourth in TV content201 (after USA, Japan and Germany),202 and fifth 
in Advertising (after the USA, China, Japan and Germany)203 to name but a few. A large 
domestic market benefits UK creative businesses because of the well–known ‘home bias’ in 
the consumption of creative and cultural content.204 
On the supply side, we also see obvious areas of strength. This is the case for creative 
content as well as services, where the UK boasts established players with a growing digital 
presence alongside born digital start–ups who are experimenting with new business 
models. 
In broadcasting, the BBC is one of the most internationally distinctive (and respected) 
features of the UK’s creative landscape. Its BBC iPlayer is a digital milestone of recent 
times, and BBC Worldwide already generates 12 per cent of its revenues digitally.205 
Channel 4 and BSkyB are also known for their innovativeness in the commissioning and 
distribution of TV (including interactive) content; Sky’s television sports services have 
played an important part in making English Premier League football a world leader. 
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Channel 4’s Future Media division generated 5.6 per cent of the broadcaster’s revenues 
in 2010, and 8.4 per cent of its operating profits.206 Then there is the vibrant independent 
TV production sector, and young start–ups like ChannelFlip Media, which are exploiting 
substantial opportunities in online video platforms like youTube (where it now boasts 
around 11.5 million subscribers).207 
There are large global players alongside smaller entrepreneurial companies in other 
creative sectors too: in advertising there is WPP, but also Albion London, part of the 
thriving East London cluster of digital creative agencies at the interface between software, 
advertising, branding, and design.208 In publishing, we have Pearson (which also owns 
Penguin209), but also Mendeley, a London–based social network and data storage service 
for researchers (and acquired by Reed Elsevier for £45 million at the time this manifesto 
was going to print). The Daily Mail, BBC News and The Guardian attract millions of users 
to their websites each day (MailOnline has more unique visitors than even The New 
york Times and has reported excellent progress in building online advertising revenues 
in 2012210), while Kickstarter–backed start–up Matter funds its investigative science and 
technology journalism by selling individual stories that can be accessed on any device.
Fashion has Burberry, Topman and ASOS.com (the latter with 7 million members), as well 
as cutting–edge designers of wearable technology like Studio XO, and Cassette Playa’s 
augmented reality streetwear. We have already noted the wide range of options on offer 
for purchasing digital music in the UK, and the recent successes of many independent 
record labels. In games, while there has been great upheaval for console developers 
with the closure of studios like Sony Liverpool Studio in 2012 and of Bizarre Creations 
the year before, social online games studios Jagex and Mind Candy have gone from 
strength to strength. A recent survey of UK games businesses carried out by TIGA (The 
Independent Games Association) shows that more than a third of UK games companies are 
primarily focused on mobile.211 Oxford–based games publishing and technology company 
Natural Motion has experienced great success in mobile platforms with its racing game 
CSR Racing, which it is selling 120 million virtual cars each year. CSR Racing was itself 
developed by Boss Alien, a spin out from Brighton console studio Black Rock after it was 
closed by its owner, Disney; this illustrates how the disruption experienced by UK creative 
sectors can serve to renew their enterpreneurialism.212 
The UK boasts some of the best–known and most respected arts and cultural institutions 
in the world, like the Tate, V&A, British Museum, Royal Opera House, British Library and the 
National Theatre, but also experimental collectives like Punchdrunk, No Fit State Circus and 
Blast Theory. The claim to having launched the world’s first international award in digital 
art, the Lumen Prize, is made by an organisation based in Cardiff. The award–winning 
website for New york’s Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) was in fact designed by Cogapp, a 
Brighton–based user experience and web design agency.
The UK also hosts significant operations from some of the world’s most successful creative 
corporations, including Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Sony, IDEO and Nike. youTube set 
up one of its two global ‘Creator Spaces’ to help users produce professional content for 
its platform in London, while Microsoft has opened Lift London, a games studio that will 
develop innovative games for tablets.
What little useful cross–country–consistent trade data there are supports the idea that 
the UK is a significant global player in the creative industries.213 As the charts below show, 
the UK’s market share of exports to 17 other countries ranks highly in the two categories 
of services for which UK data are available – Audiovisual and Related Services (including 
Artistic–related Services) and Personal, Recreational and Cultural Services (which, it should 
be noted, includes some non–creative areas like health and universities). In Audiovisual and 
Related Services, the UK has a market share of exports of just under 9 per cent, third in the 
world after the US and Canada, and in Personal, Recreational and Cultural Services, it is in 
second–place after the US.
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Figure 5.1  Market share and its evolution for Audiovisual and related  
 services, 2002-2010
Figure 5.2 Market share and its evolution for personal, recreational  
 and cultural services, 2002-2010
source: UNCTAD.
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The strengths of the UK’s creative economy can be further seen in industry measures of 
global market share and exports trends. For example, between 2002 and 2011, the UK 
market share for film almost doubled, from 9.1 per cent to 17.2 per cent.214 Over that same 
period, the UK film industry received a sixth of all awards from major academies and film 
festivals. In the TV industry, the UK is the world’s leading net exporter of formats, and in 
music, the second source of musical repertoire after the US.215 Meanwhile, in advertising, 
the UK’s creative agencies are consistently ranked second in the world, behind the US.216 
2. where are the innovation gaps?
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all is well with the UK’s creative economy. 
Even a cursory glance at the exports data we have presented indicates, for example, a 
decrease in the UK’s market share for the two sectors for which we have data (in the case 
of Audiovisual and Related Services, the UK’s market share fell by a third between 2002 
and 2010). 
The UK’s video games industry has slipped from third in international development 
rankings by retail sales in 2008 to sixth in 2010.217 Canadian developers have overtaken the 
UK globally, and also in the UK market.218 This is even before considering online and mobile 
platforms where the UK faces stiff competition from other countries like South Korea, 
Sweden, Finland and Germany.
More generally, if we look at the current landscape, it appears that the UK’s strengths are 
mostly around the creation and supply of goods, content and services, rather than in their 
distribution, or the development of platforms and devices such as those that have come to 
dominate creative industry value chains. Neither do we see UK companies producing the 
digital tools that are making the creative process more efficient for professionals and users. 
For example, although the UK is the undisputed European leader in music production, 
German companies such as Native Instruments and Ableton control the market for digital 
music–making instruments and have a strong presence in digital music distribution through 
SoundCloud.
yet, arguably, it is the developers of these tools and platforms that stand to gain most from 
the commercial opportunities presented by the Internet, as that is where the economies of 
scale are greatest, not least because of the strong network effects we discussed in Chapter 
Four. As venture capitalist Tim Chang noted apropos the App economy: “it’s too difficult 
to predict which developers will make money, so we’re backing the pickaxe suppliers. 
The guys who made it really rich in the goldrush were Levi Strauss selling jeans etc. – the 
enablers and suppliers.”219 
There is, then, the risk of repeating past mistakes where UK creative businesses generate 
great ideas – intellectual properties, genre–defining franchises and bold new concepts – 
that are then fully exploited by others, only this time on the Internet, with digital platforms 
replacing analogue publishers as the gatekeepers controlling global markets. Even in the 
absence of potential abuses of dominant position by Internet platforms such as those 
that we discuss in Chapter Nine, the UK’s creative companies may find themselves sliding 
past the ‘sagging middle’ and into a long tail which, the empirical evidence presented in 
the previous chapter suggests, turns out not to be such a good place to be in terms of 
commercial advantage.
Fragmentation and lack of scale is another worrying – and persistent – feature of the 
UK’s creative economy. As A Future for British Film, Chris Smith’s recent review of British 
film policy noted when discussing the progress of the UK film industry since the previous 
review in 1998: “Despite the successes of individual films, the strategic goal of more 
sustained growth across the sector has not yet been achieved.”220 Business registry data 
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(available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/bus-register/uk-business/2010/index.html) 
suggests that in sectors like audio–visual (which comprises ‘Motion picture, video and TV 
production, sound recording and music publishing’), ‘Creative, arts and entertainment’ 
(which includes live performance and visual arts) and ‘Computer programming and 
consultancy’, around 90 per cent of companies have fewer than four employees, compared 
with three–quarters in the economy as a whole. 
What’s more, these data understate the importance of small firms in the creative industries, 
because the business registry and the official surveys based on it do not cover firms that 
are neither registered for Value Added Tax (VAT) purposes nor run a PAyE scheme for 
employee income tax and national insurance contributions.221 Hard data on how many 
creative businesses this affects are not available but we know from the ONS’s Labour 
Force Survey that over a quarter of creative practitioners are self–employed, double the 
proportion for all occupations.
UK creative businesses, mostly small–scale, face the twin dangers of aggregation and 
fragmentation, with the commercial odds stacked against them on the digital shelves of 
tightly–controlled walled gardens, or in the wild waters of the open Internet. The best way 
to confront these risks is through more innovation: in new creative products and services, 
where the UK traditionally excels; in online business models, so that more of the value 
added can be captured by UK creative businesses; and in Internet platforms.
The fact that the UK is some way behind its peers in terms of digital infrastructure is a 
cause for concern in this context. Booz & Company recently put the UK in 12 place in its 
Digitisation Index, based on the speed, reliability, and ubiquity of the infrastructure, as 
well as the affordability of access, usability of services, and skills of the population. The 
UK’s average connection speed, at 5.7 Mbps in the middle of 2012, puts it at 18th place in 
the world, and – despite the government’s target of access to 24 Mbps for more than 90 
percent of the country by 2015 – the UK is lagging behind several of its peers in the overall 
rollout of superfast broadband.222 
If infrastructure were the only digital challenge facing the UK creative economy, tackling it 
might be straightforward, but our analysis suggests that the UK faces significant challenges 
on a number of fronts: arts policy; research and development; access to finance; arts policy; 
competition and regulation (including intellectual property); and education and skills. 
These are the issues that a policy agenda for the creative economy needs to address. Such 
an agenda must be informed by a ‘system’ view of innovation that identifies the resources, 
policies and frameworks that need to be in place to support innovation in the UK’s creative 
economy, setting the scene for our more detailed consideration of policy solutions in the 
chapters that follow. 
3. A creative innovation system
Academic research over the decades has shown that innovation happens within a system 
that includes the talent that generates, recombines, and experiments with new ideas, the 
lenders and investors that support these ideas, and the markets where these ideas are 
tested.223 
Contrary to laissez–faire accounts, we know that the public sector plays an essential part 
in this system – in fact, its action (or inaction, or mis–action) has been used to explain 
persistent differences in the competitive advantage of nations.224 Schools and universities 
produce the skilled personnel that generate innovation, along with much of the knowledge 
that is deployed in it. The fiscal regime establishes incentives for investing in research and 
development, while competition and intellectual property regulations set the rules of the 
game within which competition plays out and rewards are distributed. Governments invest 
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directly in public goods like infrastructure, and they procure vast quantities of services, as 
well as scan the horizon to identify promising technologies and set standards that reduce 
uncertainties about their performance and future evolution.225 
Networks are the glue that bind this innovation system together – ensuring that 
information about new opportunities, available resources and good practice are rapidly 
disseminated, helping different agents – entrepreneurs, businesses, investors, policymakers, 
regulators and educators – to coordinate their activities, and giving voice to smaller players 
and fragmented industries which, by their nature, are further away from the centres of 
power and decision–making.
This innovation system must be adaptable. Social systems as diverse as those built around 
the institutions of intellectual property and measurement have a strong tendency towards 
stability or inertia: once a particular way of doing things is established, it can become 
deeply entrenched.226 If, for example, an industry is too reliant on a declining business 
model, it is unlikely to be motivated towards cannibalising its own visible shorter–term 
interest. This is the famous ‘innovators’ dilemma’ that has bedevilled the digital transition 
of creative sectors such as music, film and publishing to online markets.227 Compounding 
the problem, those who might lose from innovation can become vested interests and lobby 
policymakers to block change and stop innovation in its tracks.
The way in which all these components are configured varies across industries. This has led 
scholars to focus their attention on specific ‘sectoral systems of innovation’, defined as “a 
set of products and the set of agents carrying out market and non–market interactions for 
the creation, production and sale of those products.”228 
The main building blocks of a sectoral innovation system are knowledge and technology, 
actors and networks and institutions.229 There is a rich body of research that has examined 
how these different blocks are configured in the sectoral innovation systems of industries 
like biotechnology, manufacturing and information technology.230 There are no such 
studies looking at the creative economy, but if we are going to understand how to support 
innovation within it, we need to understand where this innovation takes place. This is what 
we mean by the ‘creative innovation system.’31 
In Chapter Three we discussed the essence of creative goods and services (“novel, or 
significantly enhanced products whose final form is not fully specified in advance of 
production”), and in Chapter Four we reviewed the trajectories of creative technologies 
which are manifest in particular industrial structures (characterised by, for example, 
industrial fragmentation and the presence of gatekeepers). All of these things form 
components of the creative innovation system. They are joined by the actors, large and 
small, on the supply side (incumbents and entrepreneurs) and, on the demand side 
(business clients and consumers). 
Here, we focus on the ‘public’ part of the creative innovation system – that which is more 
closely aligned with policy domains where action can improve (or hinder) the innovative 
performance of the creative economy, and therefore, its prospects for growth.232 
What are the practical needs of the creative economy from this innovation system 
perspective? What does a creative innovation system look like? 
•	It has an education system233 – including schools as well as universities, colleges and 
training providers – which supplies talent with the right mix of skills. In the case of the 
creative economy, this includes the technical and artistic skills to do creative work, but 
also the commercial and management skills needed to realise commercial value from 
it. The education system must also produce consumers with an appetite for innovative 
goods and services.
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•	It incentivises research and development in the creative industries, just as it does in 
other sectors through fiscal incentives and funding programmes. Research on IT and 
software sectoral systems of innovation highlights the importance of basic research 
which can lead to insights that can then be applied in the private sector.234 In the 
creative economy, where innovation often involves the creative deployment of new 
technologies (not just their production), research in disciplines such as the arts and 
humanities and social sciences becomes central.235 Many studies have also highlighted 
the spatial dimensions of innovation using concepts like industrial clusters and 
regional innovation systems.236 These are equally important in the creative economy, 
with the added consideration of the linkages between not–for–profit arts and cultural 
institutions, and commercial creative businesses.237 
•	It is hard to overstate the importance for innovation in the creative economy of risk 
finance and the institutions that supply it. The literature on innovation in digital sectors 
like software and internet services has for example linked access to venture capital to 
the success of these industries in the USA and Israel.238 
•	The business and technology dynamics that we described in Chapter Four can 
generate situations of monopoly, and abuse of dominant position. It is the role of the 
competition regime to keep tabs on the activities of gatekeepers, identify abuses of 
dominant position where they occur, and act swiftly to remedy them. That requires 
competition authorities who are well–informed and have the power to act speedily and 
with the authority when necessary. At the same time, the regulatory system, including 
competition supervision, should not be so costly that it presents a burden or be so 
heavy–handed that it penalises business success and stymies innovation.
•	It has a balanced copyright regime which does not pit rights owners against technology 
companies and users, and which recognises that monetising content on the Internet 
and allowing access to the public need not be mutually exclusive.
•	A unique component of the creative innovation system is the publicly subsidised 
arts and cultural sector. Public support enables it to take artistic risks that might not 
be possible in a wholly commercial environment.239 But partly sheltered as it is from 
commercial competitive pressures, this sector may need incentives from its funders 
to undertake digital innovation to maximise audience reach and value. It may further 
need incentives to promote spillovers between the subsidised arts and the commercial 
creative economy.
•	It invests in public digital infrastructure where the market might otherwise under–
invest, and procures digital services to support innovative delivery of public services 
and the more effective functioning of government. 
Figure 5.3 attempts to bring together all these insights and maps the UK’s creative 
innovation system and the main institutions that comprise it. Budget figures are annual 
aggregates drawn from public sources unless indicated (no attempt has been made to 
identify separately spend in the creative economy). In the chapters that follow, we assess 
how well each component of this system is functioning, and then set out, in practical terms, 
our policy recommendations in each of the key areas that we have identified.
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Figure 5.3 An institutional map of the uk’s creative innovation system
references: 
1. 2011-2012 (includes teaching and research spend); 2. 2012-2013; 3. Economic and Social Sciences Research 
Council, 2011-2012; 4. Higher Education Innovation Fund, 2013-2014; 5. 2010-2011; 6. Arts and Humanities 
Research Council, 2011-2012; 7. Engineering and Phsyical Sciences Research Council 2011-2012; 8. Local Enterprise 
Partnerships, 2011-2012; 9. 2010-2011; 10. 2011-2012; 11. 2008-2012 (annualised); 12. 2011-2012; 13. 2011-2012;  
14. 2010-2011; 15. 2010-2011; 16. 2011-2012; 17. 2011-2012; 18. 2010-2011 (original commissions); 19. 2009-2010;  
20. 2011- 2012; 21. Direct expenses 2011-2012. 22. 2011 2012; 23. 2011-2012; 24. Budget for 2013-2014 25. 2012-2013; 
26. Office for Fair Trading, 2011-2012; 27. Intellectual Property Office, 2011-2012; 28. Competition Commission, 
2011-2012; 29. Information Commissioner’s Office, 2011-2012; 30. 2012-2014 (annualised); 31. Enterprise Investment 
Scheme 2010-2011; 32. Enterprise Capital Fund, 2011-2013 (annualised) 33. Venture Capital Trust, 2011-2012;  
34. 2007-2012 (annualised) 35. Enterprise Finance Guarantee, (overall government commitment); 36. 2011-2013 
(annualised); 37. Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme, 2013 2014; 38. UK Innovation Investment Fund, 2009-2011 
(annualised). 39. 2012-2013; 40. 2012-2013. 41. 2011-2012; 42. 2011-2012. 43. 2011-2012.
proposAl two
policymakers should establish a ‘creative innovation system’ framework within which 
strategic priorities can be addressed in a coherent and effective manner.
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6 reseArcH And developMent
It is widely recognised that innovation – at its simplest, “new ideas, successfully applied”240 
– is the driver of long–run economic growth. In the UK, it is estimated that innovation 
accounted for almost two–thirds of labour productivity growth in the 2000–2008 period, 
for example.241 
Similarly, a glance at the creative economy’s fastest growing businesses reveals a profusion 
of innovations. Some of these are technological, like the colossal infrastructure that 
Facebook uses to manage 500 terabytes of data every day;242 some are product and 
service innovations, exemplified by Apple’s iDevices; and others are managerial innovations, 
such as Valve Corporation’s famous decision to abolish its hierarchies to increase its 
employees’ productivity.243 Then there are the ‘softer’ innovations – new stories, universes 
and characters – which often build on, but sometimes also inspire, these other innovative 
activities: Double Negative’s ground–breaking visual effects, the interactive iPad app re–
curating T. S. Eliot’s poem, The Wasteland, or accompanying Björk’s 2011 Biophilia album; or 
The Guardian Online’s intricate data visualisations.244 
At one level, these innovations are but artefacts and practices – new products, services, 
ways of working and making money. At a deeper level, they embody knowledge about 
what is technically feasible and what customers demand: in short, what works and what 
does not. Microsoft’s Kinect shows that it is possible to supply consumer electronics with 
advanced motion–capture capabilities. Avatar indicates the creative and commercial 
possibilities of 3D film. 
1. A techno–centric view of r&d 
Research and development (R&D) is an umbrella term for the investments made to create 
the new knowledge embodied in innovation – including upstream, riskier basic research 
as well as less open–ended, more applied activities.245 This knowledge has some features 
of what economists call ‘public goods’, which means that ‘first to market’ innovators will 
generally be unable to capture all the returns from their original investments in R&D. Only 
a fraction of the overall revenues generated by the CGI motion picture market accrued to 
Pixar,246 the Californian company that arguably kickstarted this market in its modern guise, 
for example. The same is true for the Graphical User Interface (GUI) originally developed 
by Xerox researchers, and subsequently deployed commercially by Apple and Microsoft. 
Conversely, late–comers can learn from their predecessors’ failures and avoid repeating the 
same mistakes. Electronic Arts’ decision in 2012 to change the business model in its much 
heralded Star Wars: The Old Republic Massive Online Game serves as a costless lesson for 
other companies thinking about targeting that particular market. 
These knowledge spillovers – uncounted and unrealised by the innovator – mean that 
overall levels of investment in R&D will tend to be below what would be socially desirable, 
providing a rationale for government support. yet in practice such support is dominated 
by a ‘science and technology–centric’ (STEM) view of R&D, despite decades of criticism 
against such narrowness of vision.247 In other words, when talking about R&D, policymakers 
tend to think of people in white coats in the lab, new machines and drugs, which is 
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quite different from what R&D usually looks like in the creative economy. There, R&D is 
more often than not geared towards resolving ‘product’, ‘process’ and ‘business model’ 
uncertainties involving the novel application of technologies rather than scientific and 
technological ones per se, even though the application can in some cases lead to further 
technological innovations.248 Neither does R&D in the creative economy necessarily entail 
discrete knowledge breakthroughs that can be captured in patents, or even in academic 
publications.249 Add to this the fact that creative R&D activities often happen in an iterative 
rather than ‘linear’ way,250 and that they involve sole traders and micro–businesses that, as 
we noted in Chapter Five, are invisible to official surveys, it should come as no surprise that 
they can go ‘hidden’ and unsupported.251 
The narrowness of official R&D definitions is not concealed, however; indeed, it is openly 
declared. It is there in how the Treasury routinely refers to the public research budget as 
the ‘science’ budget252 (despite almost £260 million of the £2.5 billion annual budget for 
the Research Councils being allocated to the arts and humanities and social sciences).253 
And it is apparent in the OECD’s Frascati Manual, which provides international guidelines 
for R&D definitions and metrics, and describes it as including “creative work undertaken 
on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge 
of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new 
applications…” HM Revenue & Customs’ (HMRC) notes for prospective claimants for UK 
R&D tax relief state that all “works in the arts, humanities and social sciences” are excluded 
from the definition. 
An important implication of all this is that the vast majority of innovation policies in 
the UK have been designed and implemented with sectors such as manufacturing and 
pharmaceuticals in mind, which rely on scientific R&D processes, making it harder if not 
impossible for businesses undertaking creative R&D to benefit from them. 
We need to refresh our definitions and step up our efforts to measure R&D in all its 
forms.254 We also need to make sure that the innovation policies currently in place in the 
UK – including R&D tax credits, Technology Strategy Board R&D programmes, demand–
led innovation policies (including public procurement), university knowledge exchange 
programmes and local strategies to develop innovative clusters – are all fit for purpose for 
the creative economy.255 We look at each of these in turn. 
2. r&d tax relief
R&D tax relief is the main mechanism through which the UK government supports 
R&D in the private sector (currently to the tune of over £1 billion a year).256 As typically 
configured, tax relief addresses an important dilemma in innovation policy: how can the 
state encourage private investment in innovation while avoiding the seemingly impossible 
task of selecting in advance which innovation projects will be successful and which will 
fail? It does so by providing tax relief on R&D spending regardless of project outcomes, on 
the grounds that this spending generates positive knowledge spillovers whether or not a 
project succeeds. The empirical evidence suggests that R&D tax relief has a stronger effect 
on R&D spending in some countries (France, Netherlands) than in others (Spain).257 
The fact that all businesses in the UK can apply for R&D tax relief means that, in principle, 
there should be little risk that the public sector distorts investment by favouring some 
sectors over others.258 In practice, however, the implementation of the scheme, and the way 
in which ‘eligible’ expenditures that qualify for R&D tax relief are defined, raises barriers for 
innovators in areas like the creative economy.259 Put simply, the scheme is less supportive 
of R&D by creative businesses because it was not designed with their R&D processes and 
outputs in mind. 
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The UK video games industry – with its technologically able workforce260 and high levels of 
innovative activity261 – is a striking case in point. Given the high potential for application of 
games technologies in many sectors, we would also expect R&D by games businesses to 
generate significant spillovers into other sectors. Consistent with this, games engines are 
used for visualisation and training in other industries, and in the ‘gamification’ movement, 
which deploys games–like mechanisms to encourage desired behaviours in users, such as 
those that promote health, or improve learning outcomes.262 
However, the video games sector and its R&D activities have distinctive features which, 
in some cases, prevent it from benefiting from R&D tax relief in the UK. In the first place, 
innovation in games companies – as in many other creative businesses – is typically 
organised around collaborative projects which cut across teams rather than in a specialised 
department in a single corporation. This makes R&D and production entangled rather 
than sequential, and makes it difficult for developers to account for staff times to prepare 
R&D tax relief claims in the way that a pharmaceuticals company, say, can account for the 
time of its research scientists. Furthermore, the success of innovative games technologies, 
software and designs is determined through testing it with users, however testing activities 
do not qualify as eligible expenditures for the purposes of the tax relief.263 Also excluded 
are the investments in data analytics that help online games companies adapt their 
products to the needs of users – an increasing problem for intensive users of analytics in 
other creative sectors like software, advertising and music too.264
All of these problems are of course exacerbated in the case of the creative industries which 
are disproportionately made up of small businesses, as discussed in Chapter Five. Smaller 
firms naturally find it more difficult to engage with the process of applying and securing 
R&D tax relief. In its 2011 Plan for Growth, the Government announced welcome changes 
in the R&D tax relief scheme to make it more attractive to SMEs, including an increase 
in the rate of tax relief for companies with less than 500 employees.265 HMRC, however, 
also decided that it did not want to complicate the scheme by adding new qualifying 
expenditures – which means that the in–built biases against R&D in the creative economy 
that we have described are still very much a feature of the scheme.266 
3. the technology strategy Board
The UK government also funds R&D directly through the Technology Strategy Board (TSB), 
its “prime channel for supporting business–led technology innovation.”267 The TSB spends 
roughly £300 million each year on science and technology–focused R&D programmes. 
In contrast to the (at least in theory) industry–agnostic R&D tax relief, the TSB primarily 
disburses its funds through targeted R&D grants, challenges and networks which seek to 
‘connect and catalyse’ different parts of the UK’s innovation system. As an arm’s length 
body, the TSB can recruit people with the mix of skills it judges necessary to fulfil its remit.
In recent years, the TSB has targeted the creative economy with several initiatives – 
including a dedicated creative industries knowledge transfer network,268 challenge prizes 
through its ICTomorrow programme,269 various collaborative R&D programmes, and, its 
newest venture, the ‘Connected Digital Economy Catapult’ (CDEC).270 In its 2013 Budget, 
the government committed £15 million to a new TSB–run competition to support digital 
content production by consortia involving creative businesses, educational research 
facilities and training providers.271 Although these investments are far from negligible in 
size (amounting to more than 200 projects in total, worth £33 million, in the last five years 
excluding CDEC and the new competition announced in the 2013 Budget),272 they have 
lacked visibility and transparency. As a consequence, it is difficult to judge whether they 
have been effectively targeted, or have achieved their desired impacts. 
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In addition to this, the TSB has sometimes faced criticism that its predominant focus on 
technology–centric R&D (as the organisation’s name clearly indicates) prevents it from 
truly supporting innovation in the creative economy, which it often appears to treat as a 
subsidiary of digital, rather than a significant growth sector in its own right.
4. demand–side policies and public procurement for innovation
As by some margin the single largest purchaser of goods and services in the UK,273 the 
public sector can in principle engineer a step change in its innovation and growth by using 
its procurement budget to influence the development of innovative products and services. 
yet, despite well–intentioned initiatives such as the Technology Strategy Board’s Small 
Business Research Initiative274 and a series of design–led challenges run by the Design 
Council,275 it is fair to say that the systematic use of public procurement to drive innovation 
in the UK remains an unfulfilled dream. 
Successive reviews have concluded that deep–rooted cultural barriers in government 
departments lie at the heart of the problem.276 The current fiscal climate, which leads 
government departments to prioritise near–term, more certain cost savings over longer 
term, uncertain service outcomes, reinforces the problem. This manifesto is not the place 
to revisit these complex issues in any detail, but it is important to note that should the 
cultural obstacles be overcome, procurement could potentially be a very important driver 
for innovation in the UK’s creative economy.
This is partly because the UK’s public sector spends the equivalent of around 1 per cent of 
GDP on information technology.277 Within this, government departments have traditionally 
relied on a small number of large systems integrators to provide their digital services. 
Such contracts have been lucrative for the winning bidders, but out of reach for many 
SMEs supplying innovative digital services who find procurement procedures excessively 
bureaucratic. Partly in recognition of this, the Government is introducing a new Digital 
Procurement Framework, led by the Government Digital Service (GDS), to streamline 
procedures so that agile SMEs can more easily compete for government contracts.278 The 
push across government to open its data is also partly motivated to stimulate the market 
for innovative digital services by SMEs.279 While the steps the GDS is taking to reform 
departmental tendering processes are very welcome, there is a risk that they may not go 
far enough to make a dent on digital service markets, nor are they sufficiently joined up 
with other parts of the public sector (including the BBC). 
EU public procurement regulations have also been criticised for creating barriers for 
SMEs that want to tender for government contracts. The most recent update of the EU 
Public Sector Directive (which should be implemented during 2014)280 aims to increase 
participation of SMEs (from all sectors) – for example, by making it harder for EU 
governments to set disproportionate financial thresholds for tendering that are harder for 
SMEs to satisfy and also by permitting the establishment of official lists and certification 
for pre–qualification purposes which reduces the administration burden in tendering for 
bidders. The Directive also introduces a new ‘innovation partnership procedure’ in line 
with the EU’s Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.281 The 
procedure will allow a contractor to propose the development of an ‘innovative product, 
service or works’ in response to a procurement notice in the Official Journal of the 
European Union (OJEU) where public tenders are announced. 
As part of our recommendation that government should bring the creative economy into 
the frame of mainstream R&D policies, the UK should consider how can these changes be 
leveraged to support innovation in the UK’s creative economy, and to explore the efficacy 
of leading a campaign in Europe to improve the recognition of the R&D exemptions from 
the EU public procurement rules as being applicable to the development of digital services, 
where such services can be shown to be genuine R&D. 
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In addition to using its purchasing power to ‘pull’ innovation from its contractors directly,  
government can also spur demand for innovation by providing incentives for buyers of 
innovative goods and services elsewhere in the economy (perhaps the best example of 
this are the so–called ‘innovation vouchers’ used to encourage more interaction between 
SMEs and universities). Nesta’s previous work has shown how vouchers distributed to SMEs 
which can be used to buy in the services of innovative creative businesses can also boost 
innovation in SMEs, at least in the short term.282 The 2005 Cox Review, which looked at the 
role of design as a driver of productivity and innovation, made specific recommendations 
about how this could be done for design, including measures to raise design’s profile with 
managers by scaling up the Design Council’s Designing Demand programme, and setting 
up a national network of creativity and innovation centres.283 Despite the growing body of 
evidence in the UK and beyond284 of the important contribution of design as an intangible 
investment driving economic growth, this agenda has unfortunately languished in the UK in 
recent years.
5. the public research base and knowledge exchange
The public funding of upstream, basic research in universities is another route, adopted by 
governments of all persuasions, to address the market failure which results from knowledge 
spillovers from R&D. The creative economy is no different in this regard. Funding for 
computer graphics research by the US ARPA (Advanced Research Projects Agency, later 
renamed DARPA) at the University of Utah famously resulted in the breakthroughs that 
gave rise to the modern CGI animation and visual effects industries; it also provided the 
training ground for creative entrepreneurs that would go on to create Pixar, LucasFilm, 
Silicon Graphics and Adobe.285 The ‘audioscrobbler’ music recommendation algorithm 
underpinning online radio Last.FM was developed at the University of Southampton.286 
Basic research in the arts and humanities can also open up new creative and commercial 
opportunities. It develops the store of cultural heritage, traditions and practices that 
creative content draws on; it contributes to the public’s engagement with culture and 
provides professional reflection on it.287 Thechineseroom, the games studio behind 2012’s 
indie breakthrough game ‘Dear Esther’ (which sold a quarter of a million copies within half 
a year of release), originated from a research project on digital storytelling funded by the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council.288 
In recent years, governments have also introduced funding programmes such as the Higher 
Education Innovation Fund (HEIF) in England, to incentivise universities to apply their 
research findings for use in the economy. The research impact goals of today’s funding 
regime reflects this aim, the latest of many efforts to avoid universities decoupling research 
from the needs of the private sector and wider society. As part of this ‘impact agenda’, 
universities in the past decade have been strongly encouraged to package their research 
outputs as intellectual property (typically, patents) which are then available for commercial 
licensing. The funding that universities in England receive according to the ‘Sainsbury 
formula’ measures the success of their external collaborations precisely in these terms.289 
Here we again see the misalignment between a ‘linear model’ of R&D, linked to (somewhat 
outdated) views of the way innovation happens even in science and technology, and the 
innovation activities (and knowledge needs) of the creative economy, where patent–based 
licensing packages are rarely of central importance. 
Geoffrey Crossick, previously Vice–Chancellor of the University of London and Warden 
of Goldsmiths’, has warned of the dangers of assuming that the types of knowledge that 
are relevant for the creative economy can be readily codified and transmitted in the form 
of patents.290 Instead, he characterises the creative economy as one involving ‘knowledge 
transfer without widgets’ which includes diverse knowledge modes sitting anywhere 
along a spectrum with more or less ‘scientific’ (that is, knowledge which is predictive and 
general) and ‘humanistic’ (knowledge which is interpretive, and intuitive) characteristics.291 
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In many parts of the creative economy, commercial and creative success is linked to the 
seamless integration of these varied types of knowledge (a theme we revisit in Chapter 
Eleven in our discussion of education and skills); as the late Steve Jobs said, “it’s in Apple’s 
DNA that technology alone is not enough — it’s technology married with liberal arts, 
married with the humanities, that yields us the result that makes our heart sing.” 
The dominant organisational model for universities, where research and teaching are 
conducted within ‘disciplinary silos,’ may hinder this ‘fusion’ of knowledge which is so 
important for the creative economy. Currently, a number of initiatives are in place to 
promote cross–disciplinary working, including research programmes that reach across 
the research funding councils, such as the Global Uncertainties programme,292 involving 
all seven UK research funding councils, and the Connected Communities programme, 
which is led by the AHRC, but supported by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC). The AHRC’s 
funding of four major knowledge exchange hubs focused upon the creative economy 
represents another initiative to encourage collaboration between academic disciplines and 
in their interface with business and other players in the creative economy.293 There is also 
a growing focus on multi–disciplinary teaching at postgraduate level in areas that relate 
to the creative economy.294 These are welcome moves, but both institutional and funding 
barriers continue to constrain them, leaving them at the margins compared with more 
traditional ‘scientific’ inquiry.295
Crossick’s thesis challenges conventional thinking about how the research base impacts 
the economy. It also raises difficult questions about the basis for public funding of research 
in the creative area. If public funding is conventionally justified through the existence of 
knowledge spillovers, what happens when the knowledge cannot be codified? In what 
sense is it able to ‘spill over’? Perhaps a more convincing economic argument for public 
funding of research in these cases would be to incentivise researchers to deploy the skills 
and competences they have developed through their research experience in other socially 
valuable contexts – including the private, public and third sectors. 
In any case, there is some evidence that many arts and humanities researchers are heavily 
engaged with the creative economy, but often ‘below the radar’ and in ways which are not 
well captured by conventional metrics of knowledge exchange. For example, while they 
are less likely to have taken out a patent, licensed research outputs, formed a business or a 
spin–out or consultancy than academics in other disciplines, a greater proportion of those 
working in creative arts and media have had their research applied in a commercial context 
(25 per cent compared with 20 per cent in non–arts and humanities disciplines). Some 
61 per cent of arts and humanities academics interact with other organisations through 
membership of networks, 55 per cent provide informal advice, and 37 per cent provide 
consultancy services.296 This is in line with the interactive view of knowledge transfer in the 
creative economy advocated by Geoffrey Crossick, where knowledge is “constituted as a 
social phenomenon… It is given form in social interactions within the value chains that go 
outside the academic world”.297 
Notwithstanding these connections, however, the systems and processes of major research 
universities are not always well suited to dealing with the SMEs which populate the 
creative economy. Their time horizons may be very different, and their key personnel may 
not be familiar with university bureaucracies. Their relationships with university research 
programmes are bound to be different from the situation in science and engineering, where 
laboratory– or ‘testbed’–based researchers move across the boundaries of business and 
academia, from lab to lab, with relative ease. The experience gained over the last five years 
by creative economy ‘labs’, such as the Bristol Pervasive Media Studio,298 a partnership 
between the University of West of England, Bristol University and the Watershed arts 
centre, is generating useful evidence and experience for addressing this challenge.
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From the perspective of universities, a business–focused relationship between academic 
researchers and digital creative economy companies remains an aspiration rather than a 
reality. It is still rare (though by no means unknown) to find business school economists 
and arts and humanities researchers who are comfortable with and knowledgeable about 
issues of computer science and digital technology. The cross–research council Digital 
Economy Programme, which since its inception in 2008 has invested £138 million, is an 
important case in point. Independent evaluation of the programme’s work to date suggests 
that it has generated strong peer–reviewed research outputs, but that its economic impact 
has so far been limited. Some 72 per cent of the grants awarded have been led by Principal 
Investigators with an engineering and computing background. The equivalent numbers 
for arts and humanities and economics are negligible. The evaluation panel concludes that 
“Our biggest concern is the need for more economics and business understanding of digital 
economies to put alongside the technological and user aspects.”299 
Box 6.1: stanford university and the growth of silicon valley 
Silicon Valley in the San Francisco Bay Area is of course the most well–known 
example of a successful and sustainable ICT cluster. It has been the subject of 
many academic studies (e.g. see Saxenian, 1994, Feldman and Braunerjehlm, 
2007), yet a number of myths persist. While it is often characterised as a hotbed of 
entrepreneurial, private sector–led innovation and growth, the very significant role 
played by the public sector is less often acknowledged. This is the case too with the 
academic community, in particular Stanford University, which has been a crucible of 
new technologies and high–tech start–ups, making a considerable contribution to the 
economic success of the Valley. 
Stanford’s model since Frederick Terman set up the Stanford Industrial Park in 1951 is 
the textbook example of a virtuous cycle: attract and retain academic talent that can 
bring in federal research funding and use those funds to develop industrially–relevant 
research, which can in turn build capacity for more and better research. Stanford has 
been an undeniably important part of the Silicon Valley success story. It has been 
estimated that Stanford technology start–ups accounted for 60 per cent of Silicon 
Valley revenues in 1988 and 1996 (including Hewlett Packard) (Lenoir, 2004).300
The strength of this model stems from the synergies it builds between public 
funding and industry–relevant research. Collaboration with industry gives Stanford 
a competitive advantage when bidding for Federal research funding, as well as 
opportunities to carry out contract research (that said, while Stanford does well in 
terms of industrially funded R&D activity, this remains a relatively small proportion of 
its overall research income, particularly when set against the costs of conducting this 
research).301 
Stanford’s ability to work closely with industry, and to spark new waves of 
entrepreneurialism in Silicon Valley, is enhanced by its flexible approach to IP, 
which for example made it possible for Jerry yang and David Filo, and Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin, to spin out yahoo! and Google from Stanford, even though 
both innovations had been developed while they were studying their PhDs there 
(in the case of Google, Stanford had even taken a patent on the Search engine, 
but ultimately determined that Brin and Page were best placed to develop the 
technology and licensed it to them). These entrepreneurial duos were therefore 
able to exploit their inventions. In the case of yahoo!, the university benefitted 
indirectly through the creation of the yahoo! Founders Chair in Stanford’s School of 
Engineering.
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Stanford also operates a programme called Media X through which it disseminates 
new research and technology around human computer interaction to a wide network 
of industry members in the media and entertainment sector. These industry members 
pay a fee for access to this knowledge and for the ability to shape Stanford’s research 
agenda by participating in the design of research themes for interdisciplinary teams 
across Stanford’s faculty. Again, the application of IP policy by Media X is flexible. In 
the words of one senior researcher, they “trust that value will return to them in other 
ways”. 
sources: 
Saxenian, A. (1994) ‘Regional Advantage.’ Boston, MA: MIT Press; Braunerhjelm, P. and Feldman, M. (Eds.) 
(2007) ‘Cluster Genesis.’ Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lenoir, T. (2004) ‘Myths about Stanford’s interactions with Industry.’ See: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/
evnts/4097/TLenoir_Myths_about_Stanford.pdf Ku K. (2002) ‘Software Licensing in the University 
Environment.’; Interview conducted as part of an evaluation of the Edinburgh–Stanford Link Programme for 
Scottish Enterprise (EKOS, 2004).
6. creative clusters 
It is well known that innovation has an important geographical dimension; that ideas 
move more quickly and easily between companies that are located close to one another. 
This is because it is easier to see (and imitate) what happens ‘at your doorstep’ than on 
the other side of the world. Knowledge is often circulated through personal networks, 
or when individuals move between companies, or start new ones – they tend for various 
reasons to do this within the same location, as long as there are the opportunities for 
them to do so.302 Together with the fact that a critical mass of companies within an 
industry tends to attract skilled labour, as well as specialist suppliers and investors (what 
economists call ‘agglomeration economies’) these innovation spillovers generate ‘clusters’ 
– highly productive, innovative, fast–growing and potentially resilient concentrations of 
companies.303 
Echoing the importance of innovation in the creative economy, we find that creative 
businesses have a remarkable propensity to form these clusters. In fact, some of the most 
renowned clusters in the world – IT, software and Internet companies in Silicon Valley 
and film in Hollywood – are overwhelmingly ‘creative’ as we have defined it in Chapter 
Three (See Box 6.1 for an account of Silicon Valley and the role of Stanford University in 
its growth).304 Nesta’s mapping of the geography of creativity in Great Britain shows that 
while London dominates the landscape, there are other important ‘creative hotspots’ 
beyond the capital – in cities like Manchester, Brighton, Cambridge, Edinburgh and Cardiff, 
to name but a few.305 
There also appear to be important complementarities between the (not–for–profit) arts 
and cultural infrastructure and the commercial creative economy. These complementarities 
are at the heart of the influential ‘Creative Cities’ idea put forward by US economist Richard 
Florida. According to Florida, a city’s arts and cultural scene makes it more competitive and 
wealthy by providing services and experiences that attract creative and entrepreneurial 
professionals.306, 307 Currid (2007) attributes much of New york’s outstanding success as 
a creative hub to the web of informal social networks surrounding its vibrant nightlife.308 
Pratt (2009) documents a similar story in London’s Hoxton in the 1990s,309 and emerging 
evidence from the AHRC Brighton Fuse project (which looks at digital media companies 
in Brighton) points in the same direction.310 Glasgow is yet another example in which 
culture has played a key role in both regenerating the city and contributing to its creative 
renaissance.311 A recent Nesta study looking at the connection between arts and cultural 
clustering and the salaries of professionals in the ‘commercial’ creative economy in English 
towns supports the idea that the urban arts and cultural infrastructure makes a significant 
contribution to their productivity.312
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Both clusters and creative cities frameworks have however been heavily criticised by 
researchers who have questioned the way they are defined, the assumptions that underpin 
them, how feasible it is to build them, and the benefits that they can actually generate.313 
This has not stopped policymakers (in the UK and elsewhere) from trying to ‘catalyse’ them 
where they didn’t exist previously, or to scale them up where they did. 
So, we have seen strategies aimed at attracting inward investment by ‘anchor tenants’ 
(currently in the case of East London’s Tech City);314 and by incentivising creative 
businesses to integrate into local supply chains (Manchester).315 Other cities have bet on 
their cultural sectors (Glasgow, Liverpool), in the hope of building a ‘creative brand’ that is 
attractive for the highly educated professionals that Florida includes in his ‘creative class’.316 
There have been many place–based interventions aimed at creating entrepreneurial 
networks where wider informal learning can take place.317 Universities have also tried to 
nurture some of these creative clusters, not least by providing incubators and facilities for 
creative start–ups and spin–outs.318 
The track record of these initiatives is patchy to say the least. This is partly a consequence 
of unrealistic expectations among policymakers – experience suggests that successful 
clusters develop organically and over long periods of time. They are very hard to ‘build 
from scratch’, which is what some policymakers have tried to do.319, 320 In some cases, they 
have erred by attempting to import lessons and models from other places ‘wholesale’, 
without paying sufficient attention to local circumstances and conditions. Silicon Valley and 
Bilbao have been used as the templates for ‘cookie cutter’ creative clusters and cities in 
some parts of the UK, with returns which are, as yet, far from clear.
7. An agenda to support r&d in the creative economy
Many of the defining features of the creative economy and its R&D processes that we have 
discussed make it a difficult target for innovation policy – the way it integrates diverse 
knowledge bases, including non–STEM as well as STEM disciplines, the importance of ‘non–
technological’ forms of innovation, the rapid rates of change in the technologies they use 
and the markets they serve, and last but not least, the micro size of the vast majority of 
creative businesses. But, as a significant and rapidly growing part of the UK economy, its 
contributions to R&D and innovation can no longer be ignored.
All of this suggests that policymakers responsible for designing and funding existing 
approaches to R&D need to take a hard look at the framework and policies currently 
in place. The aim should be to remove the inbuilt biases which create undue barriers 
for creative businesses seeking to benefit from existing structures, whilst re–designing 
initiatives on the basis of evidence from the growing number of creative economy 
experiments. 
In the case of the R&D tax credit, it is time to take seriously the new classes of R&D 
expenditures in areas such as online usability testing and analytics which UK companies 
will need to undertake to thrive in online markets.321 Policymakers should also examine 
the lessons emerging from overseas experiments, such as Singapore’s Productivity 
and Innovation Tax Credit, with its wider class of eligible R&D expenditures, and their 
applicability in the UK.322
The AHRC’s commitment to strong, new channels for knowledge exchange is clearly set 
out in its latest strategy document.323 A £16 million investment in four knowledge exchange 
hubs for the creative economy (2012 to 2016) promotes experimentation in a number of 
directions: REACT, the Bristol–based hub in which one of the authors of this manifesto 
is a participant, is focused upon brokering commercially valuable links between arts and 
humanities academics and small technology firms.324 Similarly, the Design in Action hub in 
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Dundee is researching, developing and evaluating new products and processes through 
the application of design principles across a range of sectors from health to energy. 
These experiments deserve, and require, rigorous monitoring and mining for lessons of 
success and failure. They, and other Research Council programmes, should also attach 
more importance to developing collaborative research strategies with universities in other 
countries (such as the US and China) where the UK has much to learn. This may require 
looking at the terms and conditions dictating where research money is spent.
The TSB’s recent efforts to engage with creative businesses is most welcome, but at a 
strategic level it has been hindered by too narrow a focus on technological innovation. With 
the CDEC, it has the opportunity to pull together its various workstreams with creative and 
digital businesses into a genuine Creative Economy Programme, covering areas as wide as 
health and education, where the creative use of digital technologies has great potential. In 
its pre–launch phase, the Catapult team has worked hard to breach the cultural line which 
separates small creative and technology companies from the big industrial players who 
play leading roles in other Catapults.325 The CDEC should be viewed as another, important 
experiment, with potentially significant implications for the TSB’s innovation agenda in the 
creative economy. But this also means that it needs to be evaluated rigorously, in order to 
assess its impact, and learn from it.
Elsewhere in the UK, the challenges of shoehorning creative businesses into mainstream 
innovation support mechanisms has led to the development of small–scale but more 
targeted initiatives aimed at encouraging creative innovation. The Northern Ireland 
Executive’s Creative Industries Innovation Fund is one such example, in which creative 
businesses can apply for funding support to undertake collaborative R&D projects that 
cross sub–sector boundaries. In its first round, the Fund distributed £4 million to creative 
businesses, and preliminary data from its evaluation suggest that it has been successful in 
promoting innovation activities, with almost three–quarters of recipients claiming to have 
developed new products and services.326 The Fund has re–launched with an additional £4 
million of funding over the next three years. Welcome though these initiatives are, they are 
fragmented and do not solve the fundamental mismatch between the needs of the creative 
economy and the approach of mainstream innovation support. 
In the area of clusters, in Box 6.2 we set out some lessons from past experiences in cluster 
development that will be relevant for regional and local bodies trying to spur innovation 
and growth in their creative economies. In particular, policymakers must resist the 
temptation to build greenfield creative clusters, and instead take a hard – and realistic – 
look at existing industrial strengths. They should follow a more ‘data–driven approach’, 
mining data to establish where there are ‘latent’ agglomerations in their regions which, with 
the right support, could develop the dense web of networks that are conducive to clusters, 
innovation and growth.327 
In this respect, initiatives like the Tech City Map,328 the Cambridge Cluster Map329 and 
the AHRC’s Brighton Fuse330 are attempts to adopt a more pragmatic, consultative 
and evidence–based approach to cluster development that should be encouraged and 
rolled out more widely331 (and in the case of the Brighton Fuse at least, one that also 
acknowledges the complex connections between the not–for–profit arts and cultural 
infrastructure and the commercial creative and digital industries). Related initiatives in 
Scotland (such as Creative Clyde),332 Wales (the proposed Cardiff Bay Creative Industries 
Hub) and Northern Ireland (Creative Industries Innovation Fund, see above) reflect the 
growing salience of devolved political structures in the design of industrial policy and, in 
principle, add diversity to the UK creative economy’s R&D base. Without the capacity to 
rigorously evaluate evidence and absorb lessons, however, much of the energy involved in 
these numerous initiatives is likely to be wasted. 
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Box 6.2: seven rules for creative clusters 
1. Be pragmatic: Policymakers would be well advised to avoid wishful attempts to 
build clusters from scratch – successful examples are few and far between, not 
least because new clusters in an industry need to overcome the critical mass 
and reputational advantages enjoyed by established ones. A more productive 
approach is to build on areas or niches of existing strength. Seeking to take a 
budding or ‘latent’ creative cluster to its next level is a better idea than trying to 
spawn one from scratch. 
2. Be data–driven: Policymakers should use data to identify where are the 
areas of existing local strength. This includes measuring the number, size and 
trajectory of local firms in different creative sectors, and the types of graduates 
and research being produced by local universities. It is straightforward to 
benchmark against other places using labour market data from websites like 
the ONS’s Nomis (http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/). Policymakers should however 
bear in mind the limitations of official data sources where micro–businesses 
and freelancers are often unrepresented, or which may fail to capture the 
activities of emerging sectors, and explore other potential sources of data like 
social networking sites or company websites. An example is the use of Spotify 
registration data in BPI’s 2013 Digital Music Report (https://www.bpi.co.uk/
assets/files/BPI_Digital_Music_Nation_2013.PDF)
3. think systemically…: Creative clusters are in several ways ‘miniature’ versions of 
the creative innovation system portrayed in Chapter Five – incorporating a local 
labour market (skills) and research base, finance, competition, collaboration and 
(physical, digital and cultural) infrastructure (although the IP and competition 
regimes are designed and implemented at the national level). This means that 
discrete interventions will rarely be enough to support sustainable growth in a 
cluster – it is important to pay attention to the whole system. 
4. …and listen: Policymakers should adopt a similarly data–driven approach to 
identifying barriers to cluster development and the potential remedies. Learning 
from experiences outside is important, but this requires rigorous evaluations of 
cluster policy and detailed consultation with local businesses (http://www.nesta.
org.uk/publications/working_papers/assets/features/the_effects_of_cluster_
policy_on_innovation). When doing this, it is important to minimise the risk 
of capture by local vested interests by listening to all the voices in the cluster. 
Policymakers should recognise that innovative creative businesses with the 
greatest growth potential will often be those with the least time to meet them. 
5. raise visibility and strengthen networks: An unconnected, ‘un–self–aware’ mass 
of creative businesses will not benefit from knowledge spillovers or from lower 
transaction costs. Policymakers can help remedy this situation by supporting 
local business networks, and bridging the gap between communities and groups 
with complementary resources and capabilities (for example, content and digital 
media businesses, or artists and technologists). This ‘profile–raising’ can also 
help highlight local job opportunities to creative graduates. 
6. Invest in people as well as buildings: Policymakers have often conceived of 
interventions to support clusters in terms of new buildings – such as incubators, 
cultural quarters and iconic arts centres – rather than investments in creative 
and entrepreneurial skills. yet, it is creative talent which, ultimately, drives 
innovation and growth in the creative economy. Policymakers should always 
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weigh the opportunity costs of investments in ‘bricks and mortar’ against 
the benefits of other interventions (for example, training sessions or work 
placements and internships for creative graduates) which may have less visible 
outputs, but be more beneficial in the long run.
7. leverage anchor institutions: Universities have a central role to play in creative 
cluster development strategy. When doing this, they need to think holistically 
about how their different functions (suppliers of talent, research, networks, 
support services, entrepreneurialism and facilities) can support local creative 
clusters. This may require them to bridge disciplinary and departmental silos 
(http://www.brightonfuse.com/wp–content/uploads/2012/02/Brighton–fuse–
universities–and–cdit–clusters.pdf). A live example of where this is being done 
is the International VFX Hub at the National Centre for Computer Animation 
at the University of Bournemouth, which combines working with local 
schools, knowledge transfer through PhDs in industry, support for graduate 
entrepreneurship and access to facilities in an effort to boost post–production, 
animation and CGI in Bournemouth. 
proposAl tHree
the Government should make r&d tax relief more accessible to creative businesses. 
technology strategy Board programmes should be further broadened to address 
the needs of the creative economy. public procurement rules should be changed to 
open up opportunities for smaller digital firms. cross–disciplinary research council 
knowledge exchange initiatives should be rigorously evaluated and the lessons 
applied in a further round of investment. More international collaborations with 
leading research centres should be encouraged.
proposAl four
local policymakers should observe our seven–point guide for developing creative 
clusters.
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7 Access to fInAnce
1. Barriers to finance in the creative economy 
The defining feature of creative work – its focus on generating differences whose final form 
cannot be fully specified in advance – echoes a striking feature of most creative product 
markets, namely that it is extremely difficult to predict demand for a product before it is 
launched in the market. 
There are, of course, differences across creative service and content sectors – the ‘form’ 
of an advertising campaign commissioned by a client, for example, will tend to be 
more tightly specified than that of a new film or a new video game targeting consumer 
markets.333 But even there, the requirements of advertisers can change rapidly (not least 
because of technology disruptions such as those we described in Chapter Four). In other 
words, there is a great deal of uncertainty in these creative markets as well. Creative 
businesses partly deal with this situation by organising production around projects that 
bring together bespoke teams of creative professionals for limited periods of time. 
Although this ‘flexible specialisation’ makes creative businesses nimbler and more 
responsive to changes in the market,334 it also results in the industrial fragmentation that 
we described in Chapter Five. 
Together with the uncertainty that characterises creative markets, this shuts out most 
creative businesses from loan finance: not only is past track record a less reliable guide 
to future success, but creative businesses are less likely to have fixed assets they can use 
as collateral.335 What assets they do have – copyright in the case of content businesses – 
are intangible and much more difficult to value and sell in the case of default. The same 
uncertainties mean that creative businesses face greater barriers to accessing equity 
finance too, because investors require (prohibitively) high rates of return to compensate 
them for the risks they are taking.336, 337 
But without access to loan finance, many creative businesses struggle to manage their 
cash–flow. And without risk finance, there is little scope for the entrepreneurship and 
risk–taking that they need to innovate, and therefore grow. There is a perennial concern 
that these barriers to finance make it hard for UK creative businesses to reach a global 
scale (which in turn might enable them to diversify project risks),338 or to hold on to their 
intellectual property (which they may need to sell off to finance their next project).339 The 
prima facie evidence for the existence of such access to finance problems is that many 
investors appear unwilling even to consider creative industries as an investment asset 
class.340
The micro size of the vast majority of the UK’s creative businesses in fact underpins 
many of the other challenges discussed in this manifesto: smaller companies typically 
lack the capacity to engage in R&D or the incentives to invest in the human capital of 
their employees. They lack the firepower to contest incumbents in creative markets. The 
clusters literature suggests that larger companies in contrast can act as ‘anchor tenants’ 
supporting complete value chains in the local economy,341 and also spawn innovative spin–
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offs that keep clusters entrepreneurially–renewed.342 The sheer extent of the challenges 
makes starting and growing a creative business daunting for even the most seasoned of 
entrepreneurs. 
And yet, despite the endemic nature of these problems, the UK’s creative industries 
have not traditionally done a good job in articulating them. There is a striking disconnect 
between the volume of complaints by creative business leaders about the problems in 
accessing finance343 and the volume of hard evidence available to back their claims. No 
doubt this is in good part reflects the fact that many creative industries lack a culture of 
collecting and producing the data that investors need to assess risks and make informed 
investment decisions, and that policymakers need to craft interventions. And where there is 
data it tends not to be publicly available.344 
But it is also reflective of the wider problem that many creative businesses lack the 
commercial nous to grow their business. The vast majority of creative businesses frequently 
fail to produce formal (or even informal) business plans,345 fuelling the perception that 
they are not ‘investment–ready.’346 This is especially problematic when it is considered 
that general investors are likely to be much less familiar with the business models that 
characterise the creative industries.347
What little quantitative evidence there is does however support the view that UK creative 
businesses face barriers to finance which prevent them from scaling. 
An econometric study commissioned by DCMS and BIS from researchers at Warwick 
Business School in 2011 revealed that early–stage small–and medium–sized enterprises in 
the software and content industries like Radio & TV, Publishing and Film, faced greater 
difficulties acquiring finance than companies with similar risk profiles in other sectors, and 
that this had a material impact on their ability to grow.348 Content companies, the study 
concluded, were discouraged from even seeking external finance in the first place.
Anecdotally, it seems that UK creative businesses with the most promising growth 
potential are acquired by global (often US) multinationals. An example of a likely wider 
phenomenon – and part of a general debate about the attitudes of British business leaders 
to exit349 – this is something that has also been linked to technical issues with the operation 
of UK capital markets, which make ‘selling out’ to overseas bidders more attractive than 
a stockmarket listing.350 Although of course overseas takeovers need be no bad thing for 
the UK – that depends on the price at which the companies are acquired – there are high–
profile cases where British companies appear to have been ‘hollowed out’ after takeover, 
meaning that the UK has lost out on the ancillary benefits from having UK–owned creative 
businesses.351 So, for example, games developers Bizarre Creations (taken over by US 
games giant Electronic Arts) and Black Rock Software (acquired by Disney) were both shut 
down scarcely five years after being taken over. Web 2.0 darling Dopplr all but disappeared 
from the map after being bought by Nokia.352 There is also a related perception that the 
capital gains tax revenues that are generated for the UK Exchequer from one–off sales of 
UK creative businesses to foreign acquirers are much smaller than the tax revenues that 
would have cumulated from corporate profits if the businesses had instead been retained in 
the UK.353 
Another variation on the theme that the UK’s creative businesses ‘sell early’ and fail to 
fully capture the commercial value of their ingenuity and innovation, is in the so–called 
‘intellectual property poverty trap’ where the suggestion is that UK content businesses in 
sectors like film, publishing and video games have no other option but to sell their IP to 
powerful (overseas) gatekeepers in order to complete their projects and bring their content 
to market.354 In doing so, it is argued, they relinquish the future royalties which they might 
have otherwise reinvested in growing their business. 
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This structural feature of the UK’s creative creative content markets helps explain why, 
for example, even though a full third of the 200 highest grossing films at the global box 
office made between 2001 and 2012 were produced or originated in the UK,355 the UK film 
industry still has very few production and distribution companies of global scale. The most 
well–known British film production company, Working Title, is owned by NBCUniversal. 
eOne, the most successful UK–based independent film distributor, is Canadian–owned. 
Many voices in the UK’s creative economy are concerned that this IP poverty trap may, 
if not addressed, transform the UK into a nation of ‘work–for–hire’ creative contractors, 
competing with their overseas counterparts on cost, rather than quality grounds, and not 
enjoying the upside when their creative projects are a success.356 Evidence from the AHRC 
Brighton Fuse research project supports the idea that UK companies fail to hold on to the 
IP they generate: just 15 per cent of the creative and digital companies producing copyright 
that were surveyed identified royalties as a significant source of revenues (in contrast, 71 
per cent said that business–to–business services were significant).357 Content companies 
were also twice as likely as others to report access to finance issues as a significant barrier 
to growing the business.358 A sample of 30 leading video games companies surveyed by 
Games Investor Consulting for Nesta in 2009 claimed that original IP development in the 
UK was in decline, or had stopped altogether.359
But perhaps the starkest indication of access to finance problems in the UK’s creative 
economy in 2013 is in the lack of young, digital native companies with a true global scale. 
Without exception, the large UK creative businesses mentioned in Chapter Five are all 
decades old: Pearson was established in 1841, and Burberry in 1856. WPP was founded in 
1971, and EMI (now of course owned by Universal Music Group) in 1931. The situation in the 
US could not be more different, with Amazon having been founded in 1996, Google in 1998, 
Facebook in 2004 and Zynga in 2007. One could also look at Israel, which has achieved 
the highest concentration of high–tech start–up companies anywhere outside of the Silicon 
Valley in less than two decades.360 High–tech industry now accounts for more than 54 per 
cent of Israel’s industrial exports and over 26 per cent of the country’s exports.361 
The recognition that the UK’s creative economy faces access to finance problems, and 
the belief that policy can do something to help, explains why the UK’s creative industries 
leaders have set up a dedicated Working Group under the Creative Industries Council to 
look at these issues (on which one of this manifesto’s author sits.)362 
2. the role of policy
Of course, the concerns that innovative businesses in the UK face barriers to accessing 
finance go well beyond the creative economy. There are longstanding complaints, for 
example, that British banks are not sensitive to the needs of SMEs.363 And for years there 
has been talk of an ‘equity gap’ preventing UK businesses in innovative and high–tech 
sectors from realising their growth potential364 – a situation that has been made even worse 
by the current credit crunch. The Government has attempted to address these problems 
through a number of policy interventions. 
Some of these are aimed at improving access to bank finance. This includes Funding for 
Lending,365 the Enterprise Finance Guarantee,366 the National Loan Guarantee and the 
Business Finance Partnership (which seeks to increase the diversity of sources of finance 
for UK businesses).367 These programmes variously use public funds to reduce the costs of 
borrowing for SMEs, either by providing loan finance to banks themselves at below–market 
interest rates, or using public funds as the guarantee for unsecured bank loans with the 
intention of increasing bank lending to businesses that lack the assets that could be used 
as collateral. The Business Bank which will start operating in 2014 also seeks to improve 
access to loans for SMEs.368 
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The Government has also encouraged private equity investment in UK businesses, in two 
principal ways. 
First, through tax efficient schemes allowing investors to claim income and capital tax 
relief on their equity investments on qualifying companies. These schemes include the 
Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme (SEIS) aimed at smaller, entrepreneurial companies 
(businesses can use it to raise up to £150,000 per annum),369 the Enterprise Investment 
Scheme (EIS, with a limit of up to £5 million per annum),370 and Venture Capital Trusts 
(VCT, where investors buy shares in a qualifying venture capital fund that subsequently 
invests it, with a maximum investment of £5 million per company per annum).371 
Second, through publicly–backed venture capital funds operating under the umbrella 
of Capital for Enterprise (CfEL), a fund management company owned by BIS.372 CfEL’s 
portfolio includes 12 Enterprise Capital Funds, the UK Innovation Investment Fund, and 
the Business Angel Co–Investment Fund (which co–invests with syndicates of ‘business 
angels’). 
In addition to these specific fiscal interventions, the government and the Bank of England 
are paying growing attention to the operation of UK capital markets, and how they can 
be regulated in ways that encourage more ‘patient’ and ‘long–term oriented’ lending and 
investment supporting innovative sectors with high growth potential. The Kay Review 
of UK Equity Markets published in 2012 concluded that “short–termism is a problem in 
UK equity markets.”373 In 2012, the Government also announced that it was working with 
the London Stock Exchange to reduce regulation (such as rules on ‘free float’, eligibility 
criteria and reporting requirements) so as to make it easier for medium–sized growth firms 
to list their shares in London instead of seeking capital in the USA.374 Early in 2013, the 
London Stock Exchange announced that it would be creating a ‘High Growth Segment’ 
for medium–sized companies looking for capital on the way towards listing in the main 
market.375
Going beyond these ‘sector–agnostic’ schemes and changes in regulation, the UK 
government pumps significant amounts of finance into the creative economy through 
public broadcasting,376 Lottery funds377 and production tax credits378 for culturally British 
films.379 Although this tax relief is formally justified as a cultural intervention – it funds the 
production of ‘culturally British’ films in compliance with EU State Aid rules – in practice it 
makes the UK a more attractive location for commercial film production. It helps explain 
why in 2010 the British Film Commissioner could claim that it was 40 per cent cheaper to 
make a film in the UK than in the USA and 7 per cent cheaper than even in Czechoslovakia, 
despite lower labour costs there.380 The present government has also approved production 
tax credits for animation, ‘high end’ drama, and video games broadly along the lines of the 
film tax relief, although with modifications that recognise the technological and business 
specificities of these other industries. These measures have been introduced in the Spring 
2013 budget.
The amounts involved in all of this public activity are very substantial: in 2012, Nesta 
estimated that publicly–backed finance for early–stage businesses (including Enterprise 
Capital Funds, Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme, the Enterprise Investment Scheme, 
Venture Capital Trusts, the Business Angel Co–Investment Fund and Early Growth Fund) 
during their current funding round was worth £773 million in total.381 The Enterprise Finance 
Guarantee represents a commitment of £379 million. 
In 2011, the British Film Institute spent £104 million (this includes almost £35 million of 
Lottery funds spent on film production and distribution),382 and Arts Council England 
£604 million (including £450 million in grant–in aid from the Government, and £151 million 
from the National Lottery).383 Since 2007, HMRC has paid £789 million on account of film 
production tax relief.384 The BBC alone spent £1 billion on UK–produced content in 2010–
2011.385
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What have all of these interventions meant for access to finance in the UK’s creative 
economy?
A major difficulty in answering this question is that little data are publicly available on 
how many creative businesses have accessed finance through the various schemes, 
and where they have, what has been the impact? Going beyond wider concerns about 
the effectiveness of measures like publicly backed venture capital,386 there have been 
complaints about how some of these schemes de facto exclude creative businesses 
(echoing the concerns about R&D tax relief that we discussed in Chapter Six). So, for 
example, the general perception that creative businesses in sectors like music were being 
denied access to the Enterprise Finance Guarantee by banks because ‘music is too risky 
a sector’ led the BIS Select Committee to claim in 2010 that it was ‘unacceptable that the 
creative industries sector — which generates around £4 billion a year in the United Kingdom 
and is one of the six sectors designated by the Government as growth sectors — [was] 
effectively being excluded from this avenue of funding.’387 
A 2011 Demos report argued that the treatment of royalty payments in the EIS reduced its 
usefulness for copyright businesses.388 In a 2010 study of project finance, Nesta identified 
features of EIS and VCTs that created barriers to their use in the video games sector.389 
And in its submission to the Culture and Media Select Committee’s ‘Support for the 
Creative Economy’ Inquiry, investment house Ingenious Media claimed that confusion and 
sluggishness in the management of EIS at HMRC was having adverse effects on investment 
in creative businesses.390 
The December 2012 report for the Creative Industries Council from its Access to Finance 
Working Group echoed these concerns in its call for the Government to undertake a 
systematic review of existing interventions to ensure they do not discriminate against 
creative businesses. It also recommended the creation of new schemes such as a dedicated 
finance guarantee to improve access to bank lending for the creative industries, and a 
sector bid to the Business Finance Partnership which is setting up funds to act as new 
sources of lending for UK businesses, going beyond banks.391 It also proposed a broader 
host of measures to improve the awareness and take–up of existing initiatives, and 
industrial policy interventions to raise the investment–readiness of creative businesses, 
including public initiatives to enhance networking between the creative and investment 
communities.392
Judging the impact of the various subsidies and tax reliefs is actually more difficult than 
it might seem given the availability of economic impact studies published by subsidised 
cultural institutions393 and the now–defunct UK Film Council.394 This is because the 
commissioning organisations have had strong interests in presenting support measures in 
a positive light, and the independence of the results have therefore been questioned. The 
interventions have never been designed, and the data collected by policymakers, to permit 
their rigorous evaluation. 
That said, it is difficult to question that measures like the film tax relief have had very 
strong positive impacts through attracting inward direct investment in the UK’s film making 
capacity,395 and beneficial side effects like supporting the growth of the visual effects 
cluster in London’s Soho (even if it is difficult to estimate what growth in the sectors 
would have been in the absence of public investment).396 Likewise, it is self–evident that 
investment by the UK’s public service broadcasters, supported by measures such as the 
Terms of Trade for independent television producers,397 and spending by the wider public 
sector on digital media,398 has been a significant driver of growth in the UK’s media sectors. 
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3. our recommendations
A number of clear principles emerge from our analysis which echo the priorities of the 
Creative Industries Council’s Access to Finance Working Group. For policy, foremost is that 
the Government must pay explicit attention to the needs of creative businesses during the 
design and management of general programmes to support finance and risk–taking in the 
UK economy.
But to enable this, and for their part, creative businesses need a step change in their 
attitudes to financial and economic data. Not only would the production and sharing of 
more rigorous and timely data inform the design of policy interventions, it would also, 
crucially, open the doors to new sources of private finance. In the same way that it has 
led mainstream policymakers to question the susceptibility of the creative industries to 
strategic interventions, an ambivalent attitude to data has contributed to the perception 
that creative businesses are not a serious proposition for investors. Absent hard evaluation 
evidence, we would caution against introducing new sector–specific access to finance 
programmes, and would instead suggest that the Creative Industries Council prioritises the 
collection and coordination of investor–friendly financial and economic data.399
We have no doubt that the new production tax credits for UK businesses making 
animations, high–end drama and video games will help level the playing field against 
subsidised competitors in countries like Canada, France, Singapore, Australia and Ireland 
and attract inwards investment, in the same way it has done with the film industry. They 
may also help to stem the brain drain of talent away from the UK in these industries.400 But, 
on their own, we do not believe they will help the UK grow creative businesses of the scale 
needed to reap the biggest rewards in the creative economy (the experience of the British 
film industry is instructive in this regard).401 Evidence from Canada suggests that generous 
subsidies for games development have so far failed to catalyse a strong indigenous 
games sector – a 2010 report estimated that 90 per cent of the development workforce 
in Montreal worked for foreign–owned studios, and questioned whether existing schemes 
were suitable for smaller developers (see Box 7.1 below).402
It will also be important to monitor the proposed new tax relief to ensure that it provides 
incentives for the most innovative businesses, whether these are new ventures or 
established players who are pushing out the envelope of industry practice, as it is for these 
businesses our analysis suggests the market failures are greatest. The attention that HMRC 
has paid to technical points made by the UK video games industry during the consultation 
about the games production tax credit (in order to avoid unduly favouring developers of 
packaged games against online and mobile ones) is encouraging in this respect.403
Box 7.1: r&d tax credits and creative Industries in canada 
Canada is perhaps the clearest recent example of how fiscal measures can be used to 
‘pump prime’ the creative economy. Three provinces in particular – British Columbia 
(Vancouver), Ontario (Toronto) and Quebec (Montreal) – have attracted international 
attention for their tax credits. The Canadian video games industry has experienced 
rapid rates of growth (c. 11 per cent per annum), and now employs almost 16,000 
people and generates $1.7 billion gross value added, making it the third largest games 
development territory in the world behind the US and Japan. 
Canada’s growth story is not just about headline–grabbing tax credits, however. 
Production tax breaks are one part of a larger ecosystem supporting the video games 
sector, including R&D tax credits, a strong education system and access to university 
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research. Telefilm, the national audiovisual agency also administers the Canada Media 
Fund, which provides finance for the production of interactive digital media content.
Canada’s tax breaks extend far beyond video games development into other areas of 
the creative industries including music and sound recording, book publishing and film 
and TV production, all areas in which the country has achieved considerable success 
in international markets. However, it is the very aggressive tax credits for video 
games production (as high as 40 per cent of labour costs for content production 
activities in the case of Quebec) which have received most international attention. 
They are widely credited with having attracted to Canada some of the biggest names 
in the video games business, including Electronic Arts, Ubisoft, THQ and Warner 
Bros. These ‘anchor’ companies have brought with them high profile and kudos 
(which attracts high–end talent and further investment), but there is also the risk of 
creating a monoculture dependent on a handful of large companies, and vulnerable 
to (unpredictable) shifts in market conditions. 
Some developers have complained that the existing tax incentives are not always well 
suited to smaller studios working in newer gaming segments like social and mobile. 
A recent industry survey, for example, found that a large proportion of respondents 
felt that government incentive schemes were designed primarily to benefit large 
developers and publishers. The typical approach is for the tax credits to accrue 
retrospectively – in other words, the companies must first spend the money and 
then claim the rebate. Although it is possible to structure accounts in a way such 
that the tax credit is received in advance, this usually requires accounting skills that 
are beyond the means of many small developers. As Jens Uwe Intat, Electronic Arts’ 
European Senior Vice–president put it: “Tax credits are good for people who are good 
at making money.”
Another feature of Canada’s tax credits is that they are only available for creative 
content development, which excludes the development of Internet platforms. The 
development of a Canadian Facebook or Google, for example, would not have been 
supported by the tax credits. 
Of course, tax credits have costs for the Exchequer too. There are indications in 
Canada that the Government is increasingly getting concerned about the country’s 
escalating tax relief bill. Since Prime Minister Stephen Harper took power in 2006, the 
cost of various tax relief measures has grown by Canadian $20 billion (Goar, 2012). 
All this while Ontario reputedly granted Ubisoft a Canadian $263 million in tax credits 
and subsidies in 2009. A recent industry survey confirms that the future tightening 
of government support is perceived as the third highest risk for the sector, reflecting 
growing unease about the industry’s dependence on subsidies, and raising questions 
about the long–term sustainability of aggressive fiscal approaches to building up the 
creative economy.
sources: 
CBC News (2010) ‘A missed opportunity: the evolution of video games in Canada.’ [online] Available at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2010/09/09/f–videogames–history–part–two.html [Accessed 25 
Janaury 2013]
Gamasutra (2010) Interview: Jason Della Rocca on breaking tax breaks’ hold. [online] Available at: http://
www.gamasutra.com/view/news/29311/Interview_Della_Rocca_On_Breaking_Tax_Breaks_Hold.php 
[Accessed January 2013].
Goar, C. (2012), ‘Tax breaks leave gaping hole in federal budget’. Available at: http://www.thestar.com/
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11 April 2013).
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Policymakers should also keep a close eye on recent innovations in capital markets 
where digital technologies are in some areas beginning to bridge longstanding gaps 
between supply and demand for risk finance. They should ensure that regulations do not 
inadvertently get in the way of such market–led solutions to barriers to finance, including 
crowdfunding,404 peer–to–peer lending405 and invoice finance.406 There are numerous 
examples of this happening: the Government’s policies to encourage risk capital investment 
in innovation, such as EIS and the Enterprise Management Incentives scheme typically do 
not apply to financial services firms, nor can ECFs invest in them. Financial regulators are 
often suspicious of new entrants, creating considerable uncertainty for finance start–ups. 
Because of the barriers to finance they face, creative businesses are hit especially hard by 
this regulatory prejudice against new models of finance.407
Going beyond this, bodies like the London School of Economics Growth Commission 
have joined Nesta in calling for any state–backed banks that are set up to channel capital 
into funding innovation by high–growth businesses.408 We urge policymakers to include 
innovative creative businesses in their purview.409 
proposAl fIve
Government should ensure that its generic business finance schemes do not 
discriminate against creative businesses, and that regulations help the development 
of financial Internet platforms (such as crowdfunding sites). Absent hard evidence 
on their efficacy, government should resist introducing new sector–specific finance 
programmes. A higher priority is to coordinate the collection and publication of 
investor–friendly data through the creative Industries council, thus supporting the 
development of a thicker market for risk finance.
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8 Arts And culture
1. A mixed economy 
The economist John Maynard Keynes, who for the first time placed public funding for 
the arts on a firm footing through the founding of the Arts Council in 1946, did so not on 
economic, but cultural grounds:410 
“We are capable of shutting off the sun and the stars because they do not pay a 
dividend. London is one of the richest cities in the history of civilization, but it cannot 
‘afford’ the highest standards of achievement of which its own living citizens are 
capable, because they do not ‘pay’. If I had the power today, I should surely set out to 
endow our capital cities with all the appurtenances of arts and civilization on the highest 
standards of which the citizens of each were individually capable, convinced that what I 
could create, I could afford…”
Today, public funding is the cornerstone of the UK arts economy, reportedly providing 
over half the income of the arts and cultural sector, against the one–third drawn from box 
office and other commercial income and the rest from sponsorship and donations.411 There 
is constant debate about this balance, which is more skewed to the public purse than in 
the United States and less so than in Germany.412 The current UK Government stresses the 
importance of philanthropic contributions,413 but there is no serious challenge to the thrust 
of Keynes’s argument: public funding of the arts is justified because it delivers a range of 
public benefits. 
The absence of challenge to this orthodoxy appears to reflect public opinion. Ipsos–MORI 
reports that 24 per cent of the British people are most proud of ‘our culture and arts’, 
ahead of ‘British sports teams’ (10 per cent) and ‘British business’ (4 per cent), though 
some way behind ‘The Royal Family’ (36 per cent) and ‘The NHS’ (37 per cent),414 and 
surveys show a growing level of participation in arts and heritage activities.415 The BBC, a 
flagship cultural organisation, has maintained a high level of public trust over many years, 
in spite of numerous controversies.416
It is also true, however, that in recent years economic arguments have become much 
more prominent amongst UK arts funders. This arises from the growing need to justify 
arts expenditure against competing priorities in public spending (at a time of fierce 
constraints).417 It also recognises the emergence of a substantial commercial arts sector, 
with the rapid growth of the film, television, radio and recorded music industries and the 
positioning of these at the heart of creative industries policy in the late 1990s. 
2. economic value and cultural value
Economic arguments for public funding of the arts and culture have had little traction 
with the UK’s cultural leaders.418 This is, no doubt, partly explained by their distaste for the 
language of economics (‘goods’ and ‘services’) when the decisions of most artists, and 
the audiences they engage with, are made on aesthetic, emotional, spiritual or intellectual 
(‘intrinsic’), not utilitarian, grounds.
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There has been a corresponding unwillingness of economists to engage with the arts and 
culture. ‘Cultural economics’ as a discipline languishes in the dreaded category Z ‘Other 
Special Topics’ in the Journal of Economic Literature’s official classification of economics 
research. Where there has been work – mostly by economic consultancies who have been 
specially commissioned to do it, not by independent academics – it has been in the area of 
‘economic impact’: the estimation of the employment and output consequences of specific 
cultural activities. While a necessary part of the toolkit for policymakers for whom culture 
is a locus for economic development, economic impact studies do not measure the value 
of culture, nor do they necessarily provide justifications for why public funding is needed to 
support it. 
One of the few published examples of economic valuation – a contingent valuation 
(willingness to pay) study of the British Library in 2003 – concluded that ‘non–use’ values 
accounted for the majority of the British Library’s overall value.419, 420 Other studies have not 
addressed questions of valuation using the empirical tools endorsed, for example, by the 
Treasury Green Book421 – government’s guide to cost–benefit analysis. This contrasts with 
other complex spheres, such as environment and health, where public economists have 
successfully attached numbers to the value of goods and services which are not primarily 
mediated through markets. 
Instead, funders in the UK’s arts sector have been dazzled by the blizzard of economic 
impact studies, which use no consistent methodology and are of varying quality of 
execution. The poorest quality examples have dragged down how the better–executed 
ones are perceived and, in a variant of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, organisations have felt 
obliged to commission economic impact studies because others have done so. No one 
has wanted to suffer the disadvantage of lacking impact estimates. But when the numbers 
haven’t stacked up in aggregate,422 the outcome has been that the intended audiences 
– most obviously those in charge of funding – have not believed the results.423 Prisoners’ 
Dilemmas can only be resolved by decisive leadership, which has to date been lacking. The 
dearth of rigorous economic valuation studies in the cultural area has left the arts open 
to judgments expressed in crude instrumental terms, of a kind that Keynes would have 
abhorred.424 
Why have things been different in environment and health? We suggest, because there 
has been more determined and imaginative leadership. The publication in 2011 of the 
UK’s National Ecosystems Assessment425 was a groundbreaking independent and peer–
reviewed quantitative analysis of the value of the UK’s natural environment and the 
services it provides. This offered an evidence base using the full panoply of techniques 
that economists use to value public goods, including contingent valuation and subjective 
wellbeing. The assessment was the outcome of a wide–ranging partnership of government 
departments and agencies, local government, NGOs and research councils. Credit also 
goes to the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee which, in 2007, called for 
this radical assessment.
Here is an opening for the AHRC’s new project on cultural value. Under the leadership of 
Professor Crossick, it has set out “to clarify research–led understanding of an area often 
dominated by assertion” and to understand “a complex problem too often oversimplified.” 
The AHRC, announcing the project, added: “It is widely understood that culture brings 
considerable economic benefit to the UK, including the arts and creative industries. But 
there is also widespread agreement that to understand these benefits in economic terms 
alone is to miss some of the most important contributions that the arts and culture bring 
to individuals and society. The challenge is to develop additional perspectives that are 
persuasive in method and offer compelling detail and substance.”426 This is a most welcome 
initiative and one which will require inter–disciplinary thinking on a considerable scale.427 
There is need for rigorous research too in the area of spillover benefits of public arts and 
culture spending to the commercial creative industries and vice versa. Ed Vaizey MP, who 
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has been the Minister in charge of the arts and creative industries throughout the life of the 
current UK coalition government is one who frequently draws attention to this symbiosis: 
“I firmly believe that the lines will continue to blur between what we consider the art 
ecology and the creative economy,”428 he wrote in a foreword to an Arts Council of England 
report which itself set out to define “an approach that invests in the interface between the 
arts ecology and the creative economy.” This report goes on to acknowledge that “there 
is now increasing recognition that the flows or value chains linking the various elements 
within the arts sector are more nuanced and complicated” than sometimes portrayed.429
The purpose of this chapter is not to analyse these linkages per se430 or to debate the 
overall level of funding. As noted earlier, the latter is dictated as much by judgements 
about cultural value (which lacks a common unit of measurement) as economic. Our own 
sympathies lie strongly with Keynes’s view that the non–monetisable societal benefits 
justify healthy levels of public funding for the arts. But we also believe that where 
economic justifications are given for public funding they should be made on the basis 
of economic valuation, not just assessments of economic impact, and that much greater 
efforts need to be made to understand the relationship between economic and cultural 
values. 
Instead, and consistent with the broader thesis of this manifesto, we explore the response 
of arts and cultural organisations to the emergence of digital technologies so that we can 
understand whether a better led and managed response might add value not only to the 
contribution made by the arts themselves, but across the wider UK creative economy. 
Based upon previous Nesta studies, we argue that the cultural sector has an ‘innovation 
problem’ with regard to digital, but that there are good examples of peer–to–peer learning 
and a number of useful initiatives from which further innovation can develop. 
3. Innovation: a problem and an opportunity
There is no doubt that the emergence of the Internet and associated digital technologies 
impinge upon the world of the museum, the library, the theatre, the opera house and the 
art gallery in as wide a variety of ways as they do upon commercial creative businesses, 
with the important difference that a publicly funded business model, like that of the Royal 
Opera House or the BBC, is less vulnerable to the convolutions of online advertising which 
have so disrupted commercial media business models. 
In other respects, the threats and opportunities are connected, though not identical. 
Digital technologies potentially transform access to the arts as they do to commercial 
published and recorded works, but art forms where the core product is live performance 
appear to be less at risk of cannibalisation of audiences than record companies and 
book publishers.431 Cultural institutions such as art galleries and museums which have 
online exhibitions are likely to find these recruit, not cannibalise, attendances at physical 
exhibitions.432 Many arts and cultural organisations will share the concerns of commercial 
firms about online copyright infringement, but not all are heavily focused upon protecting 
intellectual property. Libraries and other memory institutions campaign for easier access 
to ‘orphan works’ and other ‘rights–bound’ troves in their care because easy digital access 
supports their mission to spread knowledge. That is why libraries have found themselves 
at loggerheads with commercial players, as in the dispute between the British Library and 
News Corporation about access to news archives or between libraries and book publishers 
about the loan terms for e–books. 
The BBC enjoys a unique position in these matters. It has a big interest in protecting its 
rights and in making commercial returns from its rights in overseas markets and through 
re–packaged programmes (for example in DVD format) in the UK. It also supports in very 
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substantial ways the music industry, especially with regard to classical music.433 At the 
same time, the BBC feels a responsibility to take advantage of digital technologies to 
make available to licence fee payers, and to some extent to a wider international audience, 
its abundant archives. In laying down the terms for a new ten–year Royal Charter and 
Agreement for the BBC in 2006, the Government introduced a novel, sixth ‘purpose’ for the 
Corporation, which states that the BBC should also “in promoting its other purposes, help 
to deliver to the public the benefit of emerging communications technologies and services 
and, in addition, take a leading role in the switchover to digital television.”434 
Viewed from a narrow perspective, this may be seen as one of a succession of moves to 
‘salami slice’ the BBC’s licence fee income to fund other media projects on the political 
agenda; but, potentially it opens up a wide vista of possibility in which the BBC might 
play a pivotal role in ensuring that the UK’s content creation and publishing strengths are 
exploited to their maximum public value advantage in a digital world otherwise dominated 
by commercial platforms. This concept, sometimes referred to as the ‘Digital Public Space’ 
(see Box 8.1 below), will require clear leadership from the BBC Trust, the new Director 
General of the BBC, Lord (Tony) Hall and his Director of Strategy and Digital, James 
Purnell, if it is to succeed.
Box 8.1: the digital public space 
Since its foundation in 1922 the BBC has accumulated over 1 million hours of 
programming with supporting documentation, 6 million stills and the world’s largest 
collection of sheet music.435 The BBC has long recognised the huge potential for 
digital technologies to unlock the value of this archived content and to make it 
available for the benefit of those who paid for it through the licence fee. In 2004, the 
BBC looked to a “future where the public have access to a treasure trove of content, a 
store of value which spans media and platforms, develops and grows over time, which 
the public own and can freely use in perpetuity.”436 At that time the BBC saw itself 
as moving into a ‘second phase of the digital revolution’ (the first one being about 
distribution, mobility and increased consumer choice), where the rapid growth of 
broadband and video on demand would ensure the public had “access to previously 
closed archives at zero or low cost”. 
Ten years on, the vision has evolved into the model of the ‘Digital Public Space’ which 
envisages an open, non–commercial, Internet–hosted platform, supported by the BBC 
and a coalition of other publicly funded archive owners from around the UK, such as 
the BFI and the British Library, and designed to make the UK’s vast digital archives 
available to everyone in a quality–assured environment. There is also potential to 
co–operate with Europeana,437 a European–wide digital archives project and other 
international initiatives such as the Digital Public Library of America.
The ambition behind this project speaks of a curated Internet space which eschews 
aggressive acquisition and manipulation of personal data and excludes advertising. 
For commercial participants, the Digital Public Space would offer an environment 
in which rights–protected material would be safeguarded by the provision of 
clear terms of trade and which would, it is hoped, offer an environment friendly to 
experimentation and innovation. Following the BBC World Service model, the Digital 
Public Space would also aim to make services available internationally, providing a 
non–commercial global platform model for access to high–quality digital content. 
The Digital Public Space would establish interoperability of standards and other 
working links with the Digital Copyright Exchange/Copyright Hub proposed in the 
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Three years ago, Nesta published a study of innovation in the cultural sector based upon 
detailed research involving two of the UK’s leading cultural organisations: the National 
Theatre and the Tate Gallery.440 It sought to clarify what is meant by innovation in an 
arts and cultural context and identified the response to digital technologies as a central, 
cross–cutting theme. The resulting study focused upon four areas of potential innovation: 
audience reach, artform development, value creation and business model innovation. 
It found, in the case of National Theatre, that live broadcasts of plays to cinemas achieved 
a striking extension of audience. This larger audience included a significant minority of 
people who were not regular National Theatre–goers and whose incomes were lower 
than those attending live performances in London, thus suggesting an attractive digital 
route to serving a more diverse audience. There was no evidence that the cinema shows 
cannibalised the live theatre audience: on the contrary, the live broadcasts appeared 
positively to recruit audiences to the theatre by tapping into the local audience networks 
of digital cinemas. The Tate, regarded as a leader in the use of digital technologies in the 
art world, was presented with evidence which allowed it to quantify the benefits of online 
access to exhibitions, showing that, as with the NT, the Tate’s online audience was more 
diverse in terms of ethnic identity and income levels than those who attended exhibitions 
in person.
On the theme of advancing artforms, the study provided indicative insights about the 
relative levels of emotional engagement of cinema and theatre goers in the experiment, 
so challenging assumptions that in the flesh ‘live’ is necessarily always most engaging. 
With regard to innovation in value creation, the research explored ’willingness to pay’ and 
‘willingness to donate’ for the virtual experience of a gallery exhibition, adding insight to 
voluntary and crowdfunding methods. 
Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property. Procedures to arbitrate differences over 
questions of rights ownership, for example, could be shared between the Digital 
Public Space and the Copyright Hub. 
A very small–scale pilot for the Digital Public Space already exists in the form 
of The Space (thespace.org), a BBC collaboration with Arts Council England to 
develop a cloud–based Internet platform that gives audiences access to digital arts 
programming and related content. “A six month experiment in delivering digital art 
to audiences”,438 the sharing of technology and development of digital production 
skills through the project have been as important to the project as the impact on 
audiences (as of January The Space had attracted over 1 million visits from 630,000 
unique visitors).439 The pilot phase ended on 31st March, and is now being evaluated 
with a view to establishing an ongoing service.
In this manifesto, we argue that the Digital Public Space initative should lie at the 
heart of a renewed BBC commitment to digital technology, consistent with its 
obligations under its sixth digital public purpose. 
sources: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/apr/20/bbc-archives
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/policies/pdf/bpv.pdf
http://www.europeana.eu
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/posts/one-square-at-a-time
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2013/jan/06/bbc-digital-public-space-archive.
(All sources last accessed 11 April 2013).
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The study concluded that digital technologies “are bringing new audiences to arts and 
cultural organisations … creating new sources of cultural and economic value and in some 
cases taking the artform itself in new directions.”
The momentum created by this and other experimental studies led to the decision by the 
Arts Council of England, the AHRC and Nesta to fund a £0.5 million pilot digital R&D Fund 
for the Arts and Culture in England, subsequently followed by a three–year scheme (2012–
2015) with over £7 million to distribute. The England pilot attracted 495 bids.441 Creative 
Scotland, the AHRC and Nesta followed up with a pilot fund for Scottish arts and cultural 
organisations.442 A fund in Wales is planned. The Creative Industries Innovation Fund in 
Northern Ireland is exploring related territory, although this initiative is not exclusively 
focused on arts and culture and is not research–led.443 Six themes have been selected as 
priorities for the digital R&D funds: user–generated content and social media; distribution; 
mobile/location issues; data and archive; business models and resources; and education.
National Theatre Live, meanwhile, has continued to grow, with seven cinema broadcast 
projects in the 2011/12 financial year, contributing an audience of over 800,000, against a 
worldwide paying audience of 2.3 million. In commercial terms this remains small compared 
with the impact of, say, the global commercial success of the NT’s production of War Horse, 
which contributed over one fifth of the company’s income – itself a powerful confirmation 
of the porous boundary between the arts and the commercial creative economy.444
There are many other useful and inspiring examples of big digital projects. The BBC’s 
coverage of the 2012 Olympic Games, richly exploiting broadcast and web–based platforms 
to offer a diversity and depth of content, was a striking example. 
Many smaller arts organisations are also vigorously pushing the boundaries of digital. 
National Theatre Wales (NTW), a company with no fixed physical base and formed only in 
2010, has put at the core of its mission engagement with audiences through a combination 
of online social media and on the ground collaboration with communities to establish 
physical audiences in scattered performance sites. NTW’s street performance of The 
Passion in Port Talbot, starring Michael Sheen and webcast live, was widely hailed as an 
artistic and social triumph, which also yielded numerous benefits, including a boost for the 
‘hyperlocal’ Port Talbot Magnet news service created by journalists following the closure 
of the local newspaper. Wales, however, also provides illustrations of the difficulties arts 
organisations encounter in dealing with digital. Audiences at the Torch Theatre in Milford 
Haven, one of the most remote cultural centres in the UK, can today enjoy live digital 
performances from the New york Metropolitan Opera, but not from the Cardiff–based 
Welsh National Opera due to a mix of contractual issues and institutional lack of will. 
A broader indication of the limitations of the arts’ response to digital opportunity is laid 
out in an online profile of what were then Arts Council England’s 869 regularly funded 
organisations (2009). This found that 94 per cent of these organisations were using online 
resources only as a marketing tool; a scant 4 per cent were judged to be offering some 
form of self–standing online experience.445 “For most arts organisations (and certainly 
most of those who are about to become Arts Council national portfolio organisations) 
digital has not yet fundamentally altered their core practice or business model,” the report 
concluded.446
How can arts organisations get better at digital innovation? The most likely route is by a 
judicious blend of guidance and incentives from funders, along with improved networks 
to support peer–to–peer learning. A strong culture of research and experimentation, in 
business models as well as approaches to production and creativity, will be needed to 
nourish improved structures and networks. 
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Not Rocket Science (2009) proposed a significant publicly provided fund for arts R&D, 
made available to organisations with the capability to deliver it and conditional upon open 
dissemination, analogous in the minds of the authors to the distribution of publicly funded 
radio and television programmes by public service broadcasters.447 
This related to an earlier provocation from John Knell, an experienced arts consultant, who 
urged the many foundations, trusts and philanthropists giving money to the arts to band 
together around a compact designed to achieve higher standards and mutual learning 
to support “a long–term vision of the type of arts and cultural ecology they are trying to 
create and how they might do that better together.”448 
Accomplished management of digital ‘cultural data’ also offers potentially high returns 
to arts organisations.449 Well mined social networks data, for example, can contribute 
significantly to understanding of audiences, to building community, new business models 
and to measuring intangible assets like reputation, through social analytic tools such 
as Klout and Kred.450 Funders can use this ‘data 3.0’ or ‘data–driven decision–making’ 
approach to improve the information base for investment decisions. “The current 
policy approach to the use of data in the cultural sphere is out–moded and inadequate. 
Considerable financial and other benefits are already failing to accrue as a result”.451 
Recent research by Nesta, looking at data analytics in UK businesses more generally, finds 
“a visible data dividend” for the minority of companies making a heavy investment in 
online data. Almost a third of businesses in the information and communications sector are 
identified as heavy adopters (versus less than a fifth across the whole sample) and they use 
digital data for text and data mining, forecasting, digital dashboards, market segmentation, 
market testing and price–setting.452 
4. conclusion
After years of unproductive debates where cultural and economic values have been 
pitched against each other, it is time to accept that the arts do produce value that can be 
meaningfully assessed, and measured, by economists, but that they of course produce 
cultural value which cannot be expressed in monetary units.453 Funders need a much better 
understanding of the relationship between these economic and cultural values, not least 
because in some cases the former – which can be measured – may do a very poor job at 
signalling the latter. 
The arts and cultural sector is an essential part of the UK’s creative economy. But as we enter 
the third decade of the digital revolution, most UK arts funders and arts organisations are 
well behind the technology curve. To catch up, they need to experiment more and ensure 
that, as far as possible, the results of that experimentation are accurately logged and shared. 
As part of this, like other businesses, arts organisations need to understand their data 
resources and develop the skills to exploit them. This work should be a priority for the Arts 
Councils, the Research Councils and arts organisations in the coming years. 
Leadership will of course come from many different parts of the cultural sector. But the BBC 
is uniquely well placed, and resourced, to help build this culture of shared experimentation. 
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proposAl sIx
the treasury and the dcMs should undertake a broad–based assessment of the 
value of public arts and cultural spending in the uk, drawing upon similar work on 
the natural environment and the cultural value project of the Arts and Humanities 
research council. funding decisions should be justified in the light of criteria that 
emerge from this work. 
proposAl seven
funders should incentivise experimentation with digital technologies by arts and 
cultural organisations and allocate a sustained percentage of their resources to 
digital r&d, ensuring that the evidence arising from this work is openly shared. 
under its new leadership, the BBc should publish in 2013 a strategy to reflect its 
digital public purpose in the period to 2018, not least through the ambitious vehicle 
of its digital public space initiative.
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9 coMpetItIon
The history of the creative economy abounds with charges of anti–competitive behaviour: 
from the 1938 Paramount decree that vertically disintegrated the Hollywood studio system 
to the unease between games developers and Nintendo in the 1980s and 1990s.454 In the 
second digital decade, Microsoft became a high profile target of anti–trust authorities on 
both sides of the Atlantic, following its ‘browser wars’ with Netscape.455 More recently, 
Google has found itself the target of European and American competition authority 
scrutiny. Meanwhile, and most directly relevant to this manifesto, widespread disruption to 
creative business models has raised new challenges for those charged with ensuring fair 
play in creative markets.
While it is hard to overstate the importance of these issues for the ability of the UK’s 
creative economy to innovate and grow, their complexity and scope means that they 
are often paid less attention than they deserve. In this chapter, we tackle them head–on, 
without forgetting their connections with other important areas of policy like intellectual 
property, privacy, data protection and plurality. We first consider how market power can 
arise on the production side of the creative economy, before turning to questions of 
distribution, including the role of Internet platforms456 such as Google, Amazon, Apple and 
Facebook in creative markets. 
Our assumption throughout is that open, contestable markets, subject to clear and well–
informed supervision on competition grounds, are essential for a successful UK creative 
economy. While we acknowledge that the Internet is a great generator of innovation and 
competition – and contend that, to this day, its markets remain broadly contestable – we 
do not agree with those who appear to assume that this will always necessarily be the 
case as a consequence of the Internet’s architecture. This raises the question of whether 
the UK’s competition machinery is sufficiently well adjusted to identify and address abuses 
of dominant position that may emerge in digital markets. Our answer is that further 
adjustment is needed.
In considering new ideas, we need to bear in mind the context of European law, within 
which UK competition rules sit. We must also bear in mind that a major set of institutional 
changes is already under way in the UK, with the creation (from 2014) of a unified 
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), subsuming the top tier competition roles of 
the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission. The CMA has indicated that 
it will seek stronger relationships with specialist economic regulators like Ofcom, which 
has competition authority in the UK’s communications markets, as well as other regulatory 
powers relevant to the creative economy.457 
1. production
Policymakers setting the rules for competition authorities seek the right balance between 
static efficiency (the conditions of ‘perfect competition’ where markets deliver efficient 
outcomes) and dynamic efficiency (because the promise of profits arising from market 
power is what spurs business to innovate). Market power can however become entrenched 
when incumbents restrict or co–opt entrepreneurial entrants; or even contagious where it 
spreads across interconnected markets – a real concern in a digitally converged creative 
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economy. In some creative markets there is an additional issue: democratic societies 
require that news media are not dominated by too narrow a set of perspectives or 
interests. This ‘plurality’ issue has been the source of much debate in the UK in recent 
years, chiefly around News Corporation’s large holdings in national newspapers and pay 
television – a debate intensified by last year’s revelations to the Leveson Inquiry into press 
ethics about the scale and persistence of the Murdoch group’s influence on Ministers. 
Two essential features of creative markets that we have already discussed explain the 
historical recurrence of concerns about excessive market power in the creative economy; 
first, the intangible, informational nature of creative products, and second, unpredictability 
about the demand for them.
The ‘informational’ aspects of creative products mean that once the first, costly copy has 
been produced, the marginal cost of making additional copies is low and, some argue, 
almost zero. This means, in principle, that there are few technological limits to the supply 
of creative goods, or the scale of the businesses that produce them.458 The low cost of 
reproducing creative products also underpins arguments for Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs) – copyright, patents and design rights – that offer temporary monopolies to enable 
commercial exploitation in creative markets and so incentivise further creativity.
On the demand side, as we have discussed in Chapter Seven, consumer (and business) 
interest in creative products is often driven by unpredictable, fast–changing tastes and 
fashions, giving an advantage to those players in the value chain – traditionally, large 
publishers and studios – that are able to spread risk over a portfolio of projects.459 
These businesses also manage demand for their creative products by investing heavily 
in marketing and, in some cases, exerting control over distribution.460 In the extreme, 
market dominance can give rise to dubious practices, such as exclusivity deals to restrict 
competition and payola in radio.461
The consequences of these microeconomic features of creative industries are well known: 
they give rise to a relatively small number of ‘gatekeepers’ who select and fund creative 
goods supplied by independent companies and talent. The Hollywood studios’ market 
share of the UK film box office was 60 per cent in 2011.462 The four major music labels 
between them controlled 75 per cent of the global music market in 2012463 – the same 
market share as that of large publishers in the UK consumer books market in 2011.464 Three 
companies – Sony, Microsoft and Nintendo – between them control the global video games 
console market, and games publishing is also highly concentrated. Even in UK creative 
service markets like advertising, a relatively small number of large groups such as WPP and 
M&C Saatchi account for a large share of markets.465 
Concentration of power on one side of the bargaining table generally means weakness 
on the other: consider the up–and–coming band amongst a thousand others in relation to 
a large music label or an established music streaming service.466 Or the budding novelist 
handing a first manuscript to a publisher. This inequity in bargaining power explains why 
individual creators often struggle to capture the value generated from their creative 
work. Royalties can be low and opaquely distributed by collecting societies about which 
their members have too little accurate information, and many creators relinquish their 
intellectual property on disadvantageous terms, resulting in ‘IP poverty traps’.467 Studies 
show that few authors earn significant incomes from copyright.468 Where they can, the 
most successful artists can take publishing matters into their own hands, as the Beatles did 
in creating Apple Records. 
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2. distribution: networks and ‘tipping markets’
Digitisation has made the distribution of creative content and services more dependent 
on a telecommunications infrastructure which has itself in the last three decades moved 
from being dominated by public sector utilities to being somewhat less dominated by a 
privatised version of such utilities (BT in the UK), along with more recent players in fixed 
and mobile provision. Those policies that influence market structure, investment and prices 
in telecommunications markets also affect many aspects of the creative economy, not least 
by shaping the ability of telecoms companies to act as gatekeepers into creative markets.
In the UK, content businesses do not have to pay these companies (Internet Service 
Providers or ISPs) a fee to access consumers – an aspect of ‘net neutrality’, discussed 
further below. ISPs are, however, able to manage traffic to allow differentiated quality 
of services for different types of Internet traffic, for example, to prioritise delivery of a 
managed video–on–demand service which requires a guaranteed picture quality. While 
such traffic management may support new services to consumers and also protect a 
specific consumer experience, there are concerns that it may also give ISPs power to 
engage in anti–competitive practices, for example blocking their rivals’ content, such as 
Internet–based video–conference or ‘telephone’ services like Skype. 
Then there are Internet platforms. As explained in Chapter Four, digital technologies have 
lowered the fixed costs of creative production, storage, reproduction and distribution, 
enabling the emergence of strong Internet platforms with unparalleled reach, such as 
iTunes, the App Store, Facebook, Amazon or Steam. Concerns are frequently expressed 
that these platforms may themselves present a problem of market dominance: Amazon’s 
global market share of the e–book market is over 60 per cent;469 in 2009, Amazon 
controlled 18.2 per cent of the entire US e–commerce market.470 iTunes controls 70 per cent 
of digital music sales in the US (and just under a third of all music sales);471 in 2011, Steam 
enjoyed over 50 per cent of the PC download market, while Google earns 48.5 per cent of 
the world’s online advertising revenues and accounts for more than 90 per cent of Internet 
searches in the countries of the European Union.472 Online news markets also exhibit high 
levels of concentration (as well as a close relationship to their offline counterparts).477 
One reason for this market dominance is the network effects in Internet platform markets 
that we described in Chapter Four, which can create ‘winner takes all’ situations (also called 
‘tipping markets’). In the absence of diversity in demand for different platforms, or of easy 
interoperability between them, consumers and business competitors can find themselves, 
at least in the short term, facing unacceptable levels of market power.474 
Another reason is the existence of consumer switching costs and lock–in, where users make 
investments that are exclusive to the platform and cannot be ‘exported’ to competitors – 
such as their links with friends in a social network, or a catalogue of video game content 
for a console. The evidence suggests consumers mostly do not exercise the option to 
switch even in markets where they are readily able to do so, as it is with broadband 
suppliers,475 where a regulator like Ofcom seeks to ensure that switching terms and options 
are simple and clearly visible.
In spite of all these potential sources of market power, the UK’s specialist communications 
sector regulator Ofcom operates on the principle of “a bias against intervention”476 in 
markets, in the belief that naturally occurring competitive forces will usually safeguard the 
interests of consumers. There are good reasons for thinking that competition does indeed 
assert itself in Internet platform markets despite the microeconomic features discussed 
above. 
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
82  A MANIFESTO FOR THE CREATIVE ECONOMy
 COMPETITION
Foremost among these is that providers in one platform market may enter another 
and harness the same network effects that previously had protected the incumbent, 
reducing the latter’s market power. Internet platforms frequently use such ‘envelopment’ 
tactics against each other.477 So, Facebook (with Graph Search) and Apple (with Siri) are 
developing new forms of search, whilst Google’s Android competes in the mobile phone 
business and secures premium entertainment content to strengthen youTube’s market 
position with regard to video services which have stronger roots in television and film. 
An envelopment strategy was also famously used by Apple when it moved from devices 
into content distribution and by Amazon in the opposite direction with its Kindle reader.478 
Providers can also use mergers and acquisitions to gain a foothold in new Internet platform 
markets, especially when they have the cash stockpiles many do. Google has bought more 
than 100 SMEs since 2001, including 26 in 2011 alone.479, 480 
In the last three years, the spotlight of competition policy authorities on both sides of 
the Atlantic has shone on the activities of these powerful Internet platforms. In the e–
books market, Apple has been accused of colluding with book publishers to fix the price 
of e–books, but subsequently reached agreement with the competition authorities on 
remedies which stopped short of fines.481 Writers and publishers have raised concerns 
about Amazon’s plans to buy the right to use .book as a web domain name.482 Google has 
been the subject of major examination by competition authorities in the United States and 
Europe. Google’s critics say that it has abused its market power in search, for example by 
diverting traffic in ways designed unfairly to benefit itself. 
Both the American and European competition authorities must form judgments on the 
extent to which consumer interests are jeopardised or enhanced by Google’s market 
power and in January 2013, the US Federal Trade Commission gave Google search a more 
or less clean bill of health on this specific charge,483 prompting Joaquin Almunia, the EU 
Competition Commissioner, who has led the European investigation, to counter–assert 
that in Europe Google is indeed taking unfair advantage of its dominance in the European 
search market (at over 90 per cent, this compares with about 65 per cent in the US).484 
In theory, the European Commission has the power to fine Google up to 10 per cent of its 
revenues if it confirms abuse of market power, but the signs recently have pointed towards 
an informal settlement. Mr Almunia himself has hinted that this is likely to involve voluntary 
adjustment of Google’s business practices, rather than the more radical option of seeking 
changes to the operation of the American company’s search algorithm.485 
Undeterred by these developments, other European Governments have taken more 
particular matters into their own hands. In Germany, Chancellor Merkel proposed but then 
appeared to draw back from legislation which would require Google to seek permission 
from news organisations to link to their news snippets: an attempt to extend copyright 
in order to redress the loss of revenues suffered by newspaper companies as a result of 
Google’s free online news aggregation services. While this risks the charge of imposing 
copyright at the cost of diminished freedom of expression, not to mention at the expense 
of innovation, the move struck a chord in other capitals. Amid signs that the French 
Government was considering its own version of this move, Google recently agreed to pay 
€60 million into a fund designed to help French publishers develop their own Internet 
business models.486, 487 No equivalent action has yet been mooted in the UK, though Google 
has been an energetic investor in favoured government growth schemes, such as Tech 
City in London, which it no doubt considers part of its ongoing negotiation of a ‘licence 
to operate’ in the UK, where a number of large American corporates have been under 
pressure on general issues, such as their liability to UK taxation. 
All of this adds another layer of complexity to the European debate about the future 
of copyright, which we discuss in Chapter Ten. Google is frequently accused by rights 
holders of failing to recognise its market power in helping to block the activities of ‘pirate’ 
purveyors of music and other rights–protected content.488 In the UK, the 2010 Digital 
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Economy Act put pressure on ISPs to play a larger part in dealing with these breach of 
copyright issues, whilst also giving Ofcom new powers to enforce a code of conduct on 
such matters, along with requirements to assess Internet traffic management patterns and 
to report regularly on the state of the UK’s communications infrastructure. This is a good 
example of the ways in which the role of a competition regulator’s remit has been stretched 
in response to developments in digital markets. Google, meanwhile, has attempted to take 
some heat out of the situation by stepping up the volume of its ‘take–downs’ on youTube 
and adjusting its search algorithms, though not to the extent sufficient to placate its 
critics.489 
It is evident from these examples in e–books and search that Internet platform markets can 
be challenging to evaluate from a competition perspective. Routine features such as high 
switching costs and market practices like price discrimination may in fact be consistent 
with well–functioning markets if, for example, consumers obtain upfront a clearly explained 
discount to access a platform which the providers later recoup through higher prices.490 At 
the same time, abuses of dominant position may occur even in situations where ostensibly 
the price customers are charged for digital content or services is zero and competition 
is just ‘a click away.’ Facebook, for example, is able to harvest its customer data for 
commercial gain without charging its users. In the UK, regulation of issues around data 
privacy is primarily the concern of the Information Commissioner’s Office, with limited 
‘concurrent’ powers held by Ofcom with regard to data protection issues in some areas, 
but excluding the activities of websites. This opens up an area of risk: that the regulatory 
system may be insufficiently informed and alert to market power issues arising around the 
control of ‘Big Data’, which has been called ‘the crude oil’ of the digital economy,491 but 
which also raises highly sensitive privacy issues.492
3. competition policy in Internet platform markets today
Analysing market power issues in the creative economy compares in both complexity 
and importance with the fast–changing global markets in financial services, where the UK 
also has an unusually prominent interest at stake and so plays a highly energetic role in 
seeking to ensure that at the European and global level UK business interests are taken into 
account in decisions about regulatory design. Given the importance of the UK’s creative 
economy, we suggest that an equally committed approach is in order.
An effective system requires a well–structured and well–managed top tier authority, the 
role specified for the new Competition and Markets Authority, along with a level of more 
specialised economic regulation, provided in the case of communications markets via 
the concurrent competition powers held by Ofcom. Given the dramatic effects of digital 
technologies upon markets in the creative economy, it is timely to ask, however, whether 
Ofcom has the authority and expertise to meet the needs of the creative economy in full.
Ofcom’s sector–specific powers, like other specialist economic regulators in fields such as 
energy and water, are designated ‘ex ante’ and designed to promote competitive outcomes 
in telecommunications and broadcasting markets where there is a tendency towards over–
concentration, with the recognised risk of monopoly pricing and restricted public access 
to vital services. Ofcom also enforces the rules which govern consumer switching between 
broadband suppliers, with a view to reducing switching costs and promoting competition 
in the retail broadband market. Ofcom’s general duties, meanwhile, require it to pay 
attention to the interests of citizens, as well as those of consumers, reflecting the civic 
and social issues at stake in vital services like broadcasting and telecommunications. This 
combined consumer and citizen aspect is even more strikingly relevant with regard to the 
Internet, where issues of privacy, free speech and access to public services are increasingly 
tied up with every individual’s online quality of life.
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
84  A MANIFESTO FOR THE CREATIVE ECONOMy
 COMPETITION
Ofcom’s broadcasting industry powers rest upon its award and supervision of licences 
(e.g. for ITV and other broadcasters), enabling it, for example, to enforce rules determining 
relative prominence on the TV electronic programme guide (the ‘channel changer’) and 
to adjudicate on complaints about programme content, usually with regard to ‘taste and 
decency.’ An important adjunct to the broadcast regime makes the BBC Trust responsible 
for approving applications for new BBC services, which may include online offerings. As 
part of this procedure, Ofcom is responsible for assessing the potential market impact of 
new BBC services. 
In contrast, the UK’s generic competition regime is ‘ex post’, meaning that it is reactive, 
seeking to address and remedy problems in markets after they have been found to occur, 
with the burden falling on the competition authorities to show that competition law 
has been broken. Concerns about price fixing in the e–books market, for example, were 
initially raised in the UK by the Office of Fair Trading,493 before being subsumed within the 
European Commission investigation referred to above.
As noted in Chapter Two, when Ofcom’s powers were set out in the 2003 Communications 
Act, some argued that the new, converged regulator should be given a wider range of 
responsibilities and powers with regard to the Internet, both in terms of the working of 
online digital markets and to address a range of social concerns, such as the protection 
of minors and rights to privacy. The Blair Government decided, however, that the risks of 
over–regulation of the Internet outweighed the potential benefits of a more comprehensive 
approach. Ten years later, we believe that it is time to revisit this sensitive topic, in the 
context of the Communications Bill planned for 2013/2014.
Any change in UK law, however, requires consistency with European law, which 
currently rests principally494 upon three main pillars: the European Convention of Human 
Rights;495 the EU’s E–commerce Directive established in 2000;496 and the framework for 
telecommunications regulation, which was most recently updated in 2009.497 In its day 
to day work, Ofcom works within a college of European communications regulators (The 
Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications or BEREC) which seeks to 
ensure that European regulators act consistently within the agreed legal framework. 
The core objectives represented by these three pillars are as follows:
•	The Convention of Human Rights protects free speech and privacy (themselves often in 
tension with each other). 
•	The E–commerce Directive says that telecommunications carriers have only very limited 
liability for the content their networks carry (the ‘mere conduit’ principle).
•	The Telecommunications Framework proceeds from the principle of ‘open network 
provision,’ requiring providers to offer acceptable levels of service to everyone, but 
without discouraging telecommunications companies from pursuing commercial deals 
which support further investment in their own infrastructure and so result in wider 
benefits. A central goal of the framework is to encourage innovation.
The UK’s 2003 Communications Act reflected, as it was obliged to, the thinking of the E–
commerce Directive that telecommunications companies should enjoy limited liability with 
regard to the content, effectively in exchange for investing in networks. 
Ofcom’s translation of the more recent EU Telecommunications Framework is set out in its 
own ‘Approach to Net Neutrality’ published in November 2011.498 Here, Ofcom highlights 
its view of the Internet as a platform for innovation and other significant enhancements to 
the welfare of consumers and citizens, and proposes an approach which seeks to hold in 
balance permission for infrastructure owners to deliver ‘managed services’ (for example 
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in Internet TV) and a commitment to ‘best efforts’ in assuring an open, congestion–free 
general network. Through this approach, Ofcom seeks “a virtuous circle … associated with a 
period of intense and highly productive innovation.” 
In the event that proliferation of managed services were to damage the quality of the 
online experience more generally, Ofcom says it “would need to consider intervening in 
order to ensure that consumers and citizens continue to benefit from the widespread 
innovation that has delivered such significant benefits since the Internet’s creation. We 
might do so by using the powers which allow us to safeguard ‘best–efforts’ access to the 
open Internet, in particular by imposing a minimum quality of service on all communications 
providers.”
Mindful of its ‘bias against intervention’, however, Ofcom adds that “we should be able to 
rely on the operation of market forces to address the issues of blocking and discrimination.” 
Ofcom promises to keep these matters under review, citing new legal requirements (in the 
2010 Digital Economy Act) for it to monitor the effect of traffic management on the “best 
efforts open Internet” and to support a new three–year reporting commitment on the state 
of the UK’s electronic communications infrastructure.499 
4. competition policy in Internet platform markets tomorrow
So, where, if any, are the gaps or potential gaps in this complex armoury of the UK’s 
competition authorities with regard to the activities of Internet platforms in the creative 
economy? Outside Google search, which the European Commission is investigating, are 
there market practices in Internet platform markets which do in fact discriminate against 
the UK’s creative businesses? 
It is not difficult to see continued potential sources of friction: Apple’s market power in the 
distribution of music and apps; Amazon’s power in the retail distribution of books and e–
books and concern that Facebook’s commercial use of personal data might raise economic 
as well as personal privacy issues. In a digital world, none of these is a purely UK matter 
and none is subject to only UK–level jurisdiction, but the potential impact on UK creative 
businesses is clearly substantial.500
As already noted, the overwhelmingly loudest complaint from creative businesses about 
Google is its alleged complicity in online infringement of copyright. The concern is that 
Google especially, but also Apple, has no business reason to be concerned passionately 
about the spread of copyright piracy. Apple’s business depends primarily upon the 
sales of devices, not content; Google’s business depends upon its dominance in search. 
The resulting copyright wars, between rights holders on one side and ISPs and Internet 
platforms on the other, are discussed in detail in Chapter Ten. 
These were the forces which, in the UK, led to the 2010 Digital Economy Act (DEA), which 
was intended to balance the interests of rights holders and ISPs, but which was severely 
amended during a rushed Parliamentary passage. As a result, the patchwork that is UK 
competition policy for the creative economy acquired more patches, including some not 
well designed for the job in terms of website blocking. Ofcom was handed an important 
role in drawing up and enforcing a code of practice, intended to make it easier for rights 
holders to assert their rights. Ofcom also got new responsibilities to monitor ISP traffic 
management and the state of the country’s communications network. Suddenly the 
regulator – funded in large measure by telecommunications companies (the ISPs) – was 
drawn into the middle of the most divisive issue in the creative economy in circumstances 
where Internet platforms are not subject to Ofcom’s ex ante powers.
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Subsequent to the DEA, the Hargreaves Review of IP made three further proposals which 
impinged on the supervision of competitive creative markets: 
 - that, in spite of the delay in bringing the DEA into force (due to challenge in the 
courts), Ofcom should immediately start to gather reliable information about online 
rights infringement, in order to provide a firm evidence basis for the design of effective 
enforcement mechanisms;501
 - that the Government should facilitate, but not direct, a new Digital Copyright Exchange 
(subsequently carried forward as the Copyright Hub project by Richard Hooper) to 
make paid access to licensed material much easier and so to make rights infringement 
less attractive to consumers and small businesses;502 
 - and that the Government should establish a clear mandate in law for the Intellectual 
Property Office (IPO) with regard to competition and market issues (subsequently 
reflected a memorandum of understanding between the IPO and the OFT),503 so that 
issues such as the shortcomings of collecting societies and the particular needs of small 
firms in creative markets might receive the timely attention they deserve.
Standing back from this account of regulatory and competition policy issues, two points 
emerge. First, it is difficult to argue from the evidence, including major competition 
authority investigations in the US and Europe, that there is yet hard evidence of consumer 
detriment in markets where Internet platforms play a major role. In those circumstances, 
we believe, any proposal to design ex ante powers for a specialist regulator to deal with 
Internet platforms would be tantamount to over–regulation, with potentially high risks to 
the sorts of digital innovations (and therefore consumer benefits) we discussed in Chapter 
Four. 
It is important, however, to reiterate that we reach this conclusion on a pragmatic reading 
of the empirical evidence that is publicly available, rather than on theoretical arguments 
like those deduced from the benign or generative nature of the Internet.504 yet, it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that there is a growing gap in UK policymakers’ ability to keep 
abreast of the complex range of issues in play. In other words, while it appears that, as of 
the time of writing, Internet markets remain broadly contestable and innovative (not least 
because of the dynamics of ‘envelopment’ between platforms we highlighted above), 
policymakers should not assume this will always be the case; they need to keep a finger 
on the pulse of competition in these Internet markets, which requires an institutional 
framework able to generate timely evidence to inform action. Any ‘evidence vacuums’ that 
exist will be inevitably filled with ad hoc reviews and initiatives. In the six years to 2011 there 
have been four such involving intellectual property issues alone. Given the importance 
to jobs and prosperity of the UK creative economy, the uncertainty that this creates for 
businesses is surely unacceptable. 
So, what should be done? We believe that the UK needs a coherent point of authoritative 
expertise on competition and related market issues arising from the Internet, and its impact 
on the creative economy. The obvious lead organisation here is Ofcom, which has already 
developed much relevant expertise, but which lacks authority to gather information in 
some Internet markets and which should be encouraged to draw attention publicly to 
shortcomings in the way these markets are working, from the perspective of consumers 
and citizens and to track new developments.505 It is worth adding that an ambitious 
non–commercial proposal, like the BBC’s Digital Public Space, a publicly funded Internet 
platform which we discussed in Chapter Eight, would also require market assessment by 
Ofcom. 
With these points in mind, the Government should place at the heart of the 
Communications Bill planned for 2013/2014, a section which consolidates within Ofcom 
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lead responsibility for understanding competition issues arising from the effect of the 
Internet on UK consumers and citizens and which gives Ofcom the authority to undertake 
the research and collect the data necessary from Internet platforms and other creative 
businesses, building upon its current work programme in support of enforcing copyright 
online.506 There is useful potential synergy here in the design of the proposed Copyright 
Hub and its supporting mechanics, for example on arbitration of disputes. Ofcom’s general 
duties should be broadened to include responsibility for advising government of the 
actions needed to ensure a flourishing, open Internet, balancing the interests of consumers 
and citizens and committed to supporting innovation and economic growth. 
In order to address these expanded responsibilities, Ofcom will need to work closely with 
a number of other agencies. It will, as a matter of course, need to cooperate on many 
fronts with the CMA, whose own work will benefit greatly from Ofcom’s enhanced level of 
expertise on the Internet. But Ofcom will also need to coordinate with agencies like the 
Information Commissioner’s Office on data protection issues; with the IPO on copyright 
and other IP issues; and with the law enforcement authorities on matters concerning 
cyber–crime.
As a first step in establishing the detailed scope of this new approach, Ofcom should be 
asked to undertake a Strategic Review of UK citizens’ and consumers’ experience and 
expectations of the Internet, with a view to informing its advice to government. This 
review, like all of Ofcom’s work, should pay close attention to national, regional and local 
differences within the UK.
There seems to be some acknowledgement of the points we have raised in Ofcom’s annual 
plan for 2013/14, where it says: “On public policy issues, we anticipate that Ofcom’s working 
relationship with the Government will continue to be fluid, ranging from supporting to 
implementing specific policies as defined by Parliament. It is for the Government to decide 
how far regulatory policy should and could be used in support of wider government growth 
and innovation goals. This can affect specific policies in a number of areas, including 
competition and spectrum, as well as specific issues such as network neutrality and the 
creative economy.”507 
It is, indeed, for the Government to decide. We urge Ministers to acknowledge that the 
current piecemeal approach in the UK to competition issues arising from the Internet is not 
good enough and that it is time to take the next step. It is not an unreasonable hope that 
a better informed debate will be a calmer one, where constructive engagement between 
content interests and technology companies will gradually displace the trench warfare of 
recent years. 
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Box 9.1: the us/europe Internet platform puzzle 
The lack of leading British Internet platforms parallels a wider European 
phenomenon. A comparative study of the US and Europe’s information and 
communication technologies (ICT) sectors, led by Brussels–based think tank 
Bruegel, uses 2008 data from the European Commission’s Institute for Prospective 
Technology Studies (IPTS) to show that the US accounts for a far higher proportion 
of the world’s leading innovative ICT firms than does the EU (52 per cent compared 
with 17 per cent, Figure 1). In addition, the US innovative ICT firms are much more 
likely to be younger than their EU counterparts, with 71 per cent of US ICT innovators 
and 54 per cent of European ICT innovators being young. 
Figure 1: Innovative companies in the US and European ICT   
 industries 
source: Bruegel (2008) based on the IPTS scoreboard. ICT Leading Innovators in a region are all ICT firms 
that are in the top 1000 R&D spenders according to the IPTS Scoreboard. Leading Innovators in a region 
measures the proportion of overall ICT Leading Innovators in the IPTS R&D scoreboard of 1000 top R&D 
spenders emanating from that region. young firms are those that were established after 1975. young 
measures the proportion of overall ICT Leading Innovators in a region that are young.
Moreover, it seems that Europe’s strengths are in ICT areas with less potential for 
future growth – hardware and telecommunications. By contrast, the US has far more 
leading, younger innovators in Internet platform segments where so great a deal of 
value is captured (Table 1).
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 % Ict firms % young % Ict firms % young
telecom  13  74 12  28
semiconductors 33 73 14 75
computers  15  60 12  57
electronics 10 29 19 45
telecom operators 1 0 18 20
Internet 4 100 0 0
software 24 86 24 86
Table 1 Distribution of ICT companies by layer and region
us
layer I
layer II
layer III
source: Bruegel (2008) based on the IPTS scoreboard. young firms were established after 1975. Leading 
innovators measures per cent of ICT companies included in the IPTS R&D scoreboard in each of the 
regions.
The reasons for this ‘platform puzzle’ are complex – the Bruegel report attributes 
them to a lack of a single integrated digital market in the EU, fragmented IP policy, 
access to finance and skills problems, lack of an entrepreneurial culture, few 
strong ICT clusters and limited government action to build early demand for new 
technologies: many of the issues that our manifesto focuses on.
Source: Veugelers, R. (2012) ‘New ICT Sectors: Platforms for European Growth?’
europe
proposAl eIGHt
ofcom should be given powers to gather information in all Internet markets in order 
to maximise the chances of sound and timely judgments about the emergence of 
potentially abusive market power and other market concerns (an ‘early warning 
system’). ofcom should contribute a regularly updated strategic overview of these 
issues, working closely with the Information commissioner’s office, the Intellectual 
property office, the competition and Markets Authority and other relevant 
agencies. ofcom’s remit should be broadened to advise the Government on the 
actions needed to ensure the uk enjoys a flourishing, open Internet, balancing the 
interests of consumers and citizens and committed to supporting innovation and 
growth. these changes should be a central feature in any communications Bill 
planned for 2013/14.
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10 copyrIGHt wArs
Copyright has been at the centre of the political battleground of the UK’s creative 
economy for more than two decades, as rights holders have successfully sought stronger 
enforcement of laws offering copyright protection for greater lengths of time in a period 
when digital technologies have made the practicalities of enforcement of any rights a lot 
more difficult. A countervailing case for less onerous or more flexible copyright law has 
been made by advocates of an ‘open Internet’, who argue that over–zealous copyright 
protection threatens freedom of expression and undermines new forms of collaborative 
creativity made possible by digital communications technologies, with consequent 
damage to innovation, economic growth and cultural potential.508 Consumers, caught in 
the middle, are confused: the evidence suggests that most people break some aspects of 
copyright law routinely, that consumers frequently find it difficult to distinguish between 
legal and illegal material and that pragmatic rather than moral considerations govern many 
downloading decisions. There is, however, no clear–cut evidence of growing, generalised 
disrespect in principle for the rights of creators and owners of creative works to be paid for 
their work.509
The economic purpose of intellectual property (IP) laws is to protect rights of invention 
(patent), creative expression (copyright) and authenticity (trademark) in order to provide 
incentives for more invention, creativity and trade. Design rights, a patchy set of provisions 
by comparison, extend a version of this approach to economically important design 
activities. In all areas of IP there is controversy – in patents, proliferating awards are said 
to cause ‘thickets’ which impede rather than support innovation – but in the creative 
industries, the threat to copyright has dominated the policy agenda, even though many 
creative companies have successfully adapted their business models to deal with ease of 
copying in a digital world. 
This chapter proposes a peace settlement in the copyright wars that re–establishes 
copyright in a form comprehensible to digital era consumers and enforceable by rights 
holders, but which avoids mission creep into other, growing, ‘non–expressive’ areas of the 
economy.
1. from Berne to pirate Bay
It was in 1886, at the height of British political and economic global power, that the Berne 
Convention provided the first truly multilateral agreement on automatic copyright510 
(offering rights protection to creators for the author’s life plus 50 years). Although Britain 
had been a pioneer in defining the rights of authors from the Statute of Anne in 1707, it 
took a century for the UK and the US fully to embed Berne in national statute. For long 
periods, some countries, including the United States, refused to recognise the copyright of 
foreign creators. 
From the 1960s, however, rights holders were able to feel with some confidence that things 
had changed; they could look forward with enhanced confidence to extracting rent from 
international markets, but they were also aware of threats from new copying technologies: 
starting with the audio cassette in the 1960s and the video recorder in the 1970s. In 1982, 
Jack Valenti, the most notable of Hollywood’s many political lobbyists, told Congress that 
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“the VCR is to American film producers and American public as the Boston Strangler is to 
the woman home alone.”511 Note the scale of claim to a general public interest as well as a 
corporate one. It did not take long, however, for enterprising companies to work out how to 
make money first from video–cassettes and then from DVDs.512 
By the second half of the 1990s it was clear that the VCR’s threat to rights holders was a 
Disney fairy tale compared with the horror story emerging from the world wide web. As 
the web progressively gave consumers the ability to copy and transfer across the globe 
files containing first music, then books and newspapers, followed by television programmes 
and films, these content industries found themselves subject to a truly violent disruption of 
business models. With the VCR, Jack Valenti could at least appeal to American patriotism 
against a technology threat from Japan. The Internet set one business cluster on the 
California coast against another. 
For a generation of liberal American intellectuals,513 this battle touched the founding 
principles of the Republic, with the Internet promising to embed principles of freedom 
of expression for the 21st century and copyright, in its ambition for expansion, apparently 
threatening this. Advocates of the open Internet, of open source software and the Creative 
Commons in publishing514 connected with an ambiguity in American thinking about 
intellectual property protection and innovation reaching back to Thomas Jefferson’s 
optimism about the cost–free nature of the transfer of good ideas between human 
beings.515 Out of this emerged the ‘fair use’ principle, which informs US IP law and permits 
individuals and companies to make use of rights–protected material, subject to the risk of 
challenge through the courts. 
In all of this, the UK was largely in reactive mode. Although a UK scientist, Sir Tim Berners–
Lee, invented the world wide web, the architects of Creative Britain in the late 1990s 
reasoned that as the home of Europe’s largest concentration of creative industries, and 
specifically of content creators in Europe, the UK national interest lay in defending and 
extending copyright. 
It is the contention of this manifesto that this narrow focus, though well–meaning and 
based upon a plausible definition of UK economic self–interest, has contributed to a 
broader defensiveness with regard to the potential of digital technologies, which is one 
cause of the innovation problem we identify in some parts of the UK’s creative economy. 
If UK policymakers had been less inclined to rely so heavily upon the perceived benefits 
of promoting ever stronger IP rights, perhaps they would have focused more effectively 
upon other aspects of the innovation ‘system’ vital to a strong creative economy – such 
as research and development support (Chapter Six), access to finance (Chapter Seven), 
competition policy (Chapter Nine) and education and skills (Chapter Eleven). 
2. Ip, innovation and growth
The detailed case for IP reform on grounds of innovation and UK economic performance 
is set out in the Hargreaves Review on Intellectual Property and Growth,516 which was 
commissioned by Prime Minister Cameron in October 2010 and published its conclusions 
in May 2011. Its foreword summarises the argument and its implications for the UK creative 
industries as follows:
“Copyright, once the exclusive concern of authors and their publishers, is today 
preventing medical researchers studying data and text in pursuit of new treatments. 
Copying has become basic to numerous industrial processes, as well as to a burgeoning 
service economy based upon the Internet. The UK cannot afford to let a legal framework 
designed around artists impede vigorous participation in these emerging business 
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sectors. This does not mean, however, that we must put our hugely important creative 
industries at risk. Indeed, these businesses too need change, in the form or more open, 
contestable and effective global markets in digital content and a setting in which 
enforcement of copyright becomes effective once more.”517 
The review invited government to ensure the following:
•	that decisions on IP rights are taken in the light of the best available economic 
evidence;
•	that the institutions involved in administering and supervising the IP regime hold 
appropriate mandates, including with regard to competition, thus implying modified 
powers for the IPO and Ofcom, and clear standards for the operation of collecting 
societies;
•	that creative businesses be incentivised to develop more effective digital platforms for 
licensing content (through a ‘Digital Copyright Exchange’);
•	that the UK takes advantage of flexibilities in the European IP framework, for example 
to legalise the transfer of rights–protected files from one personal device to another, 
in order to bring copyright in line with reasonable and routine digital era consumer 
behaviour; 
•	that steps be taken at the UK and European levels to ensure copyright does not 
interfere with the growth of copying for ‘non–expressive’ purposes, including the use of 
text and data mining;
•	that the UK play its part in encouraging the development of a ‘Digital Single Market’ in 
Europe, to facilitate trade in digital goods and services, along with the completion of a 
50–year process to establish a unitary European patent jurisdiction; 
•	that better account be taken of the needs of SMEs in all areas of IP law, particularly with 
regard to low–cost dispute resolution and access to IP information services;
•	that serious problems facing archives and museums with regard to their management 
of digital archives and ‘orphan works’ (where the rights holder is unidentified) be 
resolved;
•	that steps be taken to ensure that the growth in patent issuance is not associated with a 
growth in corporate techniques for blocking innovation.
In August 2011, the Coalition Government declared the review’s call for a more adaptive 
IP framework to be “fundamentally the right view”, with a potential gain to UK economic 
output of between 0.3 and 0.6 per cent of GDP by 2020, along with a reduction of 
deadweight costs in the economy of over £750 million.518
Stakeholder assessments of the Hargreaves Review divided along familiar lines: scepticism 
about reform from many rights holders and enthusiasm from some technology companies 
and educational and research institutions. Some leading rights holders, however, accepted 
the case for improved licensing procedures, and collaborated with the feasibility study of 
the Digital Copyright Exchange undertaken by Richard Hooper along the lines suggested in 
the review.519 The first phase of this work confirmed the existence of “significant problems 
in a range of market segments and industry sectors” and the final report set out the 
practical steps needed to create a “not for profit, industry–led, Copyright Hub” able to 
stimulate competitive markets in “the very high volume of automatable, low monetary cost 
transactions coming mostly from the long tail of smaller users.”520
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In late 2012, the Government introduced the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (ERR) 
Bill,521 a diverse legislative vehicle which included measures to open up access to orphan 
works and to improve standards among collecting societies. Subsequently, the Government 
published a detailed list of new exceptions to copyright, in line with flexibility offered under 
the EU legal framework, with the objective “to make the UK a better place for consumers 
and for firms to innovate, in markets which are vital for future growth.”522
3. towards a new compact
Where is all of this leading? 
At the time of writing, UK Parliamentary consideration of the Government’s reforms 
is well advanced, but still incomplete, and there remains a threat of legal challenge to 
the mechanics of change proposed in the ERR Bill. Given the history of Parliamentary 
resistance to reform, it would be rash to conclude that the Government’s reforms will 
be accepted in their entirety. It is also fair to say, however, that the twin–track approach 
to copyright advocated in the Hargreaves Review – greatly enhanced access to digital 
licensing by the ‘long tail’ of smaller users, along with reforms designed to have copyright 
law make sense to people – appears to have struck a chord, not only in the UK, but also 
in Europe, and places as diverse as Canada, Brazil, Russia and Singapore. This shift in the 
debate probably reflects three things: a recognition among creative and other businesses 
that the Internet’s effects, however painful, call for radical adaptation rather than denial; 
the emergence of a ‘born digital’ generation of voters (and behind them, their more 
anxious parents) prepared to support change; and the impact of a long period of economic 
stagnation since 2008, which has underlined the need to generate jobs and prosperity 
in sectors like the creative industries, where the UK has a long–established comparative 
advantage. 
Indicators of this shift are visible all over the world. In the US, the Wikipedia et al. Internet 
shutdown in January 2012 led President Obama to withdraw support for two pieces of 
legislation (SOPA and PIPA)523 which would have increased online copyright enforcement 
powers. In July 2012, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly to block the ACTA524 
treaty, which would have consolidated a range of IP enforcement tools, but which was 
targeted by campaign groups resisting constraints on the working of the Internet. The 
following month, Aurelie Filippetti, the new Socialist Minister of Culture in France pledged 
to curtail the activities of the Hadopi law enforcement operation, a seemingly strong 
version of “three strikes and you’re out” pursuit of copyright infringers introduced in 2009 
by President Sarkozy.525 The Minister criticised the high cost of Hadopi and said that it had 
“not fulfilled its mission.”526 
The European Commission, meanwhile, a staunch defender of an ever more onerous 
copyright regime for the last two decades, has started to shift its own position, promoting 
a cautious liberalisation of access to orphan works, along with rules requiring more 
transparent operation of copyright collecting societies.527 All of these European moves 
reflect a growing awareness that without a ‘Digital Single Market’ Europe528 will further 
darken its already gloomy economic outlook. This focus upon the economic potential of 
digital technology also explains the firmness with which the European authorities have 
sustained their commitment to the principles of net neutrality in the most recent revision of 
the European Telecommunications Framework.529 
In December 2012, President Barroso himself launched an initiative on copyright reform 
based upon the expectation that Europe’s digital economy “is expected to grow seven 
times faster than overall EU GDP in the coming years.”530 President Barroso called for a 
major round of stakeholder dialogue in 2013, to be followed by evidence–based legislative 
changes in 2014. In the same week, Michel Barnier, Commissioner for the European Internal 
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Market, made a speech launching ‘Licensing Europe,’ an initiative which echoes in some 
respects the Digital Copyright Exchange concept set out in the Hargreaves Review and 
which aims to ease the difficulties of rights licensing across member state boundaries,531 
though some critics say that this initiative is being used as a device to avoid copyright 
adjustments, for example those needed to boost text and data mining.532
Ireland, holder of the Presidency of the European Union in the first half of 2013, favours 
copyright reform. Richard Bruton, Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, said: “a 
further and very important IP objective during our Presidency is that of moving forward the 
debate in the field of copyright to ensure that this is fit for purpose to meet the needs of 
the digital age for businesses and consumers alike. It is clear that the digital revolution is 
fundamentally changing the way in which business is being conducted and that European 
copyright legislation must evolve in response to that change.”533, 534 It also appears likely 
that Ireland will preside over agreement to a unified European Patent Court, an initiative 
which has taken no less than 50 years to bring to fruition.535
The case for  bold reform in Europe is also surely enhanced by the recent call by Maria 
Pallante, the Register of Copyrights of the US, for a comprehensive modernisation of US 
copyright law in ‘the next great copyright act.’  She told the Judiciary Committee of the 
House of Representatives that under current arrangements: “authors do not have effective 
protections, good faith businesses do not have clear roadmaps, the courts do not have 
sufficient direction, and consumer and other private citizens are increasingly frustrated.” 
The issues are numerous, complex and inter–related.536
Meanwhile, there has also been some movement from the other side of the corporate 
argument on copyright enforcement. In August 2012, Google agreed to co–operate with 
long–running rights holders’ demands to downgrade in its search rankings the websites 
of persistent, commercial–scale copyright infringers,537 though some rights holders have 
continued to complain about the seriousness with which Google is taking action.538 In 
February 2013, as mentioned in Chapter Nine, Google agreed to pay €60 million into a 
French media fund designed to help French news publishers adapt to the Internet,539 
following a move in Germany (subsequently softened) to require Google to remunerate 
providers of news to which the search company provides links.540
A different type of indication of the adjustment of positions in global copyright wars can 
be seen in recent books from the opposing trenches. Here are the closing words of William 
Patry, Google’s Senior Copyright Counsel, in How to Fix Copyright:
“Going after the very small number of those who are doing most of the harm [in terms 
of copyright infringement] is entirely justified. What is unjustified are heavy–handed 
techniques against the mass of the population, whether through three–strikes–and–
you’re out approaches, or threats of lawsuits with crippling penalties. Copyright owners 
have all the tools they need to go after the bad guys and we should support them 
in those efforts. However, copyright owners should also support the good guys by 
providing reasonably priced convenient authorised goods. If they don’t, no copyright 
law can help them.”541
And here is Robert Levine, in Free Ride: how the Internet is destroying the culture business 
and how the culture business can fight back, a book which argues that the Internet is in 
danger of destroying the creative industries with its disruption of business models: 
“Copyright laws do need to be revised to bring some order to the Internet; we need 
shorter terms of protection, a way to take quicker action against commercial–scale 
pirates, and less draconian damages for individual infringers.”542
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4. the peace dividend 
So perhaps it is time to imagine what might a digital–friendly UK and European copyright 
regime look like? It could: 
•	provide fair incentives to creators, small as well as large, without heavy transaction 
costs so that they can use the returns earned on their IP to invest back into their 
creative work;
•	liberate digital archiving and provide access to orphan works, hugely enriching Europe’s 
available cultural resources and generating many new business opportunities; 
•	encourage new analytical techniques based upon text and data mining and so 
strengthen our science and creative base; 
•	facilitate the emergence of new content businesses, including those based upon ‘user–
generated content’ and collaboration;
•	enable Europe to adapt to as yet unknown digital technologies without going into a 
political spasm on each and every occasion; 
•	enable children to grow up in digital schools, where they can be well–educated in the 
workings of a clear and rational copyright system (as well as in creative subjects and 
computer science – see Chapter Eleven);
•	make legitimate and effective the punishment of commercially motivated pirates;
•	nurture a European Digital Single Market, bringing serious benefits to content producers 
of all kinds and, perhaps, at last, stimulate the emergence of a new generation of 
European technology companies. 
In these circumstances, there is no reason why a fair–minded copyright enforcement 
regime cannot be made to work. The key to getting it right is to gather the information 
needed to understand consumer and business behaviour and to ensure that significant 
wrongdoers are the main target. Given the enhanced powers to gather information granted 
to Ofcom under the Digital Economy Act of 2010, along with the research undertaken on 
online infringement as a result of the Hargreaves Review, the UK is now in a position to 
enter this era of smart enforcement. 
Meanwhile a sustained approach to digital licensing, coupled with a reformed copyright 
regime that makes sense to digital era citizens, holds out the genuine prospect of an end 
to the copyright wars, putting the UK and European creative economies on the path to 
greater prosperity.
proposAl nIne
uk copyright rules and exceptions should be re–balanced, along the lines proposed 
by the uk Government, and also at the european level as part of the drive for a 
european digital single Market. A new mechanism for enabling vastly increased and 
more efficient rights licensing transactions (through the proposed copyright Hub) 
should be further developed during 2013, again with potential european replication.
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11 skIlls And educAtIon
Our definition of the creative economy emphasises its reliance on creative talent as the 
primary source of value. It follows that a growing creative economy needs an expanding 
creative workforce. In fact, we know that growth in the demand for skilled creative workers 
in the UK’s wider economy has outstripped that even in the creative industries in recent 
years.543 We also know from a long body of research on technology adoption and skills 
that information and communication technologies (ICTs) complement the non–routine 
problem–solving and complex communications tasks that are associated with creativity.544 
Separately, there is evidence that firms also reap greater benefits from ICT investments 
when they have stronger management practices.545 
This suggests that creative, ICT and management skills are three core ingredients of a 
thriving creative economy. 
Historically, the UK has benefited from an education system that has been reasonably well 
disposed towards producing talent with this skills mix, at least in the first two areas; it has 
had art and design schools which place emphasis on allowing individuals to pursue their 
own ideas alongside the development of their technical skills, strong university computing 
departments, and a long tradition of vocational training in key craft areas.546 Where 
demand has outstripped supply, the UK has been able to rely – at least until recently – on 
attracting skilled talent from overseas, enabled by a relatively permissive immigration 
policy.547 
But today, in the UK there is an alarming mismatch between the supply and demand for 
creative skills, with severe skills shortages precisely in the Internet–related areas where UK 
businesses need to compete. This includes the technical skills needed to use digital content 
creation tools and to design digital platforms, the management skills to implement new 
production processes based on iterative learning and data, and the entrepreneurship skills 
to give birth to the next generation of start–ups that will shake up Internet markets.548
Nesta gathered very clear evidence of this problem in its Next Gen skills review led by 
Ian Livingstone and Alex Hope, in 2010, when more than half the video games and visual 
effects companies surveyed reported difficulties in filling entry–level positions: employers 
identified vacancies for people with technical skills, expertise in digital platforms, and 
management and production skills as particularly hard to fill.549 The strong backing for the 
review’s recommendations from the likes of Google, BT, Facebook, The Guardian and Talk 
Talk confirmed that these concerns went well beyond the video games and visual effects 
industries. 
Consistent with this, a 2010 survey by Creative Skillset, the Sector Skills Council for the 
creative media industries, showed that 56 per cent of interactive media companies – 
including those in mobile content, Internet protocol TV and social media – struggled to find 
candidates with the right creative team–working, software and management skills.550 
Compounding these problems in recruiting new talent, creative employers also face gaps in 
the skills of those they currently employ. For example, one–third of video games companies 
surveyed for Next Gen reported that their workforce needed an upgrade in its skills. Over 
a quarter of the interactive media companies surveyed by Creative Skillset revealed skills 
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gaps in their workforce. And a third of digital entertainment companies in Brighton’s digital 
cluster say that a lack of management skills in their workforce creates significant barriers to 
growth.551
This picture of severe skills shortages and gaps is also echoed in creative industries that are 
not ‘born digital’, such as film, publishing and advertising. There, disruptive technologies 
have also given rise to new skills needs. As Creative Skillset’s report, Labour Market 
Intelligence for the Film Industry points out, “A key skills gap for the future, common for 
the film industry, is new and digital technology and particularly managing the change from 
traditional to digital media.”552 In 2009, 46 per cent of advertising companies surveyed 
by Creative and Cultural Skills reported skills gaps in their workforce. More recently, 
advertising employers have also complained of shortages in multi–platform skills.553 A 
worrying two–thirds of publishing companies surveyed by Creative Skillset in 2011 reported 
gaps in the sales and marketing skills of their workforce, and half mentioned shortcomings 
in their employees’ technical skills in areas like computer programming and web design. 
More than a third complained about a lack of business and leadership skills.554
The evidence is beyond doubt: digitisation has exposed creative, technical and 
management–related skills deficiencies in the UK’s creative workforce that demand urgent 
attention if its creative businesses are in the future to succeed in Internet markets. 
In this chapter, we consider in more detail the needs of today’s and tomorrow’s creative 
workforce and propose remedies to deal with blockages. 
1. the right stuff: attitudes, skills and knowledge requirements of a  
 high–quality creative workforce
Creativity is sometimes described less as a skill and more as an attitude or way of thinking. 
This echoes the ‘interpretative’ innovation capability outlined by Richard Lester and 
Michael Piore at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.555 They describe this as a 
willingness to try new things and to embrace ambiguity, which relates to our discussion in 
Chapter Three about the importance of meeting customers’ differentiated needs in a way 
that cannot be precisely expressed in advance. 
But they also stress the importance of brokering ideas across disciplinary boundaries: 
interpretative innovation involves exploration with a wide variety of collaborators which is 
“more appropriate when the possible outcomes are unknown – when the task is to create 
those outcomes.”556 Thus, we can view the creative process as multi–disciplinary and one 
with entrepreneurship at its heart.557 Study after study shows that even the most original, 
surprising and radical creative outputs involve the synthesis of ideas from domains, 
creative fields or disciplines further afield.558 
Posing unexpected questions and sketching possible answers, however, are by themselves 
not enough: craft and technical skills are needed to realise most creative ideas. This might 
be designing and implementing the features for a web service or video game, or writing 
the brief for an advertisement, shooting a film or producing an album. Although many 
of these skills build on theoretical knowledge (e.g. mathematics in the case of computer 
programming or ergonomics in the case of design), they also involve an important tacit 
element that cannot be taught in abstract, instead requiring ‘learning by doing’ in real–
world situations.559 When applying their craft skills this way, creative professionals build 
upon existing knowledge, learn quickly and think originally to address new problems and 
explore unexpected creative avenues.560
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Multitudes of different crafts skills and disciplines come together to generate creative 
products.561 Even making a short film usually involves dozens of specialist crafts, from 
scriptwriting and photography to acting and visual effects production. Video games 
studios bring together computer programmers, digital artists and designers. This 
means that creative professionals need strong ‘soft skills,’ including team working and 
communication, to collaborate with colleagues from other disciplines, and to perform 
effectively as part of project teams that come together for a limited period of time to 
deliver a film, a music album or an advertising campaign. 
In this intensely multi–disciplinary environment, professionals with the right fusion of 
creative and technical knowledge and skills are at a high premium. Alex Hope, Managing 
Director of Visual Effects studio Double Negative, describes his dream hire as someone 
with ‘Double Maths, Physics and Art’ A–levels.562 In a similar vein, video games studio Valve 
exclaims in its Handbook for New Employees that “Engineers: coding is only the beginning; 
Non–engineers: program or be programmed.”563 The continued growth of embedded 
creative jobs outside the creative industries adds another dimension to this required multi–
disciplinarity. 
Managers of creative businesses these days are required to have particularly strong 
project management skills, given the scale and complexity of many creative projects. The 
production of the blockbuster video game Assassins Creed III, for instance, involved more 
than 600 developers working across seven studios in America, Europe and Asia.564 And 
visual effects companies now have asset pipelines spanning the globe – when work finishes 
in one part of the world, it starts immediately in another. Live shows deploying advanced 
visual effects are at the heart of the very large and growing Chinese market for public 
festivals and globally for corporate events; firms serving these markets have learned their 
trade in the music and theatrical performance businesses.565 
As with all businesses, general business skills – accounting, finance, planning and marketing 
– are also an essential part of the mix. Historically, there have been some concerns about 
the quality of these business skills in the UK’s creative industries. Surveys have suggested 
that worryingly large numbers of UK creative businesses lack even basic business planning 
skills.566 
Last but not least, successful creative careers are built upon adaptability – a crucial quality 
for learning. As the American designer Charles Eames put it, long before the turbulence of 
the digital era: “if nothing else, a student must get from his training a feeling of security in 
change.”567 
Why this adaptability is essential now should be clear from the impact that digital 
technologies have had on what is required from creative workers, which in some cases has 
caused wholly new occupations to emerge, and rendered others obsolete. Animation, film, 
television production have all, for example, been transformed by Computer–Generated 
Imagery (CGI). Changes in business models and the reconfiguration of creative value 
chains have forced creative firms to acquire new capabilities and skills in areas as wide–
ranging as software development, community support, ‘Big Data’ and the management of 
virtual economies. In the analogue age, most content businesses had only to worry about 
producing great creative content, and left the commercialisation to their publishers. But 
with digital technologies, many are now learning how to market, publish and distribute by 
themselves, with a geographic horizon extending across continents.
The Internet and digital technologies also offer new opportunities, venues and modes 
for learning for creative professionals. Hyper Island, set up in Sweden in 1994, but with a 
global presence today, offers experiential learning.568 More recently, there has been a surge 
of ‘Massive Open Online Courses’ (MOOC) such as those provided by Coursera, EdX and 
Udacity. Although MOOCs have their critics,569 they open up lectures from prestigious 
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universities to global audiences, while providing interactive testing facilities and forums 
for group discussion. In January 2013, Coursera already boasted 2.4 million users and 214 
courses (including in subjects like ‘Creative Programming for Digital Media’, ‘Gamification’, 
and ‘Digital Sound Design’) from universities like Georgia Tech, Duke and Princeton.570 In 
December 2012, the UK’s Open University announced FutureLearn, a MOOC provider in 
partnership with 12 UK universities.571 
Stack Overflow, a ‘question and answers’ site mostly focused on computer programming, 
is another prominent example of an online innovation with the potential to overhaul how 
creative professionals acquire and update their skills.572 And then there are the plethora 
of affordable production tools, in some cases open source, and in others commercially 
developed but freely available for non–commercial activities (such as games engine Unity 
3D), which budding and veteran creative professionals can use to learn new skills and 
improve existing ones. 
2. why are the skills needs of the creative industries not being met?
Where are the weaknesses in the UK’s providers of education and training to explain the 
alarming picture that opened this chapter? 
schools
Schools teach young people ‘core’ knowledge and skills that act as a gateway, foundation 
and spur to further learning. They also provide information and inspiration about potential 
careers, helping students choose the right subjects to pursue in secondary school and 
through further and higher education. Are they currently doing this in a way that reflects 
the needs of the creative economy? We do not believe that they are – either in terms of 
what is being taught or how it’s being taught. 
Over the last decade England’s primary schools have been required to focus on teaching 
core subjects like English, science and mathematics on the grounds that without 
satisfactory performance in these areas, pupils will be at a lifelong disadvantage in terms 
of their platform for building other forms of knowledge and skills. One consequence of 
this focus, however, is that other subjects also vital to the creative economy have become 
optional appendices to the school curriculum. These subjects have included computer 
science, design & technology, and art. 
We are delighted that Michael Gove has belatedly responded to the Next Gen Skills 
campaign by agreeing to include a GCSE in computer science in the English Baccalaureate, 
which since 2010 has been used to measure and signal the performance of English schools, 
and therefore shapes schools’ incentives to invest and prioritise its resources.573 But we 
believe the continued exclusion of art and design and technology is a significant threat to 
the UK’s creative economy. 
Mr Gove’s decision on art and design & technology has been challenged by three Reviews – 
Next Gen, Restarting Britain (produced by the Design Commission)574 and the independent 
Review of Cultural Education by Darren Henley.575
Next Gen’s recommendation that art be included in the English Baccalaureate was 
developed further in the Henley Review as part of a comprehensive programme of change 
in the provision of arts and cultural education in schools.576 Although Ministers responded 
warmly to the review’s less important points, they ignored its central thrust, to the dismay 
of groups campaigning for a stronger commitment to creative subjects at the core of 
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the English education system.577 There were similar concerns that the Government was 
not heeding the warnings of the Design Commission’s call for design education not to be 
sidelined in schools.578
These critiques of government policy are today shared by the Creative Industries Council 
Skillset Skills Group, which brings together figures from across the creative industries and 
which in January 2012 made a series of recommendations to the UK Government’s Creative 
Industries Council. The group observed that: “much of the curriculum and teaching in 
schools has become too focused on what can be easily taught and examined rather than 
what gives children and young people the deep skills and emotional connection to a subject 
on which they can build.” It argued for a more balanced multi–disciplinary approach to 
the curriculum, one which combines the “artistic interests, technological innovation and 
entrepreneurial energy which is so distinctive of the UK’s creative and digital industries and 
which underpins its competitive advantage.”579
This concern with the way students are assessed and the need for a more ‘fused’ artistic, 
technology and entrepreneurial education brings us to problems with how subjects are 
taught in schools. In his 2011 MacTaggart Lecture at the Edinburgh International Television 
Festival, Google’s Executive Chairman, Eric Schmidt criticised the UK’s education system 
for forcing young people to specialise too soon in either STEM or arts and humanities 
subjects, thus reinforcing the gap between the ‘two cultures’ identified by C.P. Snow more 
than 50 years earlier. This premature specialism, he argued, diminished the UK’s ability to 
educate the ‘polymaths’ who have one foot in digital technology and the other in design 
and the arts that the creative economy needs. Next Gen had, for example, gathered 
survey evidence that young people, presented with this dichotomy, were being fooled into 
thinking that they didn’t need to acquire hard science qualifications in order to pursue a 
career in high–tech creative industries.580
Schools are also being criticised for failing to harness the pedagogical potential of digital 
technologies in the classroom (or failing to provide evidence of this) despite substantial 
cash investments.581 The sheer pace of technological change has created a chasm between 
those who design and deliver the curriculum and those who receive it – the first generation 
to grow up in a world with pervasive Internet access, and as such, often more proficient 
with digital technologies than their teachers.582 This has led to calls for a more imaginative 
deployment of technology in the classroom.583 A recent international review by Nesta 
uncovered over 200 examples of digital innovation in education and concluded that while 
“digital technology offers enormous potential to transform learning”, there had been too 
great an emphasis on kit in the classroom and too little consideration of learning aims and 
teacher capabilities. (Box 11.1) The relatively slow technology uptake in UK schools, this 
study argued, also reflects a widespread lack of confidence about managing the ‘dark side’ 
risks involved in embedding digital technologies within schools.
Box 11.1: creative technology in education 
Nesta’s Decoding Learning report uncovers many international examples of innovative 
use of digital technology in educational settings, but concludes that too often the 
interest is driven by technology rather than learning outcomes. The report calls 
for greater connection between researchers examining the use of technology 
and assessing outcomes, the firms that develop technologies and applications for 
learning, and the teachers themselves. 
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While it is difficult to identify a single nation that has fully harnessed the potential 
of digital technologies in educational settings, there are lessons to be learned from 
ongoing initiatives and programmes across the world. 
iZone is a community of innovative new york schools committed to delivering more 
personalised learning to their students. New technology is central to the approach, 
but the starting point is always the learning needs of the students. Participant schools 
identify their key learning challenges, pilot and evaluate the impact of innovations on 
student achievement and actively share their findings with teachers and educational 
technology developers. There is a strong focus on online and blended (that is, 
online and face–to–face) learning, and on combining different learning modes in the 
classroom – such as live teacher–led instruction, collaborative learning, self–directed 
learning (sometimes using bespoke software solutions) and virtual tutors. 
Maths students at the school of one (also in new york) begin each day in front 
of a large screen that generates a ‘playlist’ of activities for that day. This is a highly 
tailored learning programme generated by computer algorithms that take account 
both of the learning stage of each student and their preferred learning style. So, 
for example, a student who responds well to computer–mediated learning might 
start with a range of computer–based tasks, while another may go for one–to–one 
tutoring with a teacher. The model reduces the time that teachers need to spend on 
administration, freeing up time to get to know the students better. Evidence from 
a summer school pilot suggested that students following the School of One model 
learned maths faster. 
In singapore, the education system is highly centralised and the use of educational 
technologies is controlled by the Government. Educational products need to comply 
with Ministry of Education guidelines on learning outcomes, and their developers 
work very closely with teachers and schools to pilot products before they can 
be launched in the market. The perception is that this close connection between 
developers and teachers helps adapt technologies to the classroom. Schools are also 
allowed to proceed at their own pace when adopting these new technologies. Some 
make only minimal use of new technologies while others are far more involved. 
Bearing this in mind, one of the educational platforms more widely used in Singapore 
schools is LEAD. It includes interactive tutorials, games, exploration activities, and 
assessments in all subject areas, and allows teachers to create customised learning 
packages that can be assigned to students online. Teachers can also include 
resources such as youTube videos, chat capability, links to websites, Google Docs, 
and files they have created. They can also track students’ progress online. 
New digital technologies can empower students to take greater responsibility 
for their own learning, shifting away from conventional ‘broadcast’, linear models 
of education. the orestad Gymnasium in copenhagen uses a broad range of 
technologies to do just that, giving students a high degree of autonomy over where 
and when they work, and over how they demonstrate their learning. Podcasts, for 
example, are used to combine text, sound and narration and help less confident 
students demonstrate their abilities in areas like languages without the pressures of 
a traditional classroom environment. Smart phones are used as tools in lessons and 
the school’s virtual learning environment allows students to upload their work for 
assessment. 
This flexible approach is also reflected in the design of school facilities, with large 
open areas for collaborative working. Students are to a large extent in charge of their 
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own learning and teachers adopt more of a mentoring role. The school has achieved 
impressive results. Despite the fact that almost half of the students at Orestad come 
from families with no history of further education, the school achieves results on par 
with national averages in terms of progress to further and higher education.
Sources: Nesta (2012) ‘Decoding Learning: The Proof, Promise and Potential of Digital Education.’ [online] 
London: NESTA. Available at: http://www.nesta.org.uk/areas_of_work/public_services_lab/digital_
education/assets/features/decoding_learning_report. Accessed 28 January 2013.
The Daily Riff (2012) ‘E–Learning in Singapore: Where Teachers are Involved in Product Development.’ 
[online] Available at: http://www.thedailyriff.com/articles/e–learning–in–singapore–where–teachers–are–
involved–in–product–development–927.php [Accessed Feb 2013].
The net result of all these shortcomings is that young people find themselves living in a 
digital world whilst receiving their education in analogue schools.
Education policy is, of course, a devolved matter and school systems across the UK differ in 
important ways. While examinations remain a critical focus and the main vehicle for young 
people’s progression into tertiary education and the workplace in the nations as much as in 
England, there are signs of unease with the limitations of rigid, subject–based curricula. In 
Scotland, the Curriculum for Excellence584 represents a significant shift in school education 
policy, and an attempt to move away from past focus on narrow subject domains towards 
a cross–curricular and inter–disciplinary approach. The Curriculum focuses on developing 
four capacities in learners – successful learners, confident individuals, responsible citizens 
and effective contributors – and places strong emphasis on cross–cutting themes such as 
enterprise and creativity, along with new forms of continuous assessment. It is a wholesale 
and bold reshaping of education policy and practice, the impacts of which will not be fully 
observable for a generation, and is not without challenges in its implementation.585 
In Wales, the Welsh Baccalaureate (introduced in 2003) is more broadly drawn than its 
proposed English equivalent, but Wales is struggling with what appears to be a structural 
loss of relative achievement in numeracy and literacy, according to the PISA international 
assessments, and shares other weaknesses of the current system in England.586
Education policy in Northern Ireland has been less radical than in Scotland and is closer 
to that of England and Wales. All schools in Northern Ireland follow the Northern Ireland 
Curriculum which is based on the National Curriculum used in England and Wales. 
Currently there are proposals to reform the curriculum to make its emphasis more skills–
based in an attempt to reform the system and address persistent issues of inequality. These 
reforms, however, propose little to address the concerns voiced by the Creative Industries 
Council Skillset Skills Group. 
Higher education
The UK’s creative industries are a relatively big employer of university graduates – the 
proportion of graduates in their workforce being much higher than the UK average. So, 
57 per cent of the creative media workforce holds a degree, compared with 37 per cent 
for the workforce as a whole.587 This is particularly the case in ‘high tech’, digital creative 
sectors – around three–quarters of the workforce in sectors like video games, visual effects 
and interactive media have at least an undergraduate degree, and substantial numbers also 
have postgraduate qualifications (25 per cent in games, 33 per cent in visual effects and 36 
per cent in interactive media). 
Universities produce enormous numbers of graduates from courses that are described as 
relevant to the creative economy. In its assessment of skills supply for the creative media 
industries, Creative Skillset identified 18,250 ‘relevant’ courses in UK Higher Education 
institutions in 2008/2009.588 Next Gen argued that there was in fact a large oversupply of 
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graduates to the video games and visual effects industries – in 2009 alone, for example, 
video games specialist courses in the UK produced just under 1,600 graduates, equivalent 
to around 15 per cent of the whole workforce at the time. It has also been reported that 
there is an oversupply of talent seeking employment in sectors like music and publishing.589
This raises the obvious question: why, if there is a healthy – even excess – supply of 
graduates from courses that are seemingly relevant for the creative industries, do we see 
so many creative companies reporting skills shortages and difficulties filling vacancies? 
Put simply, the evidence suggests that most universities haven’t been producing the kind of 
talent that the creative industries demand. We see this in the poor employment outcomes 
of graduates from creative media specialist degrees evidenced in Next Gen (only 12 per 
cent of those graduating from games courses secured employment in the industry within 
six months of leaving university) and other studies (e.g. only 17.5 per cent of graduates 
from the University of Glamorgan’s School of Creative and Cultural Industries gained 
employment in the creative sector within nine months of graduation).590 
Next Gen also showed that video games and visual effects companies preferred to recruit 
from courses other than creative media (for example, from computer science, mathematics 
and physics courses), and even from overseas. The views of graduates currently working 
in these industries gathered through Next Gen’s Talent Survey were not positive either – 
over a third of respondents working in the sector said that they now recognised that their 
course lacked industry–relevant skills.591
Some responsibility for this must lie with industry, which has in the main failed to specify or 
communicate its recruitment needs in a timely manner; perhaps partly as a consequence 
of creative business cultures which, as the Creative Skillset Skills Working Group pointedly 
notes, emphasise “celebration and showcasing rather than systematically investing in 
increasing competitiveness.”592 
But UK universities must also share some of the blame. They have been accused of being 
insufficiently responsive towards the needs of their students or to industry’s, partly 
because they have lacked the incentives to do so. In the past, prospective students have 
not been given sufficient information about what will be taught in creative courses, about 
whether what is being taught will help them gain creative employment, and about the 
eventual performance of graduates in the creative labour market. From an economics 
standpoint, uninformed buyers have made for opportunistic sellers, most visibly through 
‘bums on seats’ policies that have put numbers of students above the quality of their 
learning experiences (or eventually, the skills they bring to the workplace). 
This view is echoed by the Creative Industries Council Skillset Skills Working Group, which 
believes that there are too many ill–informed students chasing too many ill–defined degree 
courses: “As the costs of higher education rise, it is increasingly important that prospective 
students and parents are able to differentiate and make informed choices about courses 
and institutions.”593 In November 2012, Creative Skillset announced a pilot scheme funded 
by the UK Commission of Skills & Employment to increase the numbers of accredited 
courses (and therefore, increase the levels of information in the creative education 
market). The resulting Creative Skillset ‘Tick’ scheme has led to the accreditation of 96 
courses in areas such as publishing, computer graphics, advertising, film, media business/
entrepreneurship, and art and design, and the scheme is now being rolled out.594
But there are further structural barriers in the way of a better match between what 
universities can offer and what creative businesses need. Foremost, and as we have 
discussed, the vast majority of creative businesses are small, and lack the people and 
time to help universities design curricula that are relevant to their needs. Second, the 
rapid pace of change in technologies and creative markets calls for a degree of agility 
in education provision that most universities simply do not have. As a consequence, not 
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only do universities lack the information to address the needs of creative businesses, 
but even if they had, it is not clear if they would be able to adapt as these needs change 
(say, by redesigning their curricula or by acquiring – in some cases expensive – new 
technologies).595 It has been estimated that approving and accrediting new university 
qualifications can take anything up to 2–3 years: as the Creative Skillset Skills Working 
Group notes, “this may be acceptable for a degree in History, but not for a Masters in 
Interactive Media Design.”596 
There are also questions about the ability of most UK universities to teach those practice–
based skills related to craft knowledge, team working and entrepreneurialism that we 
earlier argued were so important to the creative economy. Although there are some 
excellent examples of ‘work–based’ simulation programmes in the UK such as the Dare 
to be Digital competition organised by the University of Abertay at Dundee (where 
multi–disciplinary student teams produce a games prototype which is then assessed by 
industry), the organisational structure of universities (arranged along disciplinary lines), 
and institutional inertias (also connected to the difficulties of assessing teams as compared 
to individuals) create barriers to the wider adoption of work–based learning models in 
universities. 
The exceptions here may be in the arts and design schools across the UK and where key 
attributes of creativity – independence, problem solving and collaborative working – are 
inherent to studio–based learning.597 More could be learned from these experiences, but 
British higher education institutions do not seem to be very good at learning from each 
other.
Some of these frustrations formed relevant context for the Browne Review of Higher 
Education Funding in England598 and the subsequent measures announced in the 2011 
Higher Education White Paper,599 which appear to proceed from exasperation with regard 
to the creativity in education agenda by explicitly prioritising STEM subjects. While the 
importance of science, technology, engineering and mathematics to the UK’s creative 
economy cannot be disputed, the false opposition between STEM and creativity that this 
reinforces is unhelpful both to the interests of the creative economy, and of the UK more 
generally. 
The shifts in higher education policy embodied in the Browne reforms have not, thus far, 
been mirrored everywhere in the devolved nations. While STEM is an area of focus across 
the UK, Scotland has maintained a strong commitment to creative education, and has not 
withdrawn public funding support from the range of subjects that have been affected in 
England. The Scottish Government also made clear its commitment to creative education 
in its response to the changing fee regime in England.600 This level of ongoing commitment 
to creative education is, however, less evident in Northern Ireland and Wales. 
vocational education and continuous professional development
Although Further Education colleges, and other forms of vocational education, particularly 
apprenticeships, could act as channels for the structured acquisition of practical skills that 
universities don’t seem so well geared to provide, take–up by the creative industries has 
in the past been low – less than 1 per cent of creative media companies, for example, have 
ever offered a formal apprenticeship.601 
Creative businesses’ preference for university graduates over those from vocational 
education is in some cases explained by the high levels of skills they require. The 
perception that apprenticeships focus on ‘lower level’ skills may have been intensified 
by the lack, until very recently, of ‘Higher Apprenticeships’ providing skills at the 
undergraduate degree or Masters equivalent and with a creative focus. Structural features 
of the creative economy – including the predominance of micro businesses, their reliance 
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on project–based work, and the popularity of (mostly unpaid) internships (a culture which 
Creative and Cultural Skills and New Deal of the Mind are attempting to address through 
2,000 paid internships in its Arts Council–funded Internship Academy),602 creates further 
barriers to the recruitment of apprentices. 
A supply of Continuous Professional Development (CPD) options is also important to 
keep the skills of the creative workforce fresh in the face of continued and rapid changes 
in technologies and markets. However, the market for CPD presents some coordination 
problems and externalities which are exacerbated in the case of the creative economy and 
that may give rise to market failure – in particular, if creative firms under–invest in training 
their employees because of the risk that, once trained, these employees will move on with 
their newly acquired skills.603 High levels of uncertainty in creative markets, and the reliance 
on freelancers in some sectors, also reduce the incentives to invest heavily in employee 
CPD.604 
In its report to the Creative Industries Council in January 2012, the Creative Skillset 
Skills Working Group put forward a portfolio of initiatives to increase the visibility and 
attractiveness of apprenticeships for creative SMEs, and improve the skills of the creative 
workforce, as well as its managers and leaders.605 
3. conclusions
Tomorrow’s creative economy will require an even richer fusion than today’s of knowledge 
and skills from individuals who are comfortable working across the boundaries of 
established disciplines. At all levels in the education system, from school curriculum design 
to university–business links, the lamb of the arts and humanities must lie down with the 
lions of digital technology and computer science. 
In schools, a major implication is that rigorous GCSEs in both art and in design & 
technology should be included in the English Baccalaureate. 
Schools should also think hard about how they can harness the potential of digital 
technologies across the curriculum. Nesta’s Decoding Learning report suggests that they 
need to pay more careful attention to the ways in which they deploy technology in the 
classroom. New opportunities in this area open up everyday. The affordable Raspberry 
Pi computer, which has sold a million units since it was launched in February 2012, allows 
for low–cost experimentation.606 Nesta’s Digital Makers programme is campaigning for, 
and supporting, intiatives which encourage young people to engage more creatively 
with digital technologies in informal settings. Google’s announcement of its three–year 
partnership with Teach First aimed at improving the quality of science and technology 
teaching in schools in challenging circumstances is another encouraging development 
(though it is taking longer than it should to roll this out across the whole of the United 
Kingdom).607
More challenging, but no less pressing, we need to revisit Sir Ken Robinson’s contention in 
All our Futures that, as currently provided, formal education “militates against the creative 
forces of curiosity, imagination, and intuition.”608 Do we think he is wrong? Or have we 
become so dispirited that we cannot bear to ask the question?
The situation beyond schools is arguably more encouraging. Steps are currently being 
taken to improve the situation in universities as well as vocational education and training. 
As part of the Higher Education reforms following the Browne review, prospective 
university students are being provided with a ‘Key Information Set’ which includes the 
employment outcomes of previous graduates and course indicators of industry relevance 
such as the ‘Tick’ kitemark developed by Creative Skillset.609 
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The UK’s universities and other educational providers should be further encouraged to offer 
courses which equip students with the craft and technical, but also the soft and commercial 
skills that the creative economy needs. This requires tackling the institutional inertias and 
risk aversion that keep them from following successful examples of work–based simulation 
(and entrepreneurship generation) like Abertay’s Dare to be Digital competition. Alacrity, an 
innovative scheme based in Newport, South Wales, is an example of the genre – in this case 
at post–graduate level.610 There is much to be said for introducing greater competition for 
universities in these areas, by raising the prestige of creative industries apprenticeships, for 
example (as Creative Skillset has started doing), and exploring a potentially expanded role 
for private training providers in the creative labour market. 
On the vocational education and training side, the government has carried out substantial 
investments in industry–led initiatives to improve the skills of the creative workforce. This 
includes £4.7 million towards the ‘Creative Catalyst’ online platform that will aggregate 
demand for training services from creative businesses and encourage them to share 
information and skills with each other.611 In addition to this, the Employer Ownership Skills 
Pilot (EOSP) fund to encourage the private sector to invest in the skills of its workforce 
has funded bids from sectors like textiles,612 broadcasting613 and music614 to the tune of 
£13 million, and the Treasury has announced that £6 million will be made available in 
training for video games, high–end TV productions, film and animation to accompany 
the new development tax credit, subject to industry co–funding, as well as a contribution 
(announced in the 2013 Budget) of £10 million in match funding over the next two year to 
the Skills Investment Fund (SIF) to support skills development in digital content sectors.615 
One of the EOSP pilots being funded is the BBC and Channel Four’s ‘Open Channels’, 
which aims to improve production and technology skills – and increase diversity – across 
the broadcasting value chain. As part of this initiative, the BBC will offer over a hundred 
apprenticeships providing advanced technology skills.616 There is scope for the BBC and 
other broadcasters with strong digital competences to help develop the capabilities and 
skills of creative businesses such as digital media and games, as a long–term investment in 
value chains they will rely on increasingly in years to come.
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) provide another route to much needed competitive 
disruption, so long as careful attention is paid to quality and understanding the student 
experience. The UK’s creative economy has great potential to gain from exploiting those 
opportunities in order to develop relevant workforce knowledge and skills. Imagine, 
for example, if online courses on cutting–edge digital techniques were provided by the 
country’s leading institutions, or courses that fused technology and creative disciplines 
across different departments or even universities. Or that low–cost courses were available 
which offered innovative ‘blends’ of online lectures and digital practice, making use of 
affordable content production tools. There may be scope here for an alliance between the 
UK’s creative industries and FutureLearn, the MOOC platform that was recently announced 
by the Open University in partnership with 12 other universities, to ensure that the right 
online courses for creative businesses are available.617 
proposAl ten
Governments across the uk should make a schools digital pledge, designed to 
ensure that the school curriculum, including its representation in the english 
Baccalaureate, brings together art, design, technology and computer science and 
that young people are able to enjoy greater opportunities to work creatively with 
technologies, both in and out of school. steps should also be taken to address 
the disconnect between what uk creative businesses need from graduates and 
what universities are teaching them. Measures to improve the quality of graduate 
employment data made available to prospective applicants for creative courses 
(including industry–approved course kitemarks) should be extended.
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ten recommendations
proposAl one
the Government should adopt our proposed new definitions of the creative 
industries and the wider creative economy. these are simple, robust and recognise 
the central role of digital technologies.
proposAl two
policymakers should establish a ‘creative innovation system’ framework within which 
strategic priorities can be addressed in a coherent and effective manner.
proposAl tHree
the Government should make r&d tax relief more accessible to creative businesses. 
technology strategy Board programmes should be further broadened to address 
the needs of the creative economy. public procurement rules should be changed to 
open up opportunities for smaller digital firms. cross–disciplinary research council 
knowledge exchange initiatives should be rigorously evaluated and the lessons 
applied in a further round of investment. More international collaborations with 
leading research centres should be encouraged.
proposAl four
local policymakers should observe our seven–point guide for developing creative 
clusters.
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proposAl fIve
Government should ensure that its generic business finance schemes do not 
discriminate against creative businesses, and that regulations help the development 
of financial Internet platforms (such as crowdfunding sites). Absent hard evidence 
on their efficacy, government should resist introducing new sector–specific finance 
programmes. A higher priority is to coordinate the collection and publication of 
investor–friendly data through the creative Industries council, thus supporting the 
development of a thicker market for risk finance.
proposAl sIx
the treasury and the dcMs should undertake a broad–based assessment of the 
value of public arts and cultural spending in the uk, drawing upon similar work on 
the natural environment and the cultural value project of the Arts and Humanities 
research council. funding decisions should be justified in the light of criteria that 
emerge from this work. 
proposAl seven
funders should incentivise experimentation with digital technologies by arts and 
cultural organisations and allocate a sustained percentage of their resources to 
digital r&d, ensuring that the evidence arising from this work is openly shared. 
under its new leadership, the BBc should publish in 2013 a strategy to reflect its 
digital public purpose in the period to 2018, not least through the ambitious vehicle 
of its digital public space initiative.
proposAl eIGHt
ofcom should be given powers to gather information in all Internet markets in order 
to maximise the chances of sound and timely judgments about the emergence of 
potentially abusive market power and other market concerns (an ‘early warning 
system’). ofcom should contribute a regularly updated strategic overview of these 
issues, working closely with the Information commissioner’s office, the Intellectual 
property office, the competition and Markets Authority and other relevant 
agencies. ofcom’s remit should be broadened to advise the Government on the 
actions needed to ensure the uk enjoys a flourishing, open Internet, balancing the 
interests of consumers and citizens and committed to supporting innovation and 
growth. these changes should be a central feature in any communications Bill 
planned for 2013/14.
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proposAl nIne
uk copyright rules and exceptions should be re–balanced, along the lines proposed 
by the uk Government, and also at the european level as part of the drive for a 
european digital single Market. A new mechanism for enabling vastly increased and 
more efficient rights licensing transactions (through the proposed copyright Hub) 
should be further developed during 2013, again with potential european replication.
proposAl ten
Governments across the uk should make a schools digital pledge, designed to 
ensure that the school curriculum, including its representation in the english 
Baccalaureate, brings together art, design, technology and computer science and 
that young people are able to enjoy greater opportunities to work creatively with 
technologies, both in and out of school. steps should also be taken to address 
the disconnect between what uk creative businesses need from graduates and 
what universities are teaching them. Measures to improve the quality of graduate 
employment data made available to prospective applicants for creative courses 
(including industry–approved course kitemarks) should be extended.
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